Articles by alphabetic order
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
 Ā Ī Ñ Ś Ū Ö Ō
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0


Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples

From Chinese Buddhist Encyclopedia
Jump to navigation Jump to search



Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples

India-China-Tibet-Japan

Hajime Nakamura

Revised English Translation Edited by Philip P. Wiener </poem> University of Hawaii Press books are printed on acid-free paper and meet the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Council on Library Resources

FOREWORD

The appearance of a revised English edition of Professor Nakamura's work will be warmly welcomed by scholars and by laymen who seek to understand the complex societies of Asia with whose destinies the West is ever more intimately involved. It is surely appropriate that this should be the first major publication of the East-West Center at the University of Hawaii, for Mr. Nakamura is concerned with two problems that are crucial for the development of better mutual understanding between East and West.

The first of these problems is the identification in some meaningful way of the "East" and the "West." How may one define such entities, and how may systematic comparisons be made that will bring into bold relief basic differences and similarities? In the four and a half centuries from the European discovery" of Asia to the present period of intensified culture contact, Europeans and Asians alike have learned all too little about each other. False antitheses and monolithic comparisons have persisted from one generation to the next; knowledge is difficult to attain, understanding is more so, and resort to cliché generalization proves irresistible. In recent times some of these clichés have been dressed up in new jargons so that thousands of unwary readers have been led to believe that they were being given new magic keys that would open the door to the "Oriental mind," "Oriental logic" or what-not. But the keys opened doors into dream worlds inhabited only by clichés and phantasies.

Professor Nakamura sweeps aside this flotsam and sets out to analyze, with rigor and objectivity, the characteristic thought-patterns of four Asian peoples as these are revealed in their languages, their logic, and their cultural products.

In this analysis he speaks neither of an "Oriental mind" nor of an undifferentiated "West." Rather he speaks of the Indians, the Chinese, the Tibetans, and the Japanese out of solid understanding of their distinctive cultures and histories. And when he speaks of the West, it is with full awareness of the mutiplicity of traditions that have contributed to Western civilization. He seems to me to demonstrate the level of understanding that can be reached once we transcend the ancient myth of the "East" and the "West" as monoliths.

The second major problem dealt with in this study is equally relevant

to the need for mutual understanding between the peoples of Asia and the West. Mr. Nakamura poses it this way: It is clear that no people in the world today is isolated from those world-wide movements of thought and belief that everywhere tend to transform men's lives and the values they live by. Yet each people is engaged, consciously and unconsciously, in selecting among the manifold influences which reach them and then of adapting and modifying those elements which they select. What governs this process and how does it come about that out of it cultures emerge which are amalgams—certain elements of them being native and distinctive, others clearly derived from one or another world-wide movement? Mr. Nakamura believes that there are clues to this process in the long history of Buddhism which began and evolved in India and then invaded, one by one, all the historic societies of Central, East, and Southeast Asia. Indians, Chinese, Tibetans, and Japanese were continuously engaged in selecting and adapting elements from the evolving tradition of Buddhism. The ways in which they did this reveal certain long-continuing and distinctive modes of thought, certain key values and attitudes which governed the scope of the borrowing and the process of adapting Buddhist ideas. These peoples' experience with Buddhism, when properly understood, in turn helps to explain their differences one from another and their widely variant responses to Western culture in our time. This is the great theme to which Mr. Nakamura addresses himself in this volume.

The magnitude of this study, involving as it does four civilizations, four literary traditions, two and a half millenia of history, and a host of analytical problems, inevitably directs attention to its author. What sort of man is he and under what circumstances did he conceive and carry through this impressive work? Mr. Nakamura completed the original Japanese version of his study in 1947 when he was in his middle thirties. Portions of the work in its early stages were developed as part of a broader project on language and culture headed by Professor Kichinosuke Ito, but the scope and method of the book are distinctively Mr. Nakamura's own. He graduated from Tokyo Imperial University in 1936 and received the degree of Doctor of Letters (Bungaku Hakase) in 1943. In 1957 he was awarded the Imperial Prize of the Academy of Japan for his four-volume history of early Vedanta * philosophy. Since 1954 he has been Professor of Indian and Buddhist Philosophy at the University of Tokyo.

Professor Nakamura was trained at Tokyo University in Indian and Buddhist studies—fields which necessarily involved him in the study of the cultures and the Buddhist traditions of China, Tibet, and Japan. In the course of this training he acquired the broad knowledge of languages and cultures requisite for such a study as this. From the beginning of his career, however, his intellectual interests carried him beyond the

traditional confines of Indology and Buddhology. He emerged as a major force in the modernization of Indian studies in Japan, and his publications have ranged over a wide field: studies of ancient Indian history, studies on the character of primitive Buddhism, studies of Indian philosophic traditions, notably Vedanta *, articles on the living traditions of modern India, a book on the nature of religion in modern Japan, and numerous publications on problems of language and culture and on East-West cultural relations.

The catastrophe which befell Japan in 1945 ushered in a period of great intellectual and spiritual ferment. Japanese intellectuals asked themselves fundamental questions* about their nation and their culture, about the potential of a new Japan in a new world order. One facet of this great effort of reappraisal and projection was comparative study which, it was hoped, would give the Japanese a fresh view of their culture and society, their myths and their values. Mr. Nakamura, as the preface to the Japanese edition indicates, was drawn to this new effort at national selfknowledge through intercultural comparisons. His training in Indian and Buddhist studies led him to examine four societies (including his own) which had been affected in different ways by their experience with Buddhism. Other intellectual influences dictated the methods he was to use.

Western philosophy has long been one of Mr. Nakamura's major interests, and the approaches used in this volume were shaped by these interests. Mr. Nakamura was first introduced to the thought of such British and American philosophers as Russell and Dewey. At this stage he also read widely in the writings of Deussen, Keyserling, and Schopenhauer. After reading Professor Shinkichi Sudo's Logic, he went on to study the German logicians. He has long been deeply interested in Windelband's "problem approach" to the history of philosophy.

Like many scholars throughout the world, Mr. Nakamura has been greatly influenced by the general breakdown of absolutist philosophies. He was impelled to ask the question, not, are these views in accord with some absolute system, but rather how it is that some men in some societies come to hold such views? How will men's behavior be affected by those views, and under what altered conditions will they change them? In formulating questions of this kind, Mr. Nakamura was influenced by Marx, Max Weber, and by Professor Watsuji, whose book, Climate, explored the problem of the relation between environment and thought. Thus in the present book Mr. Nakamura uses the study of philosophic ideas to carry through an inquiry that lies largely beyond the traditional scope of philosophy. This inquiry seeks to analyze the modes of thought or "ways of thinking" of the four Asian peoples—those distinctive and slowly evolving ways in which people sort and classify experience, argue

with one another, and make value judgments or practical decisions. For such an analysis, he has been concerned with a whole range of phenomena which might be classified as social-historical, psychological, and linguistic.
The design of this comparative study of modes of thought was developed out of the intellectual interests we have noted. Each of the four sections of the study is developed on a common plan. First there is some discussion of language and logic, of the characteristic ways in which each of these Asian peoples habitually made certain types of judgment and inferences. In each section the author then proceeds to the manifestations of these patterns in formal philosophical writing, in literature, and in individual and group behavior. In each section Buddhism is used, in the manner described earlier, as a kind of chemical precipitant to isolate those indigenous habits of thinking that are most enduring and resistant to change.

Mr. Nakamura is aware that explicit logic and philosophical formulations of all kinds are the particular property of the small educated elites in the societies he is considering. But, if I interpret him correctly, he regards the philosophizing of the elite as a kind of translation into more general and abstract terms of the problems encountered in the common life of the society. And, in turn, folk sayings, proverbs, everyday thought reflect a translation downward or a seeping downward of what the philosophers have voiced. To find evidence of how this occurred and of how Buddhist ideas and values entered into this process in the four societies, Mr. Nakamura has cast a wide net. He has combed folk literature, prayers and the scriptures of popular cults, collections of proverbs, descriptions of everyday life and, wherever possible, he has used the accounts of foreign observers whose fresh eyes often register characteristics that escape the native critic of his own society. Thus, in the end we are shown not only how each elite grappled with the problems of Buddhist thought and belief but also how this process affected habits of thought and modes of behavior in the society as a whole.

The present revised English edition reflects at many points the development of Mr. Nakamura's thought in the period since 1947. When the first Japanese version was written, Japan was only beginning to emerge from the isolation of years of war and military rule. Since that time Mr. Nakamura has read widely in newer writings in the fields of philosophy, anthropology, and linguistics. During 1951–1952, he visited Stanford University where his work was the focus of a year-long faculty seminar. Again in 1962–1963 he discussed his findings with a seminar of scholars at the East-West Center. Portions of his book, certain lines of argument, and much of the documentation have been revised in the light of the author's experiences over the last fifteen years.

It is a pleasure to present this revised English edition to the Western reader. In its pages scholar and layman alike will find a wealth of insight into the range of great problems with which Mr. Nakamura is concerned. He will also, I think, come to admire its author as a tireless explorer on the frontiers of knowledge, a scholar whose virtuousity in research is matched by his relentless drive towards new understandings.

ARTHUR FREDERICK WRIGHT

YALE UNIVERSITY

EDITOR'S PREFACE

Professor Nakamura's book was the basis of conferences held at the East-West Center, in 1962–1963, where everyone agreed that the existing English version, now out of print, deserved highly to be replaced by a more readable, updated, and revised edition. With the help of the Senior Scholars and the department of Research Translations of the Institute of Advanced Projects at the East-West Center, and through close collaboration with the author and with our colleagues at the University of Hawaii, especially with Professor Kenneth K. Inada, my editorial task has been directed at providing a more correctly printed and revised text incorporating many new features. Among these are a new Foreword by the distinguished Far Eastern scholar, Professor Arthur F. Wright, who has been intimately acquainted with the evolution of Mr. Nakamura's studies; he and Professor Charles A. Moore have encouraged us to produce this new edition.

The renouned sinologue Professor P. Demiéville has recently said of Dr. Nakamura's work: "No statement or hypothesis is enunciated in this book without resting on some document duly indicated in the footnotes. . . . It is a comparative study of 'the ways of thinking' characteristic of the peoples of India, China, Tibet, and Japan, with an Introduction and Conclusion on East Asia in general. . . . They are treated in a broad manner, as "cultural phenomena" (bunka genzo * in Japanese), through language chiefly but also bringing in psychology, sociology, esthetics, and logic . . . all without pedantry, in a lively and at times humorous tone which holds your interest. . . . I was particularly struck by the part on Japan which occupies nearly half the work, for it constitutes a national self-criticism, wholesome and sharp, such as you would not have thought written by a Japanese. . . . The myth of an "Oriental mind" common to the whole of East Asia is denounced without beating around the bush. . . . The claim of Western thought to universality does not escape any better off." (T'oung Pao, vol. L, 1–3 [1963], pp. 287ff.)

Professor Nakamura's numerous emendations and additions of new material to the text of both the original Japanese edition and first English version have resulted in the following changes. The Introduction has been enlarged, recent studies on Indian, Chinese, Tibetan, and Japanese

thought and culture have been utilized, entirely new chapters on Tibet have been added, the chapters on Japan have been re-organized, and an Index has been compiled (since none existed in the first English version). Bibliographical notes have been revised to include more recent references, and more titles have been translated; more dates of authors and leaders of thought have also been discussed.
The breadth and plasticity of Professor Nakamura's thinking are evidenced by his willingness to revise even his basic ideas and interpretations, such as the greater emphasis in this edition on socio-cultural traditions and environmental influences than on innate, national, or racial traits.
I am greatly indebted to the author for broadening the scope of my own interests in the history of ideas, since I have learned so much from his work about the myriad aspects of the profound thought and culture of Eastern peoples. It has been an honor as well as an edifying experience to collaborate with so eminent a Japanese scholar as Professor Hajime Nakamura.

PHILIP P. WIENER

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

On the occasion of publishing a new English edition of this work, the author would like to offer a few words of thanks to those who worked to bring it to completion.

This work has had a long history. The late Professor Kichinosuke Ito of the University of Tokyo, who was commissioned by the Ministry of Education Committee of Japan to promote the comparative study of the ways of thinking of different peoples, asked me to collaborate in this study during the year 1945–1946. I accepted his proposal, proceeded with the necessary research, and submitted reports to the committee.

Since then, I have continued to develop my studies further. I first wished to determine the procedure I should adopt and the form in which I should embody the results. I realized that if I was not clear on methodology, I would not achieve the scientific accuracy desired. Hence, in order to pursue the study systematically, I adopted the following methods: When possible, I aimed to isolate the characteristic features of the ways of thinking of each people by analyzing their typical forms of judgment and inference; such features are, I believe, most clearly revealed in these forms of expression. I have refrained from discussing them in toto; but occasionally using the characteristic features thus isolated, I intended to proceed with investigations of concrete cultural phenomena which also reflect the ways of thinking and the thought-processes of each people. To clarify the particular ways in which Buddhism and Indian logic were introduced from India into China, Tibet, and Japan—that is, how a universal religion and logic came to be adapted to the native characteristics of each people—constituted the special focus of my research. I therefore applied the same methods in investigating the ways of thinking of each people. (Concerning the Japanese ways of thinking, I realized I had to deal also with the problem of the introduction and modification of Confucianism. However, as this problem lies beyond my ability, I touched upon it only occasionally.) The contrasts and comparisons with Occidental ways of thinking were not a separate topic but were made an integral part of the study. As a result, I took special care to indicate the contrasts presented by the ways of thinking of ancient Occidental peoples in that part of my study in which Indian ways of thinking are explained. Although the ancient Indians and the ancient Occidentals were ethnographically and linguistically related, there are many differences in their individual ways of thinking. I feel that a clarification of these differences is a scientific problem of great importance. I do not refer to a study of differences in their philosophical theories of culture, but to a specific and positive study of the characteristic features of their ways of thinking exhibited in linguistic and cultural phenomena.

When Dr. Charles B. Fahs, Director of the Rockefeller Foundation came to Tokyo in 1950, he urged a tentative translation of some chapters of this work (published in Japanese in 1948–1949) into English, on the advice of Professor Shunsuke Tsurumi. A grant was conferred by the Rockefeller Foundation on the Institute for the Science of Thought, Tokyo. A board for the translation was established; the chapters "Introduction" and "Japanese Ways of Thinking" were translated by its members.

When the author went to Stanford University as visiting professor of philosophy in September 1951, a seminar was established by the faculty for discussing the contents of the translated portions, the members being Professors John David Goheen (Philosophy), Arthur F. Wright (History), Nobutaka Ike (Political Science), Bernard Joseph Siegel
(Anthropology), Bert Alfred Gerow (Anthropology), David Shepherd Nivison (Chinese Philosophy), Donald Herbert Davidson (Philosophy), Thomas Carlyle Smith (History), and Raymond K. Waters (Japanese). The session was held every other week, and reports were distributed each time. Some parts of the translation were criticized and revised.

After the author left America in July 1952, Professors Nivison and Waters continued the work of editing the English manuscript, which was thus brought to partial completion. Some portions of the chapter on "Chinese Ways of Thinking" were translated by the author during his stay in London in 1952, and were later edited by Professor Wright and distributed by the Committee for Chinese Thought at Aspen, Colorado.
This work was taken up by the Japanese National Commission for UNESCO, Government of Japan, as the first attempt to translate philosophical works by Japanese scholars. The Editorial Board, set up by the Commission for this task, helped the Secretariat in the arrangements for translation. The author was requested to collaborate in the project
on August 21, 1958. The translation of the whole work was finished in June 1959. Finally it was published in 1960 by the Japanese National Commission for UNESCO under the title: THE WAYS OF THINKING OF EASTERN PEOPLES.
Now we are going to present a new different English translation, chiefly based upon the revised Japanese text, published in 1961–1962 by the Shunjusha Company, Tokyo.

When I stayed at the East-West Center, University of Hawaii, from August 1962 to January 1963, Senior Scholars there—Homer H. Dubs, Professor Emeritus of Oxford, Professor Philip P. Wiener, Chairman of the Department of Philosophy, City University of New York, and Daya Krishna, Assistant Professor of Saugar University, India—came to take interest in this work, and formed a group to hold sessions regularly at the suggestion of Professor Charles A. Moore. Their remarks and criticisms were very helpful in rewriting the work.

The help of Professor Wiener, who has long experience in scholarly editing as the executive editor of the JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS, was most valuable; he devoted a great deal of his time to editing this work, rewriting most of it, suggesting references to Western thought, and eliminating errors of printing and inconsecutive passages. Anne Magura was good enough to type the whole manuscript rewritten by him.
In April 1963, Professor Wiener came to Japan, and during his two-month stay, he continued to collaborate with me on the revisions and rewriting of my work. Professor Kenneth Inada kindly checked the manuscripts after receiving the revisions from Professor Wiener. Professor Ryusaku Tsunoda of Columbia University, a master of Japanese studies in America, then staying at the Center as Senior Scholar, did not spare his time in giving valuable assistance. Professor Walter Maurer, also at the East-West Center, helped in the part on India.

 I greatly appreciate the thoughtful arrangements made possible by Alexander Spoehr, Chancellor of the East-West
Center, Edward W. Weidner, Vice-Chancellor of the Center, Minoru Shinoda, Director of the Translation Bureau, and Professor Winfield E. Nagley, Chairman of the Department of Philosophy, all of whom enabled us to fulfil the task. Last, but not least, I am heartily thankful to Professor Arthur F. Wright of Yale University who kindly honored me by contributing a new Foreword to this edition.
Herewith I express my sincere gratitude to these scholars, without whose assistance this work could not be brought to the public.

HAJIME NAKAMURA

Introduction 3
 
Ways of Thinking of East Asian Peoples—Ways of Thinking" and Other Terms—Ways of Thinking and Language—Ways of
Thinking and Logic—Ways of Thinking and Cultural Phenomena—Ways of Thinking as Revealed in the Pattern of Adoption of a Foreign Culture—The Order in Which the Ways of Thinking of Various Eastern Peoples Will Be Considered—Various Cultural Phenomena and the Ways of Thinking of East Asian Peoples—Universal and
Particular Aspects of East Asian Thought and Culture—The Cognitive and the Existential Basis for the Differences in Ways of Thinking

Part I: India

1. Introduction 41

2. Stress on Universals 44
 
Preponderance of Abstract Notions—Abstract Conceptions Treated as Concrete Realities

3. Preference for the Negative 52

 
Fondness for Negative Expression—Grasping the Absolute Negatively—Attraction for the Unknown

4. Minimizing Individuality and Specific Particulars 60
 
Disregard for the Individual and the Particular Appearing in
Language—Disregard for the Individual and the Particular in
General Speculation
5. The Concept of the Unity of All Things 67
6. The Static Quality of Universality 73
 
Comprehension of this Quality through Static Aspects of Language
—The Static Quality of Thought—Lack of Common Sense
Concepts of Time—Contemplative Attitudes—Passive and
Forbearing Attitudes toward Behavior
  
Previous Released By -TSJ5J- Next 
Page xviii
7. Subjective Comprehension of Personality 87
 
Subjective Comprehension of Personality as Revealed in Language
Subjective Comprehension of Personality as Revealed in Philosophy
8. Primacy of the Universal Self over the Individual Self 93
 
The Unlimited Extension of the Self as Revealed in Language—The
Continuity of One's Self and Other Selves—Consciousness of the
Existence of the Self—Ethics of the Non-Duality of One's Self and Other Selves
9. Subservience to Universals 107
 
Subservience to Universals as Revealed in Language—The
Extension of the Subject of Action—Reverence for the Universal Standards in Behavior—Perceiving the Truth: Faith and
Rationalism—Transcendence of Limited Ethical Systems: Part 1.
Transcendence of National and Racial Consciousness; Part 2. The
Problem of Caste—Consciousness of Living Beings: Indian
Concept of Man—The Conservative Character of Indian Thinking
—The Development of Nomothetical Learning
10. Alienation from the Objective Natural World 130
 
Lack of the Notion of Order in the Objective Natural WorldImagination Which Ignores Natural Law—The Tendency to Resort to Extremes—Fondness for Myths and Poetry—Lack of Historical
Consciousness—The Concept of Truth—Non-Development of Natural Sciences
11. The Introspective Character of Indian Thought 152
 The Development of the Sciences of Inner Reflection
12. The Metaphysical Character of Indian Thought 157
 
The Religious Character of Indian Thought—The Tendency to Transcend This World—The Tendency of Thought to Transcend the Gods
13. The Spirit of Tolerance and Conciliàtion 168
 Part II: China
14. Introduction 175
15. Emphasis on the Perception of the Concrete 177
 
Graphic Character of the Writing—The Concrete Expression of
Concepts—Explanation by Means of Perceived Symbols— Diagrammatic Explanation
16. Non-Development of Abstract Thought 185
 
Lack of Consciousness of Universals—Non-Logical Character of
Verbal Expression and Thought—Lack of Conscious Use of
General Laws—Acceptance of Indian Logic in a Distorted Form
The Non-Logical Character of Zen Buddhism
  
Previous Released By -TSJ5J- Next 
Page xix
17. Emphasis on the Particular 196
 
Emphasis on Particular Instances—Explanation on the Basis of
Particular Instances—Development of Descriptive Science in Regard to the Particular
18. Conservatism Expressed in Exaltation of Antiquity 204
 
Importance Attached to Past Events—Continuity of the Classical
Way of Thinking—Influence of the Reception of Buddhism—NonDevelopment of Free Thought—Traditional Character of Scholarship
19. Fondness for Complex Multiplicity Expressed in Concrete Form 217
 
The Concrete Character of the Artistic Imagination—Fondness for
Ornate Diction—Exegetical and Literary Predilections of Chinese
20. Formal Conformity 226
 Fondness for Formal Conformity—External Conformity
21. The Tendency towards Practicality 233
 
The Anthropocentric Attitude—Worldly Tendency in Religion— Non-Development of Metaphysics
22. Individualism 247
 
The Tendency towards Egoism—The Spiritual Leadership of
Buddhism and Its Transformation—Non-Formation of Religious Sects—University of Tao
23. Esteem for Hierarchy 259
 
The Moral Personality—Elegant Attitude on Sexual Matters— Formalism in Behavior—Esteem for Superiority in Status—The High Value Placed on Patriarchal Kinship—Religion's Struggle against the State and Its Defeat—Racial Pride and Reverence for Lineage
24. Esteem for Nature 277
 Conformity to Nature—Relationship of Interaction between Heaven and Man
25. Reconciling and Harmonizing Tendencies 284
 
The Absolute Character of Existence—Acknowledgement of All
Heretical Doctrines—Syncretism within Buddhism—Chinese
Characteristics of Reconciling and Harmonizing
 
Part III: Tibet
26. Introduction 297
27. Consciousness of the Individual 301
 Weakness of Consciousness of Association among Individuals
  
Previous Released By -TSJ5J- Next 
Page xx
28. Discovery of the Absolute in Man 309
29. Absolute Submission to a Religiously Charismatic Individual 316
30. Absolute Adherence to the Lamaist Social Order 327
31. Shamanistic Tendencies 333
32. Logical Tendencies 337
 
Part IV: Japan
33. Introduction 345
34. The Acceptance of Phenomenalism 350
 
The Phenomenal World As Absolute—This-Worldliness—The Acceptance of Man's Natural Dispositions—Emphasis on the Love of Human Beings—The Spirit of Tolerance—Cultural Multiplicity
(Consisting of Several Strata Still Preserved) and Weakness of the Spirit of Criticism
35. The Tendency to Emphasize a Limited Social Nexus 407
 
Overstressing of Social Relations—Social Relationships Take
Precedence over the Individual—Unconditional Belief in a Limited Social Nexus—Observance of Family Morals—Emphasis on Rank and Social Position—Problems of Ultra Nationalism—Absolute Devotion to Specific Individual Symbolic of the Social Nexus— Emperor Worship—Sectarian and Factional Closedness—Defense of a Human Nexus by Force—Emphasis upon Human Activities— Acuteness of Moral Self-Reflection—Weak Awareness of Religious Values
36. Non-Rationalistic Tendencies 531
 
Indifference to Logical Rules—Lack of Interest in Formal
Consistency—Slow Development of Exact Logic in Japan—Hopes for Development of Exact Logical Thinking in Japan—Intuitive and
Emotional Tendencies—Tendency to Avoid Complex Ideas— Fondness for Simple Symbolic Expressions—The Lack of
Knowledge Concerning the Objective Order
37. Problem of Shamanism 577
Notes 588
Index 691
  
Previous Released By -TSJ5J- Next
 
INTRODUCTION

Ways of Thinking of East Asian Peoples

Our sense of belonging to one world has never been keener than at present. Yet the emphasis today on this evident fact itself implies that while every individual is affected by the quickening flow of world events, he is still strongly influenced by the ways of living and thinking in his own nation and culture.

It is commonly said that following the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan in less than a century rapidly and skillfully adopted and assimilated Western civilization; this acceptance was selective and beneficial in several respects. But may we say that it is actually being accepted in its entirety? And how much the less may this be said of those great peoples of Asia, the Indians and the Chinese? For despite their close relations with Westerners for several hundred years, industrialism and capitalism have failed in many respects to replace their traditional ways; it is not surprising therefore that verbal expressions, beliefs, ritual practices, etc. show few signs of being easily transformed. Western thought, from its first arrival in these lands, was theoretically rather well understood among the educated classes as a part of their general cultivation. And yet it certainly did not govern completely the practical and concrete behavior of many of these peoples. How are we to explain this? We cannot dismiss these phenomena simply by labels like "cultural lag," "backward peoples," or "Asiatic underdevelopment," but must rather seek the answer in the cultural characteristics and traditional ways of thinking of each group of people.
There has long been a tendency to think in terms of a dichotomy between East and West, presupposing two mutually opposed cultural sets of values labeled "Occidental" and "Oriental." Thus the Oriental way of thinking is represented as "spiritual," "introverted, "synthetic" and "subjective," while the Occidental is represented as "materialistic," "extroverted," "analytic," and "objective." This sort of explanation by paired opposites is now rejected as too simple; the cultures of the "Orient" and "Occident" are too diversified and each one is extremely complex. If we

inquire into what these words refer to, we are struck by the fact that the sense of each is composite, embracing a range of various narrower concepts. For example, the Greek and Hebrew civilizations, among the historical components of Western civilization, differ markedly from each other. Moreover, the civilization formed by the fusion of these strains is divisible into the ancient, medieval, and modern periods, each of which has its peculiar characteristics; and further, modern Western civilization takes on different characteristics from nation to nation. Consequently, without a thorough grasp of these differences it is impossible to generalize accurately about the ways of thinking of Westerners.
So likewise in the case of Eastern peoples,1 we must first explain the characteristic ways of thinking in each of their diverse cultures. If we are to hazard any conclusions about Eastern peoples as a whole, it must be as a tentative hypothesis in a comparative study of the data. Generalized conclusions drawn before such individual preparatory studies have been made will perforce be hasty and dogmatic. Thus, in order to deal with the ways of thinking of Eastern peoples, it is first necessary to examine the ways of thinking of each of the peoples individually. However, such a study of all the peoples of the East is, from a practical point of view, impossible at this time. I intend to concentrate on India, China, Tibet, and Japan. My reason is that among these four peoples alone did there exist— however imperfectly—a study of traditional Buddhist logic, which came first from India to the other three areas, and then developed independently in each. I believe that the various other peoples of the East have nearly the same ways of thinking as one or another of these four. Specifically, one may say that Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, and western Indo-China (Cambodia and Laos) are akin to India. Central Asia and Mongolia are akin to pre-Communist Tibet. Manchuria, Korea, and eastern Indo-China (Vietnam) are akin to China. Thus, an examination of the ways of thinking of these four is, in effect, a study of the most influential peoples of the East. It is only after such a study, if at all, that a generalized view of the ways of thinking of Eastern peoples can emerge.

"Ways of Thinking" and Other Terms

In order to prepare an explanation for the problems raised above, I shall first define several related concepts as they appear in this work.
(1) "Rules of logic" (formerly called "Laws of Thought") are those explicitly expressed formal rules put forward bylogicians. When interpreted, such rules usually claim to give universally valid results, that is, to lead from true assumptions to only true conclusions. Traditional logic claimed special priority for the laws" of identity, contradiction, and the excluded middle; alternative systems suggest other rules. The rules of logic do not purport to describe how people think. Hence the present work, not being a work in logic, does not deal with thinking from a logical and formal point of view. But, of course, it is a historical fact that certain people have at certain times accepted, organized, and promulgated logical systems and rules, and from this fact, among others, conclusions can be drawn about how people think. In this sense alone, the present book is concerned with viewing rules of logic and logical systems as cultural products of reflective thinking.

(2) The phrase "ways of thinking" refers to any individual's thinking in which the characteristic features of thethinking habits of the culture to which he belongs are revealed. "Ways of thinking" as here used will designate especially ways of thinking about concrete, empirical questions, which may, on many occasions, involve also valuejudgments and questions of values in ethics, religion, aesthetics, and other such human concerns. The thinker need not himself be aware of any way of thinking when he is engaged in operations of thinking. However, his ways of thinking are, in fact, conditioned by his culture's habits and attitudes when he communicates his thoughts. I have adopted the phrase "ways of thinking" in the title of this work as the main subject of our study.
On some logical or other specialized problems all members of a society or a group may think in the same way. But concerning informal or non-technical problems of daily experience, the individuals constituting one and the same people do not necessarily think in the same way, and so we can only point out a general tendency of the thinking of the people concerned. Thus, as each individual may think in a slightly different way, our work can only mention the predominant tendencies of each people.

(3) Following one or more of several "ways of thinking"—as defined above—any thinker might develop a coherent,self-conscious system of thought. We call this system and its tradition a "system of thought." For example, any wellorganized, coherent system of theology or philosophy is a "system of thought." We refer to such systems only when they have affected or reflected ways of thinking of most people in Far-Eastern countries.
Ways of Thinking and Language
In studying the ways of thinking of a people, we find one of the first clues in their language. Language is basic to the cultural life of a people; so basic that when a special language system comes into being, we may say that a people has come into being. The existence of a common language and culture serves as a criterion for the identification of a people.

Even though linguistic activity is common to all mankind, a universal language has never been adopted by all people, and consequently there has never been a worldwide speech community. Several international languages have been devised, and some have, moreover, actually begun to be used for international communication. These, however, are languages used only by people who, faced with the actual situation of many different languages existing in conflict, wish to overcome this confusion. Practically speaking, these languages are also in a sense only special artifacts.
Forms of linguistic expression become, in the inner consciousness of people, norms for psychologically ordering in a fixed pattern and carrying to conclusion the operations of thought. Therefore the special forms for developing the effectiveness of a given language, especially the grammar of that language and more especially its syntax, express the more conscious ways of thinking of the people using the language, and what is more, may be said to explicate such ways of thinking.

Are philosophical ideas or traditional thought relative to language?

For some time a good deal of discussion has taken place in Western scholarly circles concerning the relation between linguistic forms and ways of thinking. Many scholars2 believe that between the two there exists some sort of parallel development and mutual correspondence. However, there are other scholars3 who either deny such parallel development and mutual correspondence entirely or assert that the relationship is not a significant one. Recently, especially in America, the relation between language and action based upon communication has been discussed as one of the most important philosophical problems.
Recognizing that many theories exist as to the relationship between linguistic forms and ways of thinking, in this work I have nevertheless followed what seems to be the general assumption that between the two there is a close relationship of correspondence or parallel development—that language is a representation in sound, writing, or gesture of the concept produced in the operation of thinking.
If there is such an intimate relationship between the operations of language and thinking, it is worthwhile and indeed necessary to inquire into forms of linguistic expression as a key to the study of forms and ways of thinking.

Studies have already been partially undertaken which attempt to clarify the differences between the ways of thinking of various peoples, using as a key the differences in the forms of grammatical construction in the languages used by these peoples. For example, Wilhelm von Humboldt thought it possible to study the differences between the structural aspects of different languages by making a study of such questions as how a given form of grammatical structure is handled in each language, what sort of grammatical position it has, and what sort of relationship it has to other grammatical forms. As one instance of this, he made an investigation of duals.4 Thus, with this method as a key, he proposed to attack the problem of the forms of thinking of a people. Again, the sinologist Granet said, "Just as linguistic research permits the analysis of the mechanism of thoughts transmitted in language, in the same way the analysis of the guiding principles of thought can verify the analysis of its means of expression."5 Taking this position he endeavored to explain the ways of thinking of the Chinese people as a whole, by using the analytical study of the Chinese language as a key.

In this work it is my aim to carry out an investigation of a broad scope with regard to the most important peoples of the East, following a similar scheme of analysis for each people.6 The procedure I have followed with each people is to study their forms of expressing judgments and inferences as initial clues to their ways of thinking, and then to attempt to elucidate these ways of thinking by analyzing the various cultural phenomena correlated with them. But for comparative purposes I have placed particular emphasis upon Buddhism—a cultural phenomenon common to all.

Ways of Thinking and Logic

Although the forms of linguistic expression raise many different problems, since we are concerned with ways of thinking it will be proper for us to give primary emphasis to the forms of judgment and inference. These are the basic forms for expressing the operations of thinking. I shall postpone for the present such questions as what varieties of forms of judgment and inference there are, and how these varieties ought to be classified, for these are, properly speaking, problems of logic.7 Accordingly, although it would be desirable to examine the special characteristics of the ways of thinking of each people, taking up all the forms of expression of judgment and inference one by one, yet insofar as the problem of their classification is concerned, the actual fact is that the content of logic in this respect is not yet definitely fixed. I would like to select for consideration merely those judgments and inferences which are fundamental or especially characteristic.

First, as to judgments, I shall consider the most fundamental and simple forms, namely judgments of identity, judgments of classification, judgments of inference, and judgments of existence.8 In Western logic the problem of impersonal judgments has been widely discussed but propositions (such as "it is raining," for example), which in the West are considered impersonal judgments, cannot be so considered in Japanese and
Chinese, differing as they do from Western languages in their linguistic forms. Furthermore, in the ancient Indian language, which is on a par with Western languages in its linguistic forms, very often the same idea is not an impersonal judgment but is expressed as a judgment with a subject ("it is raining" equals "devo varsati *" i.e. "the god of rain causes rain"). Consequently, since the question how to classify the "impersonal judgment" must first be argued out logically, in this work comparisons of the linguistic forms of various languages in the matter of the impersonal judgment will not be carried out as an independent topic, but will merely be discussed as an illustration of the relation of language to logic. Moreover, in recent years there have been many logicians who have emphasized the judgment of relation" (relational statements).9 However, inasmuch as the views of scholars vary as to the meaning of the concepts of "relational judgments," in the present work it will suffice to discuss such judgments only when necessary, without bringing them together and examining them under an independent heading.

Moreover, among the various forms of inference, I should like to call attention especially to the forms of expression of simple types of inference. In Western formal logic this problem used to be examined under the "syllogism"; but in everyday life we very often demonstrate a conclusion by advancing only one premise in the manner "x, therefore y." We must in addition consider the joining together of several inferences. However, the compound syllogism—i.e. a form which joins together complete syllogisms—is in actual fact seldom used; in almost all situations a form is used which links together abbreviated syllogisms. This is called in formal logic the sorites or chain argument. We must, of course, also be concerned with the question of how these chains of inference are differently applied by various peoples.10 We shall seek these forms of expression which exhibit especially clearly the typical features of the ways of thinking of a given people; but even better material is sometimes offered by logic, whether developed or adopted by the people. Since the original name for logic, , means skill in regard to logos (word), the features of the ways of thinking which are unconsciously embodied in language may possibly become explicit in logic and may moreover be displayed in a systematized, organized state. In this sense, logic is one of the most important keys for the study of the features of the ways of thinking of a people. Accordingly, by studying Eastern logical works and at the same time comparing them with those of the West, we should be able to comprehend some features of the conscious ways of thinking of the various Eastern peoples. Logic in the East originally appeared in India, but when it was introduced into Tibet, China, and Japan, it was studied in different ways in each place, and in each country it was considerably modified. Although
logic should be the most universal form of learning, as a matter of historical fact it has by no means been formulated or transmitted to these other peoples in a universal language. Naturally, the characteristic features of ways of thinking, differing with each people, are reflected in the mutual differences of native or imported patterns of logic when the latter are tied to the structure of a given language.

But it ought to be noted here that those who have mastered logic and actually apply it are the intellectual class of any people. Some of the intellectual class within a given society think in conformity with logic, and logic becomes a standard for them in the orderly statement of the content of their thoughts.11 In spite of the fact that the masses use language constantly every day, their use of logical forms of expression is almost non-existent. Consequently, it is incorrect to say that logic regulates the ways of thinking of a given people to the same extent as do linguistic forms. It is impossible to hold that conclusions obtained from the examination of the systems of logic of the past are directly applicable to the entire people who study this logic. In order to take logic as a key for the examination of the ways of thinking of a given people, it is necessary to take into consideration just such facts as these.
The comparison of the systems of logic of East and West is in itself a large problem and an independent topic of study. Since it is impossible to discuss this problem fully in this work, I shall discuss it only insofar as it is related to the ways of thinking of peoples in general.

Ways of Thinking and Cultural Phenomena

Here, as above, we shall not concern ourselves with logical systems as such, nor shall we deal mainly with questions of comparative philosophy.12 The reason is that, in studying the ways of thinking of a given people, one should consider the ways of thinking adopted by most of the members of that group. In doing so, it is preferable not to consider exclusively the characteristic ways of thinking of individual philosophers. Of course, every philosopher, however great, is conditioned by events in a certain region of space and time. His thinking cannot, moreover, avoid a certain continuity with that of his associates, as a member of a particular society. Thus, the ways of thinking of philosophers cannot be freed completely from national or historical traditions. On the other hand, however, a great philosopher not infrequently follows a way of thinking which differs from that of the nation which gave him birth. Indeed, a philosopher is often considered great for this very reason. Therefore, the ways or patterns of thinking of individual philosophers will generally be referred to only when necessary. However, it will be pertinent to inquire
whether the ways or patterns of thinking of the majority of the philosophers of a given people exhibit certain common tendencies.
On the other hand, I shall take up, in my study of the ways of thinking of a people, the characteristic popular sayings, proverbs, songs, mythology, and folklore of that people. Nor will it be out of place to include within the limits of this study generally current expressions even when found in the writings of formal philosophers. One must, however, exercise considerable caution in determining which of the numerous expressions found among the people are universal and truly characteristic of the people. In addition, such things as myths, religious scriptures, the arts (music, painting, architecture, etc.), and works of literature in general must, of course, be considered as important sources for our study. Since such documents abound among all peoples, one must choose as source material those which are particularly cherished by the people in question. Those works which are not esteemed by the people, even though they may be interesting from the point of view of the modern reader, will be of little significance as sources for determining the ways of thinking common to the entire people. But, on the other hand, works which furnish a critique of the ways of thinking of a given people written by foreigners, in spite of the fact that the people in question may know nothing of such works, are very important sources in that they clarify the differences between the ways of thinking of the two nations involved.

Ways of Thinking as Revealed in the Pattern of Adoption of a Foreign Culture

The modern investigator draws his conclusions about the ways of thinking of peoples by the method of comparative study, with linguistic forms, logic, and general cultural phenomena furnishing the bases for such study. There are, however, instances of a given people, in the course of its history, elucidating concretely its own ways of thinking which differ from those of another people. This insight is furnished by the way in which one people adopts the ways or patterns of thinking of another. One people does not generally adopt the ways or patterns of thinking of another culture straightaway, but rather criticizes the "alien" ways, selects from them, and modifies them in the very course of adoption. In this process the characteristics of the ways of thinking of both peoples are clearly indicated. The problem of the interplay of cultures has been investigated a great deal, but such studies have been made mainly from the historical and philological point of view. The subject has not been sufficiently explored from the standpoint of ways of thinking. It is this problem to which I address myself in this book.
Regarded from the standpoint of ways of thinking, the reception of a universal religion, among the various phenomena of cultural diffusion, would seem to furnish a most valuable clue to the understanding of the characteristic ways of thinking of a people. In what form does this people adopt the universal religion, and in what way is the religion modified? Now the most widespread religion in the East is, of course, Buddhism. (In the case of Japan, Confucianism should also be considered.) As a clue to the characteristic ways of thinking of the Eastern peoples it will be important to study how they modified Buddhism. There have been many studies of the spread (adoption, from the point of view of the people) of Buddhism. These too have been principally historical and philological, and it appears that there has been no consideration of the problem from the standpoint of ways of thinking. This is the problem I should like especially to consider.

The Order in Which the Ways of Thinking of Various Eastern Peoples Will Be Considered
In accordance with the methodology outlined above, I intend to proceed with this study in the following way. First, in my study of each of the Eastern peoples, I shall bring out the characteristics of their ways of thinking as discernible in the forms of expression of the simplest judgments and inferences. These characteristics are among the most fundamental to the ways of thinking of a people. Next I shall examine the ways in which such characteristic ways of thinking operate in connection with actual cultural phenomena (especially the mode of acceptance of Buddhism). These phenomena most certainly have a socio-psychological relationship with the characteristics discernible in the mode of expression of simple judgments and inferences. My study will concern itself with this relationship.

In studying the characteristics of the ways of thinking of Eastern peoples, the question arises as to the proper order in which to deal with the several peoples. In my opinion, studying India, China, and Japan in that order follows best the actual historical order. Since the Indians are, as Aryans, said to be of the same ethnic, linguistic, and cultural (IndoEuropean) family as Occidentals, I shall first contrast these two groups and point out their differences from the standpoint of their ways of thinking. Then I shall discuss the Chinese, who are a completely different people in origin. Lastly I shall come to Japan, which was influenced culturally by India and China (note that in contrast to this, premodern India had no cultural influence from Japan and only some from China). One would have to discuss India and
China even if one began with
Japan. Therefore, out of practical considerations I have decided upon the first-named order. Further, Tibet, although not an important region from the political or economic point of view, cannot be overlooked in a consideration of ways of thinking, in that it was there that Indian logic found widest acceptance. Consequently we shall give collateral consideration to the ways of thinking of the Tibetans.
I should further like to point out here that "the Chinese" as used in this book refers to the Han people. "Chinese national" is a political concept, whereas "the Chinese," "the Tibetans," are cultural concepts. In a consideration of the ways of thinking, the Chinese and the Tibetans must, of course, be distinguished.
Are there any common features in the ways of thinking of Eastern peoples despite the variety of their cultures? In Japan as well as in the West we often hear people maintain that a certain trait is "Oriental" or "Eastern."13 However, the East-West dichotomy has been challenged and strongly denied.14
Bertrand Russell points out that man is perennially engaged in three basic conflicts: (1) against Nature, (2) against other men, and (3) against himself.15 Inheriting this classification, Huston Smith says: "Roughly these may be identified as man's natural, social, and psychological problems. The great surviving cultural traditions are also three— the Chinese, the Indian, and the Western. It helps us to understand and relate the unique perspectives of these three traditions if we think of each as accenting one of man's basic problems. Generally speaking, the West has accented the natural problem, China the social, and India the psychological."16 Now it is well known that Asia includes several cultural areas. But the term "Orient" or "the East" is still used unfortunately as if it referred to one culture common to all Eastern countries.

Let us inquire further into the meaning implied by this term, Eastern or Oriental. First of all, it is generally said that in the East man's individual existence is not fully realized, but that the individual is subordinated to the universal. Hegel, for instance, asserted that God or the Absolute in the East has the feature of "das Allgemeine" (the Universal).
"The fundamental principles of the various religions of the East are that the single Substance alone is the True, and an individual has no value in itself, nor is capable of attaining any value so long as it is by itself, apart from that which exists in and for itself (das Anundfürsichseyende), the Absolute; that an individual is only capable of assuming true value by

uniting itself with Substance, when this individual, however, is no longer a 'Subject' but is dissolved into the unconscious."17
And regarding the difference between Eastern and Western thoughts, he says: "On the contrary, with the Greek religion or Christianity the 'Subject' is aware of its freedom; and we ought to think in this manner." In the philosophy of the East, however, "The negation of the finite is real. But that negation is one in the sense that an individual only attains its freedom in unity with what is substantial."

Hegel had only a limited knowledge of the classics of the East, acquired through his reading of translations; his views, however, are shared by many Western people even nowadays. To what extent then are Hegel's statements true? Indeed, a blind subordination to authority in some form or other has prevailed in some countries of the East. Is it possible for us to assert that in the West "the self was free" and devoid of such subordination? The complete, unquestioning faith in authority during the Middle Ages in the West and the subsequent destruction or regimentation of alien cultures did not occur in the East. Was this phenomenon of "being united with Substance" as Hegel called it, not illustrated, in some cases, in the West as well as in the East?

It is often said that the peoples of the East are intuitive and accordingly not systematic or orderly in grasping things; by contrast the Westerners are said to be "postulational" or logical, and that they try to grasp things systematically and by orderly planning. Indeed, the ways of thinking of the Chinese or the Japanese may be characterized as "intuitive." But in the case of the Indians this label is hard to apply. For example, the intricate arguments of the Abhidharma literature are logical and can never be called intuitive. There is no need to refer to the difficult literature of theology in order to point out how far removed from any intuitive grasp is that complicated, fantastic, and strange set of sentiments symbolized in Indian paintings and sculptures. Indian art urges us to form a complicated association of ideas, and leads the spectator into a strange, fantastic atmosphere.

Secondly, it is often asserted that the ways of thinking of the Eastern peoples are synthetic, and that of the Westerners analytic. The Chinese word, for instance, gives us the impression that it is synthetic, but it is more properly set in a stage prior to analysis. So long as it has yet to pass through the process of analysis, it would hardly be called synthetic. On the other hand, it is generally recognized by scholars that the Indians showed a great skill in the analysis of linguistic or psychological phenomena. We cannot say that only Westerners have a tendency to be analytical. For example, Indian grammar was most advanced in the analysis of words and phrases, but very weak in its consideration of the

synthetic construction of sentences, while, on the other hand, Greek grammar has left an excellent achievement concerning syntax which deals with the synthetic field of words and phrases. Therefore, it is unjustifiable to characterize the ways of thinking of the Eastern peoples simply as "synthetic."
Let us next consider the problem of knowledge. Max Weber says, "The premise which is common in the last analysis to all philosophies and soteriologies in Asia is that knowledge—whether it be that of books or mystical gnosis—is the only absolute way leading to supreme bliss in this world as well as in the next world. A careful examination would reveal the fact that 'knowledge' does not mean knowing the things of this world, nature, social life, or laws regulating both nature and man. Rather, it is the philosophical knowledge of the 'meaning' of life and the world. It is naturally understood that such a knowledge cannot be replaced by Western empirical learning, and that it should never be sought by empirical means, if we are to do justice to the purpose proper to that learning."18

Indeed, it is true that knowledge as conceived by the East Asian people has connotations which for the most part bear out the definition given above. But in the history of Western thought, we are able to note the existence of a similar religio-philosophical connotation. The word gnosis itself here is Greek, but a gnostic inclination is also seen in various religions in the western part of Asia, and is not peculiar to India and China alone. In the West, too, it explicitly appeared in Neo-Platonists like Plotinus, and may be traced back to Plato. It is generally presumed that such philosophical schools might have been influenced by Indian or Persian philosophy or thought, but this relationship is yet to be clarified. Under the influence of Greek philosophy the Gnostics arose in a movement to elevate the Christian faith to the level of knowledge. Likewise in the Middle Ages, such an inclination is said to be noticeable in some of the Christian mystics who were regarded as heretics, such as Tauler or Eckhart.

Let us consider the next problem. There are some people who maintain that all the principal religions of the world originated in Asia; therefore, if we label the whole area including the western part of Asia "East," the East might be said to be religious, whereas Europe (and America) or the West non-religious. Such a view was fairly dominant in Japan prior to the Pacific War, and it has never completely disappeared. However, as pointed out above, among the
East Asian peoples, the Indians in particular are extremely religious, but the spiritual disposition of the Japanese or the Chinese could never be termed religious. On the contrary, there is some evidence that Western people are far more religious than the Japanese or the Chinese.
In the same way, the contention that has repeatedly been made that
the Western civilization is "materialistic," while the East Asian civilization is "spiritual," is erroneous. A nonreligious race can never be "spiritual." Of course, it all depends on what one means by "religious" and "spiritual.
Ancient civilization and its continuation in modern Western culture, which restored the ancient culture, were superior in scientific research and application of material science (technology), and consequently, the West with all its power was able to make advances on the East. The East Asian peoples, menaced by this invader, labeled the West

"materialistic"; on the other hand, the West characterized the less advanced East itself as "soulful" or "spiritual." As far as the inability to control material nature is concerned, a similar feature can be seen in the aborigines of Africa as well as of America, and so is in no way peculiar to East Asia alone. For equally good reasons, the justification for defining the East as "internal" or "subjective," and the West as "external" or "objective" is also highly questionable.

Furthermore, it would be a very superficial observation to single out the East as "being ethical," for ethics is a part of every and any society. Observing that some of the traditional ethics of the Japanese and Chinese are not practiced in the modern West, some conservative Japanese, trying to preserve the ethics of old, have made this dubious claim. In connection with the above observation, Eastern thought is often regarded as metaphysical, and it is said that the basis of the Eastern metaphysical thought is "nothingness peculiar to the East."19 It is well-known that "nothingness" was propounded in the philosophies of Lao-tzu * and Chuang-tzu*. On the contrary, Indian philosophy generally inquires into the "existent." The meaning of "existent," however, is different from that of Greek philosophy. In Indian philosophy in general, there is a mental tendency to seek a transcendent substantial basis for "what is real." In the case of Samkara*, the ultimate being of the world is the "real," and it is rather the phenomenal world which is void, so that his thought is diametrically opposed to the thoughts of Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu, so far as literal understanding goes. In Buddhism, especially in Mahayana* Buddhism, "voidness" is expounded but it is different from "nothingness"; this fact is often emphasized by the Indian Buddhists.20 These two ideas were either identified or confused when the method known as Ko-yi (the evaluation and interpretation of Buddhism through the doctrines of Chinese thoughts, such as Confucianism, Tao-ism, etc.) was practiced after the introduction of Buddhism into China. Master Chiahsiang,21 however, repeatedly affirmed that Buddhist "voidness" and the "nothingness" of Lao-tzu's or Chuang-tzu's were not to be equated. Therefore, it is very dangerous for us to qualify the whole of Eastern thought with the term
"nothingness peculiar to the East." (However, if the term is used to refer just to one aspect of the thought, there

would be no objection. Or if a modern philosopher sets up such an idea as a result of his own contemplation, then he is free to do so, but this has nothing to do with the historically verified thought of the East.) Moreover, it could not possibly be averred that the East is metaphysical and the West is not so. Among the East Asian peoples, most of the Chinese, and the Japanese in particular, have been much more non-metaphysical than the Westerners.
Returning to the fundamental problem of the ways of thinking, it is often said that Westerners are rationalistic, but that East Asians are irrationalistic. Such characterizations seem to have acquired general acceptance and usage especially after World War II. It is particularly emphasized that the Japanese are anti-rationalistic. Indeed, the Japanese have shown in the past a distaste for systematical and logical ways of thinking. But when we consider the question more deeply, in practice the Japanese generally tend to follow certain customs and a code of conduct. Their devotion to a limited social code is a general tendency, upon which they base their criterion for moral evaluation. Accordingly, in this sense we can claim rationality for them—if "rational" is the correct term for behavior in accordance with rules.

At first sight the Chinese give us the impression of being indifferent to logical exactitude. The ways of expression in the Chinese language are extremely ambiguous, and the historical fact that there has never been a development of formal logic (apart from the short lived Mohist school) among the Chinese seems to support this view. To be indifferent to rules of formal logic, however, is not necessarily to be irrational. It is widely known that Chinese thought, due to its rationalistic character, exerted a great influence upon the philosophy of enlightenment of the modern West. Max Weber says: "Confucianism is extremely rationalistic since it is bereft of any form of metaphysics and in the sense that it lacks traces of nearly any religious basis—to such a degree that it is questionable whether it is proper to use the term 'religious ethics.' At the same time, it is more realistic than any other system, outside of
Bentham's ethical system, in the sense that it lacks and excludes all measures which are not utilitarian."22 If "rational" means thinking in a practical utilitarian way then it is the Chinese rather than the Westerners who are far more rationalistic. And it is due to this rationalistic character that Chinese thought inspired the thinkers of the p
eriod of the Enlightenment, such as Voltaire and Wolff, and came to serve as their weapons against the shackles of medieval Scholastic traditions.
Although the Indians did not achieve as remarkable a development in the field of natural science as the West, they conducted far more elaborate speculations than the Westerners of antiquity and the Middle Ages with
respect to the theory of numbers, the analysis of psychological phenomena, and the study of linguistic structures. The Indians are highly rationalistic insofar as their ideal is to recognize eternal laws concerning past, present, and future. The thought represented by Tertullian's aphorism, "credo quia absurdum," or "I believe because it is absurd," had no receptivity in India. The Indians are, at the same time, logical since they generally have a tendency to sublimate their thinking to the universal; they are at once logical and rationalistic. On the contrary, many religions of the West are irrational and illogical, and this is acknowledged by the Westerners themselves. For example, Schweitzer, a pious and most devoted Christian, says, "Compared to the logical religions of East Asia, the gospel of Jesus is illogical.23 In this sense, the East is more rational, and conversely, the West is more illogical. A rationalistic attitude is seen consistently in Dharmakirti *'s Buddhist logic or in the natural philosophy of the Vaisesika* school of India. Consequently, we cannot prudently adopt the classification that the East is irrationalistic and the West rationalistic.

Some writers make a distinction between the rationalism of the East and that of the West. For example, Max Weber says, "The practical rationalism of the West is extremely different in nature from that of the East, notwithstanding the outward or actual similarity of the two. The post-renaissance rationalism was especially rationalistic in the sense that it abandoned the restrictions of tradition and believed in the power of reason in nature."
This statement appears to be well grounded. The thought-tendency, however, which was bent on disregarding traditional authority or restriction appeared as early as the turbulent days of the so-called "Ch'un-ch'iu," Spring and Autumn Annals (722–481 B.C.), to the beginning of the Ch'in dynasty (221–206 B.C.) in China; and in India it was prominent in urban society during the period of the advent of the Buddha in the 6th century B.C., and even afterwards it was propagated by naturalistic philosophers and logicians. In modern Japan as well, the germination of free thought is faintly perceived. Accordingly, it is indeed beyond doubt that disregard for conventional authority and restriction was dominant in the modern West, and was weak in East Asia, but this is merely a difference of degree or extent; it is not a difference in essence. And even if that thought-tendency were influential in the modern West, it was not so in the Middle Ages; therefore, it would be improper to distinguish the East and West on this point.
In connection with this, a nostalgic conservatism is very conspicuous among the Chinese, and it can also be seen to a considerable degree among the Japanese, while in India it was once partly forsaken. The Moslems, who make up a fairly large part of the Indian sub-continent, have disengaged
themselves from the religions of the Indian people; therefore, nostalgic conservatism cannot be called a general feature of East Asia.
Although this nostalgic conservative character is partly common to both the Indians and the Chinese, the former are more prone to exalt the universal law underlying the past, present, and future. Thus, the basis of these two similar nostalgic characters harbors a difference in outlook or thought.
Again, we find that many people think that the character of the East Asians is their passivity. There is evidence that this has been a conspicuous feature of the way of thinking of the Chinese and the Indians. Among the same East

Asians, however, the Japanese in particular are highly sensitive to the transition of things. Buddhist teachings and
Confucian learning alike have been transformed into something dynamic in character since their introduction to Japan.
Therefore, it is impossible to sum up the ways of thinking of the East Asians in general as merely being "passive." And although the thinking of the Westerners might indeed be called "dynamic," the idea of evolution or development in phenomenal existence or in history has manifested itself clearly only in modern times and could not possibly have been clear to ancient thinkers.
It is often pointed out that India, China, and Japan are situated in the monsoon zone, so that the three countries have a climatic trait in common. People living in the zone are said to be generally passive and submissive to objective nature and lacking in the will to conquer it by means of rational and measured thinking, and as they move en masse, they are easily subordinated by a specific authority, so that they dislike to assert themselves positively. Accordingly, when various thoughts are found opposed to one another, they are likely to recognize their rational force, and to compromise and synthesize, rather than to adopt one of them alternatively to the exclusion of others.

Therefore, it is often contended that in contrast to Western thought the spirit of tolerance and mutual concession is a salient feature of Eastern thought. The religion of the West at times is harsh and even emphasizes struggle for the sake of keeping the faith and condemning unbelievers:
"If any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple." (Luke, 14.26.)
"I am come to send fire on the earth; and what will I, if it be already kindled?—Suppose ye that I am come to give peace on earth? I tell you, Nay; but rather division: For from henceforth there shall be five in one house divided, three against two, and two against three. The father shall be divided against the son, and the son against the father; the mother against the daughter, and the daughter against the mother; the mother-in-
law against her daughter-in-law, and the daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law." (Luke, 12.49–53.)

Such aggressive thoughts as expressed here did not appear at all in the religions of East Asia. Throughout the religious world of India a more tranquil and peaceful atmosphere has prevailed from time immemorial. Gotama and Mahavira * ended their lives in peace. Perceiving the fact that in China a perfect freedom of faith had been preserved since ancient times, Voltaire, who has been called the "Apostle of the freedom of faith," was utterly fascinated by Chinese law.24 Although in Japan, the principle of the freedom of faith has not fully been realized where political influence was exerted, due to the interference of the state, hatred against the heretic has been mild among the people in general. Even the Jodo* Shin sect, the most clear cut sect in its uncompromising attitude toward the other faiths, advises that in order to spread the faith it is wiser to wait calmly for a suitable opportunity rather than to force the situation.25
With the Indian people, self-conscious reflection on the impact of oneself against other selves is not clearly evidenced. Underneath this fact lies the view that all men are one in essence. And such a view as this seems to be shared by the other peoples of East Asia, though in different degrees.

The idea of tolerance and mutual concession is based on admitting the compatibility of many different philosophical views of the world. The Indians are prone to tolerate the co-existence of philosophical thoughts of various types from the metaphysical viewpoint; the Chinese are inclined to try to reconcile and harmonize them from a political and practical viewpoint; and the Japanese tend to emphasize the historical and physiographical features of such diverse thoughts. Interference with religions on the part of the state was not found in Hindu India, but in China it occurred to a considerable degree, and in Japan it was occasionally extreme. Consequently, we hesitate to sum up these standpoints with one adjective "Asiatic." While in the West, in modern times, the spirit of tolerance and mutual concession was preached especially by the thinkers of the Enlightenment and by the Pietists, in Asia, especially Iran, heretical views on religion were relentlessly persecuted.

It is often pointed out, particularly by Westerners, that Eastern thought has a tendency toward escapism, and that it is rather indifferent toward social and political action. They say that Christianity preaches the importance of practice within this world but religions of East Asia teach man to shun this world.26 Such criticism seems to have become common in the West. In relation to this, especially concerning the traits of the religions of Asia, Max Weber says, "Indifference to the world was the attitude taught them,—whether in the form of external escapism, or in
actions indifferent to this world, although taking place in this world. Accordingly, it is resistance to the world and to our participation in it."27 Weber goes on to say: "The fundamental creed of Protestant ethics in the modern West is 'inner-worldly' asceticism. It attempted to rationalize this world ethically by accepting the will of God positively, rather than to tend toward escapism as in the case of meditation.28 Daily conduct is elevated, through rationalization, to the level of god-sent vocation, and this is also man's assurance of happiness. In contrast with this, religions of the East hold nothing but a herd of meditative, fanatic, or insensitive devotees and they regard any inner-worldly practice as nonsense and are anxious to leave this world. Not that Buddhist monks have no practice at all, but, since their ultimate objective was to escape the 'cycle' of transmigration (samsara *), their conduct could never have undergone any thorough, inner-worldly rationalization."

Indeed, the ethics of Protestantism may have been as Max Weber described it. But Western thought in and prior to the Middle Ages has not always been characterized by an attitude of inner-worldly rationalization. "A herd of meditative, fanatic, or insensitive devotees" did exist in the West in the past as well as in the East. That the religious men of the East were engaged in inner-worldly activity is a fact beyond doubt. The religion that pervaded the various countries of East Asia was Mahayana* Buddhism which stresses such inner-worldly activity. Yet we can see in the religion of Iran a tendency also toward the worldly.

In relation to this, it is often asserted that the East Asian people contemplate nature and attempt the identification of man and nature by meditation, whereas the Westerners attempt to conquer nature. The attempt on the part of man, however, to assert himself and to conquer nature was not uncommon in East Asia. In China and India as well, the construction of canals, banks, water tanks, and ramparts was undertaken. On the other hand, the yearning for nature appeared also in the West, in which people sought to return to nature. Accordingly, on this point also, it is very difficult for us to make a clear distinction between the two spheres. Concerning problems of philosophy, the opposition of subject and object, for instance, was already taken up in ancient Indian philosophy. The reason why natural science has made remarkable progress in the West, especially in modern times, will be considered on another occasion. In any case, the attitudes toward nature as found in the West and the East are difficult to define or distinguish.
Max Weber states that during or prior to the Middle Ages, the ascetic life in the Christianity in the West had been tinged with a rational character: "Its object was to overcome the state of nature (status naturae), to rid man of his dependence upon the power of irrational impulse and

upon nature and the world, to subordinate man to the rule of a deliberate scheme, and to place man's conduct under the incessant self-examination and the evaluation of ethical significance. Herein lies the world-historical significance of the monk's life of the West in contrast to that of East Asia—viewed not from the whole of it, but from the general type. . . ."30 From the viewpoint of the rationalization of life, however, the workaday practices at Zen monasteries in Japan are extremely rationalistic, and, as was pointed out before, the social work of Japanese priests prior to the Middle Ages was very extensive. We agree with Weber's opinion that it is difficult to make a clear distinction between the East and the West on this particular point.
After having examined what has heretofore been designated as features peculiar to Eastern thought, we find ourselves in reality incapable of isolating a definite trait which can be singled out for contrast with the West. It appears possible for us to recognize a few similarities common to the nations in East Asia; however, it is impossible to regard them as common Eastern features and to compare them with those of Western thought as if they were non-existent in the West. These features were regarded as "Eastern" because they were conspicuous in certain countries in a certain period or among certain peoples. Accordingly, it is also certain that those common features are not without some basis in human nature.

Thus, we must acknowledge the fact that there exists no single "Eastern" feature but rather that there exist diverse ways of thinking in East Asia, characteristic of certain peoples but not of the whole of East Asia. This can be affirmed by way of comparison among the cultures of the East Asian nations, and by noting the fact that Buddhism was received by various nations of East Asia according to the character of the recipients; this clearly testifies to the cogency of our viewpoint. In other words, Buddhism, whose basic principles are universal and transcend the distinction of social classes and nations, has been adopted with certain modifications, modifications which were made according to the features peculiar to the ways of thinking of each recipient nation.
Of course, there can be similarities in ways of thinking among the Buddhists of various nations, even if they may differ in nationality, since Buddhism is a world religion and it has especially exercised a profound influence over the spiritual and social life of the East Asian peoples. Buddhism, insofar as it is a single religion, should be basically consistent wherever it may be found. (The problem of the general or common features of Buddhist sects is not treated within this book, for the problem belongs to the philosophy of religion.) It is only natural that some common traits should be perceived so long as an overwhelming number of East Asians are Buddhists. However, we cannot generalize from the facts of

Buddhism to the East Asian nations as a whole,31 because the East Asian nations are not all necessarily Buddhist. To say that there are similarities and parallelisms among Buddhists of the East Asian nations is not tantamount to showing the parallelisms and similarities of the East Asian nations as a whole. Whether the conclusions regarding the Buddhists as a whole are applicable to, for instance, the Indians—in general they are non-Buddhists—must be considered separately.

According to the above considerations, the inevitable conclusion is that there are no features of the ways of thinking exclusively shared by the East Asians as a whole, unless they are universal traits of human nature in the East and West. Furthermore, if the ways of thinking differ according to the cultural history of each people, then we should expect the cultures formed by these nations to be heterogeneous. Sokichi Tsuda recently remarked that the three nations, India, China, and Japan, have established respectively their own distinct cultures.32 As far as the ways of thinking or folk-traits of each nation are concerned, it seems proper for us to admit this cultural pluralism in order to begin our study of the fascinating diversity of human nature which led Pope to his famous saying: "The proper study of mankind is man."

Universal and Particular Aspects of East Asian Thought and Culture

The Concept of the "East" and Previous Comments on It

We have clarified in the previous chapter that there is no way of thinking generally applicable to the East Asians. Why then are such phrases as "East Asian thought" or "East Asian culture" used as if they were axiomatic concepts? I believe the answer is an historical one. The Japanese people were thrown into spiritual confusion due to their abrupt acceptance of Western culture after the Meiji Restoration in 1868. In Japan, prior to this period, Chinese and Indian thought intermingled with traditional Japanese thought, and they existed in harmony, oblivious of any peculiar differences. As a result, Japanese thought was regarded as being at one with Chinese and Indian thought, and thus the phrase "East Asian thought" came to be applied to all three countries, as identical. The people advocating the necessity of preserving the old Japanese cultural tradition especially emphasized the importance of East Asian thought; at the same time, almost invariably, such people have been Orientalists." Admittedly, an exclusive minority with nationalistic tendencies did their utmost to rid Japanese culture of the remains of the influence coming from the Indian and the Chinese cultures. This faction maintained that they would pay their respect only to things proper to

Japan, but as the predominant part of old Japanese culture owed much of its substance to India and China, such a narrow-minded attitude was not shared by liberal intellectuals in general. They paid, instead, attention to the similarity and affinity between the old Japanese culture and the cultures of East Asia in general. Accordingly, despite the difference of geographical location between "Japan" and "East Asia," the conflict between the two has been scarcely felt. Along with the attitude which maintained the superiority of Japanese culture, the following view was generally held: The Japanese are the most ingenious people in regard to accepting foreign culture. They assimilated the essential elements of the culture of East Asia. Buddhism and Confucianism are examples. Hereafter Japan might well avail itself of progressive traits of Western civilization and thereby build a new culture."
However, as we point out in this book, the way in which the Japanese received the cultures of India and China led to serious modifications and even distortion; they did not accept and assimilate these cultures in their entirety. There is a fundamental discrepancy between the old Japanese culture and the cultures of other countries in East Asia. We must not overlook this fact.

Taking notice of this situation, it has already been observed even by the Japanese scholars on East Asia that the culture of East Asia is far from being a unified entity. "Whatever amount of space may be allotted to the area which should be called 'East Asia,' as far as cultural significance is concerned, it never existed from ancient times as a unified world; there has existed no single history called the cultural history of East Asia, and accordingly, it is fundamentally impossible for us to assume that there is a single culture to be called the culture of East Asia."33 The scholars who advocate this view deny the cultural unity of East Asia but some go so far as to impute a unity to the culture of the West: "On the whole, the West has evolved, moved by a single world history, though the nations existing therein had their own singular cultural traits and were not without their own national histories."34 At the same time it is emphasized that the Western culture is the same as world culture. "At present, modern culture, world culture, that is to say, Western culture is not opposed to Japan's culture, but is rather reflected in and constitutes a development of Japanese culture itself."35 This view expressed by a respected scholar on East Asia is shared and supported by a good number of intellectuals at present. However, when such an observation is analyzed, it is found that there are two premises presupposed: (1) the unity of Western culture, (2) the identity of Western culture with world culture. These two premises are formulated in opposition to the idea of the unity of the culture of East Asia. We must, however, examine and criticize these two premises.

First, concerning the unity of Western culture, there is no doubt that European countries throughout past ages developed a culture by keeping in close communication with one another spiritually and materially. However, can we rightfully claim that Western culture is a single, unified entity? Western culture may be traced back to two cultural currents, Greek and Judeo-Christian, but it is historical fact that they conflicted with each other. These two currents were compromised and blended with each other in the Middle Ages somehow or other, but in modern times a certain number of Westerners, certain materialists and positivistic scientists, do not subscribe to the Western religious tradition. Furthermore, in Western culture, there are many conflicting trends of thought, and we have already pointed out that the features of the ways of thinking which are generally called "Oriental" are also found among the ways of thinking of the Westerners.36 It is one thing to admit that there was a close relationship among the Western nations and it is another to acknowledge the unified character of the ways of thinking of these nations. Therefore, as far as the ways of thinking are concerned, we must disavow the cultural unity of the West as we did in the case of the East. The cultural character of the West is in the final analysis nothing but that of a variegated type or an approximation to it. In any case it cannot be established as unique at all.

Next, let us deal with the contention that Western culture can be equated with world culture. It is generally acknowledged that the unification of the world was accomplished by Western nations with their dominance of power in the world in recent times. It goes without saying that no people or nation can exist isolated from the West politically or economically. In other fields as well, such as mathematical and natural sciences, learning, art, etc., the influence of Western culture is decisive. This is the reason it is generally thought that the world was unified and at the same time westernized. The unification of the world, however, is only outstanding in regard to man's efforts to control, and utilize material nature; while on the side of language, ethics, religion, art, customs, etc., the spiritual traditions of each nation can be altered only with much difficulty. For instance, the Westerners arrived in India for the first time towards the end of the fifteenth century and, at last, she came to be ruled by them. In spite of their skillful ruling policy, the Christian population in India is only a little over two per cent of the whole population; the majority of Indians professing Christianity consists of either the outcast from the Hindu society or the lowly, while the majority of the whole populace embraces the popular faiths, derived from ancient times. In China the situation is somewhat similar. The fact that the nations of the East refuse to be altered easily in their ways of thinking or their social customs, even in the face of the thought or cultural influence of the West, should not be characterized

merely as due to the backwardness or retardation of the East Asian people. Some scholars report that the characters of the ways of thinking which we have delineated mainly in terms of how Buddhism was received, presented themselves in the case of Christianity as well. If it were true, then it follows that the ways of thinking of various nations have been unexpectedly firm enough to retain their cultural peculiarities to this day.

The East Asian people and their cultures will not be regarded as inferior or backward. In some cases it is as advanced as the West. For example, it is common to the West, India, China, or Tibet that culture has developed from the integral language form to the analytical one. We shall refer to this fact later. In some phases, the principal nations of the world have gone through a common process of progress. Such a common process of progress is also seen in the field of religion, ethics, social institutions, political organizations, etc. Research into the cultural contributions of various nations as seen from the viewpoint of their interrelationship is necessary. In different times, there are different social structures, and different forms in the contrast of social classes. In spite of that, there is something unchangeable that has survived to this day, and here, I have attempted to define this. I do not mean to say that something traditional or constant is always superior to the ever-changing products of dynamic historical and social processes, but it is well to realize that while the world is making progress in new directions, many traditional cultural traits of its varied peoples are still able to enrich the world with their distinctive contributions.

East Asian Thought and Its Universality

It may be noted that those who contend that westernization is the same as universalization have the following view in mind: "Cultures of East Asia are subordinate after all to Western culture. The characteristics of various ways of thinking of the East Asian people are to be overcome some day by those of the Westerners. Western culture is in possession of universality, while Eastern culture is not." For example, Max Weber says, "The cultural phenomena which promoted the development of universal meaning and applied science happened to appear in the West, and in the West alone." And he has conducted sociological research into almost all the religious systems the world over in the light of the question, "Upon what kind of chain of conditions was the above fact dependent?"37 In Japan on the other hand, Dr. Tsuda observed likewise that Chinese thought, for example, is incapable of assuming universality.38 However, what is meant after all by "being incapable of assuming universality"? Eastern thinkers find the scientific knowledge or techniques which arose in the modern West can be understood or assimilated with ease and without change. But with respect to other cultural fields, is it possible for us to say

that anything born of the culture of the West is capable of assuming universality, whereas all the, cultural products of other nations are not? When we look back over the history of mankind, we can see the traces of Eastern influence upon the West. It is often observed that in the Bible there are traces from the stories of the Buddhist scriptures or that a part of Greek philosophy was influenced by Indian philosophy; these assertions may be vague and have not been fully worked out. However, the fact that in the parables or stories current in the Middle Ages of the West the influence of the Indian civilization appears acknowledged by scholars.39 Among others, the fact that the concept of the Buddhist "Bodhisattva" was transferred to the West and made into a canonized Catholic saint should not be overlooked in spite of its triviality.40 There is also the fact that the life story of the Indian Sakyamuni * was brought over to the West, where it was transformed into the life of one of the Catholic saints; subsequently, it was carried to Japan by Christian

(Kirishitan) missionaries, but neither Buddhists nor Christians were aware of its background.41 In modern times, however, by means of translations Eastern thought has become increasingly familiar to the West. As a result, the influence of Eastern thought on the intellectual history of France42 and Germany has been indeed remarkable. Chinese thought especially served as an impetus to the Enlightenment in Europe and inspired such people as Voltaire and Wolff. Likewise, Indian thought contributed to the formation of Romanticism in Germany. The movement by the brothers Schlegel, the philosophy of Schopenhauer, the thought of Keyserling in modern times, etc. could not be imagined without the influence of Indian thought. W. von Humboldt spoke highly of the Indian Bhagavadgita* as the most beautiful and most profound philosophical work in the world; Schopenhauer called the Upanisads* "The consolation of my life and death" and found in that philosophical epic the fountainhead of his thought. Count
Keyserling concluded his book Travel Diary of a Philosopher with the following lines: "The turmoil of the world after the great war can be saved only by the Bodhisattva Ideal." Professor Charles Morris, a philosopher in contemporary America, has given the name "Maitreyan Way" to the path upon which the world should tread in the future. In America also, pragmatists like John Dewey have shown a keen interest in the practical social aspects of Eastern thought. Northrop's comparative studies of East and West have been done from a methodological viewpoint. In England, Germany, or America, groups of people who call themselves Buddhists," though very few in number, have formed small organizations.43 Thus, if Eastern thought should come to be understood more deeply, the possibility of its influence looms larger.
Even within the confines of East Asia, a great cultural interchange
was accomplished in the past. Buddhism spread over almost the whole of Asia. To what extent Confucianism regulated the actual life of Japan is yet to be studied; however, there is no doubt that it held a kind of regulating power in the actual, social life of Japan. According to one scholarly Confucian, it was not until the beginning of the introduction of Confucianism that a moral code prevailed in Japan.44 Confucian scholars such as Ogiu Sorai, Dazai Shuntai, Yamagata Shunan *, and others, thought also that in ancient Japan there was no philosophy which could be regarded as ethics, and it was not until the advent of Chinese Confucianism that morality came into being. Particularly, Dazai Shuntai believed that in ancient Japan from the beginning there was lacking any sign of ethical awareness, and that it was not until the introduction from China of the "Way of the Sage" or "The Teaching of the Sage" that the Japanese became interested in ethics. In Japan from the beginning there has never been such a conception as 'the Way.' In recent years, however, Shintoists are said to be solemnly teaching the 'way of our country' as if it were profound, yet whatever they are teaching is nearly all fabrication and interpolation of later times. The fact that there were originally no Japanese equivalents to the Confucian list of the greatest virtues, benevolence (jen), righteousness (yi), propriety (li), harmony or music of the soul (yüeh), filial piety (hsiao), and brotherly respect (t'i); the absence of these words is proof that there was no such concept as 'the Way' (Tao) in Japan, and so the lack of Japanese equivalents reveals that their origin is not to be placed in Japan. From the time of the mythical gods to somewhere around the fortieth Emperor (ca. 645 A.D.), for want of decorum, marriages were held among parents, children, brothers, uncles, and nieces. In the meantime communication was established with foreign countries so that the way of the Sage of China came to be diffused in Japan. The result was that the Japanese people became acquainted with decorum and more acutely conscious of the ways of civilized society. The most lowly of society at present regard people who have behaved against decorum as no better than beasts; this is all due to the influence of the teaching of the Sage."45 While from the viewpoint of the Buddhists, prior to the introduction of Buddhism, Japan was utterly in the dark, it was not until that time that people were saved, and Buddhism and its enlightening virtues were received with rejoicing. For instance, Rennyo (1415–1499) expressed his feeling of joy in the following manner:
"The spread of Buddhist teachings in this country (Japan) can be traced back to the time of the Emperor Kimmei (in the sixth century), when Buddhist teachings first arrived in Japan. The Tathagata*'s teaching was not widespread prior to that time; people did not at all hear the way to Enlightenment. Having been born in an age when the Buddhist teaching

is widespread, we are now fortunate enough to have heard the way of deliverance from the world of birth and death, though we do not know what good causes brought this happiness about. Indeed we are now able to meet whatever is difficult to meet."46
Nichiren also says: "In ancient days prior to the advent of Buddha-Dharma, people knew neither the Buddha nor the Dharma. Yet after the struggle between Moriya and Jogu * Taishi (Prince Shotoku*), some people came to believe in the Buddha and others did not."47
How can we contend that there was no universality in the teaching which impressed so many people as being the universal teaching? Those who deny the cultural singleness of the East are prone to disavow the universality of Eastern thought. But logically speaking, it is inconsistent to deny the universality of Eastern thought as a consequence of disavowing the singleness of the East, dividing it into a number of wholes, and at the same time recognizing a mutual (or unilateral) influence among these cultural wholes. We must avoid this inconsistency. We deny the singleness of the East but affirm the establishment of a number of cultural wholes. And it is because of this that we should like to acknowledge a universal significance in certain aspects of various thought-systems established in East Asia. It is by no means true that all these systems have universality, but we should recognize it in some aspects of them. What we can state the universal aspects are would depend on the analysis of the cultural conditions.
If we take the standpoint of those who favor an impartial objective examination of the thoughts which mankind has produced, it follows that we could not possibly say that Western thought alone is universal and that the thoughts of other nations have no universal significance. The ancient Greeks, or at least some of them,48 had acknowledged that the philosophical thoughts of other nations had their individual significance. Also among the modern philosophers of the West there are a good many who hold such a view.49 Nevertheless, there are some who would attribute universal superiority especially to Western thought alone, perhaps because they wish to display the power of the modern West to control nature or are fascinated by it alone.

Indeed it is a fact that the modern world is being unified by dint of the political and military pressure of the West, but this does not affirm the insignificance of the cultures of the non-Western nations. In the ancient West, for instance, Greek culture still held its position of leadership even under the political and military rule of Rome, while India was gorgeously adorned by the flowers of culture, in spite of the oft-repeated dominance by foreign peoples during her long history. We ought not to disregard the cold fact that culture is subject to political, military pressure, but at the same time we must not forget the dignity of man which no power can subdue.


Customary and conventional as the phrase may be, if we remember this fact, it would not be meaningless for us to emphasize the significance of "East Asia" at present. There is a great significance in knowing East Asia and developing its diverse cultures. Originally such concepts as East Asia, the East, or the Orient were set in opposition to the Occident. In spite of their obscure connotation, these words came to be used by peoples, long subjected to oppression by the military and political superiority of the Westerners, as an attempt to preserve their respective cultural traditions. Indeed the famous slogan "Asia is one" uttered by Okakura Tenshin is not free from inaccuracy and is not in accordance with the facts of the history of thought. But the nations of East Asia, which have long cherished the desire to preserve and develop the respective cultures of their own, have inadvertently associated themselves with this slogan, because of the common feeling that they shared the same objective. It was a sort of common impulse aiming at defending their respective cultures against the rule of the West.

The desire on the part of various nations to preserve and develop their respective cultural traditions is justifiable. We ought to respect this desire. In that case, however, it behooves each nation to see to it that while being critical of foreign cultures they remain critical also of their own indigenous culture. That is, with modesty and self-awareness a new culture may be formed through enlightened self-criticism.
The neglect of criticism and the mere affirmation and preservation of the past would be tantamount to annihilating one's own culture. However, if it accepts foreign cultures uncritically, it would be merely blind acceptance, and consequently, no positive contribution toward forming a new culture for mankind will have been made.
From this standpoint, studies in East Asia should reflect something more than the mere tastes of dilettanti, and should be ready to contribute more positively to forming a fresh culture. There have been people who regard the learning and the scientific methods established in the modern West as the only absolute ones, and such a thought-tendency seems to remain fairly influential at present. This may be only natural but we ought to be critical as well as appreciative of the learning and sciences of the modern West. Learning in the future may be reformed and developed by Western advances reinforced by the results of studies in Eastern cultures.

Comparative Study of Ways of Thinking and Philosophy

A study of ways of thinking of the East Asians, at the same time, should be compared critically with the studies of Western philosophy. It goes without saying that we must compare above all the philosophical systems of East Asia with those of the West. Deussen once speculated as fol-
lows: "Suppose that there exists a certain planet in the solar system, say, Mars or Venus, inhabited by human beings or other beings with their culture flourishing and with an established philosophy. Suppose we come to know their philosophy through one of the beings living there, who had entered into the sphere of our terrestrial gravitation after being shot out in a missile. In that case we might undoubtedly take an enormous interest in the results of their philosophy, and we might carefully compare and examine their philosophy and ours. If there should be some difference, we would determine which side is true, and if it should be found that there is no difference between the two, then this would imply that the truth of the outcome of the philosophical contemplation of both sides had been substantiated. Although in this case we would have to take into account the natural and inevitable sophistication of pure reason, as Kant put it. This may be wishful thinking, but we have a similar situation in Indian philosophy, for Indian philosophy has taken a course of development independent of Western philosophy."50

He then proceeds to say, "Here, people may raise the following question: We are living in an age which has attained such a remarkable stage of development, that would it not be a childish and inappropriate attempt for us to learn something from the ancient Indians? To know the view of the world of the Indians, however, is profitable. We are enabled thereby to realize that we have fallen into a great prejudice in favor of the whole system we have established about religion and philosophy, and that besides the way of understanding things established by Hegel as the only possible and reasonable one, there exists as yet another one totally different from Hegel's."

Deussen's allegation offers a number of problems over which we must ponder. As we are concerned in this book with the ways of thinking of various nations, we shall not treat here the significance of comparative philosophy.52 Instead, we would here especially lay stress on the following point:
As is seen in modern Western philosophy, the concept of philosophy, which is required for instance by Kant, is not the "technical concept" (Schulbegriff) but the "general human concept" (Weltbegriff, conceptus cosmicus). He was not merely looking for the "epistemological system which was to be sought for only as a branch of learning, and which regards as its object nothing more than the unity of knowledge, that is, the logical perfection of cognition." With him, the ideal of philosophy was to be the learning of the relationship between all cognitions and the essence of human reason." A philosopher was not the technician of reason but the legislator of human reason (Gesetzgeber der menschlichen Vernunft).53 Therefore, for him the truth to be given by the supreme philosophy is
nothing but what is already latent in the minds of all people. It may perhaps be due to such a standpoint that in his metaphysics the commonsensical view about religio-ethics held generally by Westerners seems to be lurking.

In the "a priori dialectic," in his work Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kant made an inquiry into the nature of such ideas as the soul, freedom, God, etc. and contended that they are concepts not of the Understanding but of Reason; therefore, in regard to natural cognition they are not structural as in the case of a category, but regulative, and that there is a danger of substituting an image for the Idea or guiding concept and thus misunderstanding its meaning. According to his philosophy, however, an Idea is in no way an image. He therefore rejected the phenomenal status of these Ideas but recognized their metaphysical function. And it is well-known that Kant grounded his practical philosophy (ethics) on these regulative Ideas.

It is this regulative function that constitutes the "general human concept" lying behind the metaphysical reality of such Ideas. It is not certain whether he himself was aware of it, but in any case there was a traditional religio-ethical concept among Westerners which made him set up these Ideas, for his Ideas are not necessarily taken for granted among East Asians in general. For example, the thought which recognizes the metaphysical reality of soul as a permanent substance was rejected by Buddhism. Buddhists try to ground the establishment of ethics without setting up the idea of the immortality of soul as a condition. As for the idea of God, neither Buddhists nor Jains accept God as the creator of the universe. In Eastern thought in general, especially in Indian thought, gods are possessed of no meaning or any importance. Indian people generally are inclined to base their ethics on a domain free from God's authority. This view did not enter into Kant's philosophical vision. Despite commentaries written from various viewpoints, the attempt to understand Kant's thought mainly as initiating an epoch and a stage of development to be made by mankind's society and thought, is one-sided. As far as this point is concerned, Kant's philosophy is after all nothing but a philosophical and theoretical expression of the Protestant pietism in modern Western culture.

What we have said in the above is only an example, but in any case if we introduce various ways of thinking of East Asians into philosophical speculation, then we should have a wider and more fruitful basis for the critical consideration of the philosophical thoughts of the West.
If, however, we should admit any of the philosophical thoughts of the West indiscriminately, then we would be committed to nothing but a blind adherence to authority, already conspicuous among Japanese intellectuals. What the German philosophers have taken as the "universal human con-

cept" (Weltbegriff) was after all restricted by the historical tradition of the German people's cultural and social life, so that the attempt by the West to foist the concept on Eastern society, admitting a universal significance only for it and neglecting their circumstances, is a kind of non-critical attitude in the formation of culture. Among ideas that Western philosophers have taken up as "universal human concepts," there are not a few that seem to a majority of Japanese to have been transformed into "technical concepts."

By reflecting upon the seemingly irrelevant ways of thinking of the East Asians, we can be critical of the philosophical thoughts of the West.54 And as a result of the criticism, we should be able to acquire an efficient basis for going forward towards the establishment of a new and truly universal philosophy.
The Cognitive and the Existential Basis for the Differences in Ways of Thinking
In the following pages, we shall occasionally disclose the traits of ways of thinking of various nations in respect to their forms of expression of judgment and deduction among the peoples of East Asia, and then consider how these traits are expressed in various cultural phenomena, particularly how they have influenced Buddhism, as a universal religion, to assume different phases. In that case, we have adopted the method of inferring other traits when possible, from among some typical expression-forms of judgment and deduction. The former method proves to be the means to know the latter. Therefore, the traits seen in expression-forms of judgment and deduction are the cognitive basis (ratio cognoscendi, jnapaka * hetu).

Here several questions arise: What is the existential basis (ratio existendi, karaka* hetu) which brings about the differences in ways of thinking among nations? By what causes were such differences of expression-forms or ways of thinking brought about?
These questions cannot easily be solved here, because they are difficult questions which concern the foundations not only of philosophy but of all the sciences and humanities. The general glimpse which we shall have from a limited range of observation might help us in solving these questions.
Unverified theories have been proposed to explain why various nations show differences in ways of thinking. First of all, the features of ways of thinking seem to have nothing to do with the blood or lineage of nations. That is to say, the features of ways of thinking are not explicable by alleged racial propensities. Being left to live among a numerically greater and
stronger people, a minority group naturally becomes accustomed to the new social and cultural environment and finally takes on the same traits and ways of thinking as the dominant majority. A good example of this process of acculturation, is seen, for instance, in the familiar case of Japanese emigrants who have settled down abroad. The fact is that even the so-called "Aryan race" which was divided into East and West, that is to say, the Europeans and the Indians, came to show different features of ways of thinking. It seems that the Indians are not pure Aryans, after all, but a hybrid of Aryans and aborigines, hence such differences appear; however, there is also evidence to the contrary. Although the inhabitants of Pakistan are trying even at present to keep their "pure Aryan blood," they have already discarded the religion of their ancestors and embraced Mohammedanism. Accordingly, there is no intrinsic relationship between physiological or racial lineage and peoples' ways of thinking.

Another fairly common theory for our consideration refers us to differences of climatic environment.55 It is believed that such physical causes as climate, weather, geology, the nature of the soil, and topography of a certain locale, account for the differences in the ways of thinking among peoples; for instance, the differences of the ways of thinking between the Europeans and the Indians in the Aryan lineage might have been derived from or dependent upon such differences of climatic environment. Even the climatic or topographic environment, however, does not possess a singular or decisive influence over the differences of man's ways of thinking. If it were so, then the theory of climatic determinism would be established. But the real facts testify to the opposite. It very often happens that the selfsame people living in one and the same climatic environment changes its ways of thinking under the influence of the thought of other nations. Although the ways of thinking of an isolated people become set and hardly changeable, they can yet be changed to a considerable degree under the influence of other nations. This fact can easily be understood if we go through the history of each nation. If we stick to the climatic environment alone as its decisive cause, then we can never explain the changes of ways of thinking or thought-patterns of a nation—that is, its intellectual history.
Also in this connection, no geographical environment or topography constitutes a decisive factor, either. As is often said, India and China belong to the Continent, so that the nature of the cultures born there is continental, while that of the Japanese culture is insular, and indeed, they do create a contrasting impression. Among other things, Japan is an island nation, out of the reach of any great foreign invasion, so that she has preserved the ancient culture and even keeps such cultural products intact as have already been lost in the mainland of Asia. In the island of Ceylon, to cite another instance, the most primitive of all forms of Buddhist orders

in other countries have been preserved. Therefore, it is true that an island nation is characterized by the tendency to conservatism which preserves the traditional ancient culture intact, but a nation on the continent is not without such a conservative character. The anti-progressive or static character of traditional Chinese culture has often been pointed out. And it is astonishing that a part of the Indian population still preserves the Vedic culture as it was established three thousand years ago. Anti-progressivism or conservatism is seen in many of the countries mentioned above. Accordingly it is impossible to draw the conclusion that the geographical environment or topography, continental or insular, is the only factor which determines the differences in the ways of thinking of peoples.

Ought we not to recognize the existential basis of the difference of ways of thinking, not in the natural scientific conditions of heredity and physical environment, but in the material conditions which have to do with man's social behavior? What emerges here is a theory which attaches great importance to economic conditions in the social life of humanity. Historical materialism may be an example of such a theory. Since the criticism of materialism would constitute an independent theme of study, it is impossible for us to refer to it here. As a result of our inquiry into the ways of thinking of the East Asian peoples, we shall not hesitate to conclude as follows: The theory of the materialistic view of history or economic view of history is incapable of explaining in its entirety the fact of the different ways of thinking which vary according to the thought and culture of people. Needless to say, the materialistic view of history emphasizes that the sum total of the productive relations in a certain period, or the economic structure of society can alone provide the material base upon which the juridical and political superstructure is established, and in accordance with which a certain social or class consciousness is also formed. Despite the fact that it affords a number of solutions to problems of social organization or social thought, it does not adequately explain other cultural problems. As a matter of fact, to what extent will the standpoint of the materialistic or economic view of history suffice to explain the differences of ways of thinking among peoples which are disclosed in our studies?

Differences of productive types cannot explain many totally opposed variants of ways of thinking; for example, the fact that the Chinese people attach so much importance to concrete individuality; while the Indians seek abstract universality, and in contrast to the Chinese people who are empirical, sensuous, and realistic, the Indian people are imaginative, other-worldly, and metaphysical. It is said that in the East Asian society people generally inherited the same type of agricultural production from ancient times and that there should be little divergence of type among agricultural nations. This is the very reason why the phrase "Asiatic productive type"

is used as if the uniformity of type is taken for granted by economists and sociologists, though, of course, whether it is true that there is such uniformity is a serious question. In economics the "Asiatic productive type" might well be admitted, but so far as ways of thinking is concerned, we shall reject the use of the word "Asiatic" as an unclear and highly questionable concept. According to my opinion, ways of thinking vary according to the cultural traditions of the peoples respectively concerned. The concept of the "Asiatic productive type" does not explain the historical and cultural grounds upon which the differences of ways of thinking existing among Asian nations have arisen. Consequently, as far as this point is concerned, the materialistic view of history or the general economic view of history has in its dogmatic monolithic approach exposed its fatal weak point.

In this connection, it is often maintained by scholars that the absence of the city-state in East Asian society has produced the characteristics common to East Asian thought. It is true that the "polis" or "civitas" was never established in East Asia, and the "bourgeois" in the Western sense of the word has never existed in East Asia. "Shimin" (Japanese for citizen) is merely a coined word; "Chonin * (inhabitant of a town) is not identical with citizen.56 The absence of a city-state might have been the actual basis for the appearance of thought-characteristics common to all the East Asian nations, but it is impossible for us to explain thereby the differences in their ways of thinking.

After such considerations, the following hypothesis emerges; namely, a unique religious ideology is the determining factor of the distinctiveness of the social and economic life of each nation. Apparently this hypothesis was intended to correct other thoughts such as the materialistic view of history. Max Weber, a representative of such an idealistic view, says:

"An idea shapes the world's course just as a switchman directs man's motivated interests on to a track."57 Attaching great importance58 to the influence of religious ideas on social life, economics, and ethics, he examined the relationship between religion and social life in almost all the important nations of the world. The result of his study must be highly valued, but the study of cultural factors, in addition to religion, cannot neglect the characteristics of ways of thinking in every people. Most Indians have certain general characteristics common to Hindus, Jains, and Moslems, and most Chinese have characteristic ways of thinking shared by the devotees of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. Now it is not unusual to find the same person regarding himself a follower of many religions. The fact that this eclecticism occurs among the Japanese with Shintoism, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Christianity shows that in Japan there is a tendency, characteristic of Japan's culture, to transcend all

sectarian distinctions of religions. A foreign religion has often wholly transformed the ways of thinking of a nation, and at the same time the ways of thinking peculiar to a nation have reciprocally changed the foreign religion itself.
Therefore, we have to pay attention to the fact that historical circumstances of a nation count to a great extent in bringing about a difference of thought types. We shall point out the fact that the view of most Indians about human relations favors the identity or fusion of the self with others, in contrast to the primitivistic Westerners' view which insists on the hostile and antagonistic relations of individuals in the "state of nature." The development of such a difference of thought-forms is considered to be due to the historical evolution of the society which different conquerors and ruling people formed in India and in the West. In the case of the West, the Greeks, for instance, formed their city-state (polis) after conquering the older inhabitants. They had come as adventurers and invaders amidst a foreign people, and first of all built a safety-zone encircled by stone walls so as to keep the common enemy out of their own world. They thought that they would thereby succeed in protecting themselves against the power of the dead souls of the enemy, and would at the same time be protected against assault from the living enemy around them, so long as the city provided them a refuge.59 Against their expectations, however, the Aryans who invaded India did not face any such violent resistance on the part of the aborigines, so that their society was less menaced by the aborigines. They constructed puras (fortresses) on hills, wherein they confined themselves only in such emergencies, as an enemy invasion or flood, while in ordinary times living outside the puras. The differences of historical background in regard to social evolution, as illustrated above, continue to shape the ways of thinking of every nation for a long enough time to come. The differences of historical background, however, can be affected and seriously modified by future historical changes. Consequently, past evolution is not possessed of any absolute significance as a cultural determinant.
The question:—What is the existential basis or empirical factors which determine or explain the characteristics of a people's way of thinking?—yet remains unsolved. The question then is: Are not the expression-forms of judgment and deduction which we adopt as the cognitive means for studying the characteristic ways of thinking, working at the same time as an existential basis? Generally speaking, since the grammar and its syntax, which regulate the expression-form of judgment and deduction, do not easily change,60 they are not only expressive of the characteristic ways of thinking of a nation but in return they also regulate them for some time. In other words, it is probable that the ways of working of a thought-form might in turn be qualified by its language-form. Therefore, as far as this
point goes, the expression-forms of thought employed in language are the existential basis for the characteristics of ways of thinking of a people. But this relationship of language to thought is by no means absolute in nature. A grammar or a syntax might change on account of social unrest or as a result of a contact with foreign languages. In such cases, the ways of thinking would have undergone a change. The change of ways of thinking of a nation depends upon the many historical changes that affect the cultural customs and habits of its people.
According to the above considerations, we may offer, in the last analysis, the following hypothesis: There is no such thing as a single fundamental principle which determines the characteristic ways of thinking of a people. Various factors, as mentioned above, related in manifold ways, each exerting its influence, enter into the ways of thinking of a people. If we deal with the question of the existential basis which brings about differences of ways of thinking, we see no way left for us but to take the standpoint of pluralism. The attempt to seek out an isolated single cause looks alluring but it is destined to fail to grasp the complexities of social change. We are obliged to recognize in this case also the principle of "Things are born of various conditions" which Buddhism put forth against the monistic metaphysical theory. In what order, then, do these elements make themselves felt? This is a question to be
contemplated upon and investigated again in the future. Here we cannot dwell upon this question in detail, and even if we try to get a general perspective, it would be difficult for us to offer a single order in response. Since the thinking function is one which in the long run affects man's conduct and practice, it might have to be said that it is conditioned by how man stands at a certain point of time. Man is a historical being and is all the time subject to the currents of history, so that he should heed both the predictable aspects of history, and at the same time, the unpredictable factor of chance. For instance, such an accidental event in which a nation comes into contact with another culture can bring about an unexpected change of affairs of a more serious nature than the nation in question had ever expected.
The ways of thinking of a people have the double relation of being conditioned by the products of man's own creation, and, at the same time, of qualifying them in return. In some cases we can also see the phase on which each one of the above mentioned sundry cultural factors is in turn characterized and formed by the ways of thinking of a people. It is an independent subject of study to clarify the operation of the mutual factors in both relations. In this book, however, we shall have practically attained the objective of our study, if we succeed in clarifying the following two points: In the first place, there are some characteristic differences in the
ways of thinking of East Asian nations. In the second place, with regard to all people, there is a certain logical and human connection among these characteristics.
Attention should also be paid in this connection to the fact that in the history of every people there is a distinction of periods, such as the ancient, the middle, and the contemporary, according to which the ways of thinking of peoples naturally differ. This fact we do not mean to deny. But at the same time we also ought to recognize the fact that in every nation there are special thought-tendencies which have persisted throughout these historical stages. The more communication progresses, the closer the intercourse between nations becomes, and the more the world becomes unified, the less will be the disparity of ways of thinking among nations. Notwithstanding this fact, however, it will never be easy for any people totally to sever itself from the traditional habits and customs of the past. In order to balance variations in the ways of thinking of nations and to create a new-world culture, we need first of all to reflect upon and ascertain the characteristic ways of thinking of diverse peoples. Of course, it goes without saying that we should equally consider how they underwent changes in the course of history. The overall renovation of ways of thinking of nations will not be easily accomplished by taking only external or institutional measures such as reforms of land-ownership, economic, and political systems. For the purpose of building a new culture aspiring to truth, a rigorous criticism of the ways of thinking of nations ought continually to be made.

By what method can we grasp the special features of the traditional ways of thinking of the Indians? Going back to the various cultural phenomena of Indian history in order to examine them thoroughly and impartially for
characteristic traits will not be an easy task. If a Indeed it is a fact that the modern world is being unified by dint of the political and military pressure of the West, but this does not affirm the insignificance of the cultures of the non-Western nations. In the ancient West, for instance, Greek culture still held its position of leadership even under the political and military rule of Rome, while India was gorgeously adorned by the flowers of culture, in spite of the oft-repeated dominance by foreign peoples during her long history. We ought not to disregard the cold fact that culture is subject to political, military pressure, but at the same time we must not forget the dignity of man which no power can subdue.


Customary and conventional as the phrase may be, if we remember this fact, it would not be meaningless for us to emphasize the significance of "East Asia" at present. There is a great significance in knowing East Asia and developing its diverse cultures. Originally such concepts as East Asia, the East, or the Orient were set in opposition to the Occident. In spite of their obscure connotation, these words came to be used by peoples, long subjected to oppression by the military and political superiority of the Westerners, as an attempt to preserve their respective cultural traditions. Indeed the famous slogan "Asia is one" uttered by Okakura Tenshin is not free from inaccuracy and is not in accordance with the facts of the history of thought. But the nations of East Asia, which have long cherished the desire to preserve and develop the respective cultures of their own, have inadvertently associated themselves with this slogan, because of the common feeling that they shared the same objective. It was a sort of common impulse aiming at defending their respective cultures against the rule of the West.

The desire on the part of various nations to preserve and develop their respective cultural traditions is justifiable. We ought to respect this desire. In that case, however, it behooves each nation to see to it that while being critical of foreign cultures they remain critical also of their own indigenous culture. That is, with modesty and self-awareness a new culture may be formed through enlightened self-criticism.
The neglect of criticism and the mere affirmation and preservation of the past would be tantamount to annihilating one's own culture. However, if it accepts foreign cultures uncritically, it would be merely blind acceptance, and consequently, no positive contribution toward forming a new culture for mankind will have been made.
From this standpoint, studies in East Asia should reflect something more than the mere tastes of dilettanti, and should be ready to contribute more positively to forming a fresh culture. There have been people who regard the learning and the scientific methods established in the modern West as the only absolute ones, and such a thought-tendency seems to remain fairly influential at present. This may be only natural but we ought to be critical as well as appreciative of the learning and sciences of the modern West. Learning in the future may be reformed and developed by Western advances reinforced by the results of studies in Eastern cultures.

Comparative Study of Ways of Thinking and Philosophy

A study of ways of thinking of the East Asians, at the same time, should be compared critically with the studies of Western philosophy. It goes without saying that we must compare above all the philosophical systems of East Asia with those of the West. Deussen once speculated as fol-
lows: "Suppose that there exists a certain planet in the solar system, say, Mars or Venus, inhabited by human beings or other beings with their culture flourishing and with an established philosophy. Suppose we come to know their philosophy through one of the beings living there, who had entered into the sphere of our terrestrial gravitation after being shot out in a missile. In that case we might undoubtedly take an enormous interest in the results of their philosophy, and we might carefully compare and examine their philosophy and ours. If there should be some difference, we would determine which side is true, and if it should be found that there is no difference between the two, then this would imply that the truth of the outcome of the philosophical contemplation of both sides had been substantiated. Although in this case we would have to take into account the natural and inevitable sophistication of pure reason, as Kant put it. This may be wishful thinking, but we have a similar situation in Indian philosophy, for Indian philosophy has taken a course of development independent of Western philosophy."50

He then proceeds to say, "Here, people may raise the following question: We are living in an age which has attained such a remarkable stage of development, that would it not be a childish and inappropriate attempt for us to learn something from the ancient Indians? To know the view of the world of the Indians, however, is profitable. We are enabled thereby to realize that we have fallen into a great prejudice in favor of the whole system we have established about religion and philosophy, and that besides the way of understanding things established by Hegel as the only possible and reasonable one, there exists as yet another one totally different from Hegel's."

Deussen's allegation offers a number of problems over which we must ponder. As we are concerned in this book with the ways of thinking of various nations, we shall not treat here the significance of comparative philosophy.52 Instead, we would here especially lay stress on the following point:
As is seen in modern Western philosophy, the concept of philosophy, which is required for instance by Kant, is not the "technical concept" (Schulbegriff) but the "general human concept" (Weltbegriff, conceptus cosmicus). He was not merely looking for the "epistemological system which was to be sought for only as a branch of learning, and which regards as its object nothing more than the unity of knowledge, that is, the logical perfection of cognition." With him, the ideal of philosophy was to be the learning of the relationship between all cognitions and the essence of human reason." A philosopher was not the technician of reason but the legislator of human reason (Gesetzgeber der menschlichen Vernunft).53 Therefore, for him the truth to be given by the supreme philosophy is
nothing but what is already latent in the minds of all people. It may perhaps be due to such a standpoint that in his metaphysics the commonsensical view about religio-ethics held generally by Westerners seems to be lurking.

In the "a priori dialectic," in his work Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kant made an inquiry into the nature of such ideas as the soul, freedom, God, etc. and contended that they are concepts not of the Understanding but of Reason; therefore, in regard to natural cognition they are not structural as in the case of a category, but regulative, and that there is a danger of substituting an image for the Idea or guiding concept and thus misunderstanding its meaning. According to his philosophy, however, an Idea is in no way an image. He therefore rejected the phenomenal status of these Ideas but recognized their metaphysical function. And it is well-known that Kant grounded his practical philosophy (ethics) on these regulative Ideas.

It is this regulative function that constitutes the "general human concept" lying behind the metaphysical reality of such Ideas. It is not certain whether he himself was aware of it, but in any case there was a traditional religio-ethical concept among Westerners which made him set up these Ideas, for his Ideas are not necessarily taken for granted among East Asians in general. For example, the thought which recognizes the metaphysical reality of soul as a permanent substance was rejected by Buddhism. Buddhists try to ground the establishment of ethics without setting up the idea of the immortality of soul as a condition. As for the idea of God, neither Buddhists nor Jains accept God as the creator of the universe. In Eastern thought in general, especially in Indian thought, gods are possessed of no meaning or any importance. Indian people generally are inclined to base their ethics on a domain free from God's authority. This view did not enter into Kant's philosophical vision. Despite commentaries written from various viewpoints, the attempt to understand Kant's thought mainly as initiating an epoch and a stage of development to be made by mankind's society and thought, is one-sided. As far as this point is concerned, Kant's philosophy is after all nothing but a philosophical and theoretical expression of the Protestant pietism in modern Western culture.

What we have said in the above is only an example, but in any case if we introduce various ways of thinking of East Asians into philosophical speculation, then we should have a wider and more fruitful basis for the critical consideration of the philosophical thoughts of the West.
If, however, we should admit any of the philosophical thoughts of the West indiscriminately, then we would be committed to nothing but a blind adherence to authority, already conspicuous among Japanese intellectuals. What the German philosophers have taken as the "universal human con-

cept" (Weltbegriff) was after all restricted by the historical tradition of the German people's cultural and social life, so that the attempt by the West to foist the concept on Eastern society, admitting a universal significance only for it and neglecting their circumstances, is a kind of non-critical attitude in the formation of culture. Among ideas that Western philosophers have taken up as "universal human concepts," there are not a few that seem to a majority of Japanese to have been transformed into "technical concepts."

By reflecting upon the seemingly irrelevant ways of thinking of the East Asians, we can be critical of the philosophical thoughts of the West.54 And as a result of the criticism, we should be able to acquire an efficient basis for going forward towards the establishment of a new and truly universal philosophy.
The Cognitive and the Existential Basis for the Differences in Ways of Thinking
In the following pages, we shall occasionally disclose the traits of ways of thinking of various nations in respect to their forms of expression of judgment and deduction among the peoples of East Asia, and then consider how these traits are expressed in various cultural phenomena, particularly how they have influenced Buddhism, as a universal religion, to assume different phases. In that case, we have adopted the method of inferring other traits when possible, from among some typical expression-forms of judgment and deduction. The former method proves to be the means to know the latter. Therefore, the traits seen in expression-forms of judgment and deduction are the cognitive basis (ratio cognoscendi, jnapaka * hetu).

Here several questions arise: What is the existential basis (ratio existendi, karaka* hetu) which brings about the differences in ways of thinking among nations? By what causes were such differences of expression-forms or ways of thinking brought about?
These questions cannot easily be solved here, because they are difficult questions which concern the foundations not only of philosophy but of all the sciences and humanities. The general glimpse which we shall have from a limited range of observation might help us in solving these questions.
Unverified theories have been proposed to explain why various nations show differences in ways of thinking. First of all, the features of ways of thinking seem to have nothing to do with the blood or lineage of nations. That is to say, the features of ways of thinking are not explicable by alleged racial propensities. Being left to live among a numerically greater and
stronger people, a minority group naturally becomes accustomed to the new social and cultural environment and finally takes on the same traits and ways of thinking as the dominant majority. A good example of this process of acculturation, is seen, for instance, in the familiar case of Japanese emigrants who have settled down abroad. The fact is that even the so-called "Aryan race" which was divided into East and West, that is to say, the Europeans and the Indians, came to show different features of ways of thinking. It seems that the Indians are not pure Aryans, after all, but a hybrid of Aryans and aborigines, hence such differences appear; however, there is also evidence to the contrary. Although the inhabitants of Pakistan are trying even at present to keep their "pure Aryan blood," they have already discarded the religion of their ancestors and embraced Mohammedanism. Accordingly, there is no intrinsic relationship between physiological or racial lineage and peoples' ways of thinking.

Another fairly common theory for our consideration refers us to differences of climatic environment.55 It is believed that such physical causes as climate, weather, geology, the nature of the soil, and topography of a certain locale, account for the differences in the ways of thinking among peoples; for instance, the differences of the ways of thinking between the Europeans and the Indians in the Aryan lineage might have been derived from or dependent upon such differences of climatic environment. Even the climatic or topographic environment, however, does not possess a singular or decisive influence over the differences of man's ways of thinking. If it were so, then the theory of climatic determinism would be established. But the real facts testify to the opposite. It very often happens that the selfsame people living in one and the same climatic environment changes its ways of thinking under the influence of the thought of other nations. Although the ways of thinking of an isolated people become set and hardly changeable, they can yet be changed to a considerable degree under the influence of other nations. This fact can easily be understood if we go through the history of each nation. If we stick to the climatic environment alone as its decisive cause, then we can never explain the changes of ways of thinking or thought-patterns of a nation—that is, its intellectual history.
Also in this connection, no geographical environment or topography constitutes a decisive factor, either. As is often said, India and China belong to the Continent, so that the nature of the cultures born there is continental, while that of the Japanese culture is insular, and indeed, they do create a contrasting impression. Among other things, Japan is an island nation, out of the reach of any great foreign invasion, so that she has preserved the ancient culture and even keeps such cultural products intact as have already been lost in the mainland of Asia. In the island of Ceylon, to cite another instance, the most primitive of all forms of Buddhist orders

in other countries have been preserved. Therefore, it is true that an island nation is characterized by the tendency to conservatism which preserves the traditional ancient culture intact, but a nation on the continent is not without such a conservative character. The anti-progressive or static character of traditional Chinese culture has often been pointed out. And it is astonishing that a part of the Indian population still preserves the Vedic culture as it was established three thousand years ago. Anti-progressivism or conservatism is seen in many of the countries mentioned above. Accordingly it is impossible to draw the conclusion that the geographical environment or topography, continental or insular, is the only factor which determines the differences in the ways of thinking of peoples.

Ought we not to recognize the existential basis of the difference of ways of thinking, not in the natural scientific conditions of heredity and physical environment, but in the material conditions which have to do with man's social behavior? What emerges here is a theory which attaches great importance to economic conditions in the social life of humanity. Historical materialism may be an example of such a theory. Since the criticism of materialism would constitute an independent theme of study, it is impossible for us to refer to it here. As a result of our inquiry into the ways of thinking of the East Asian peoples, we shall not hesitate to conclude as follows: The theory of the materialistic view of history or economic view of history is incapable of explaining in its entirety the fact of the different ways of thinking which vary according to the thought and culture of people. Needless to say, the materialistic view of history emphasizes that the sum total of the productive relations in a certain period, or the economic structure of society can alone provide the material base upon which the juridical and political superstructure is established, and in accordance with which a certain social or class consciousness is also formed. Despite the fact that it affords a number of solutions to problems of social organization or social thought, it does not adequately explain other cultural problems. As a matter of fact, to what extent will the standpoint of the materialistic or economic view of history suffice to explain the differences of ways of thinking among peoples which are disclosed in our studies?

Differences of productive types cannot explain many totally opposed variants of ways of thinking; for example, the fact that the Chinese people attach so much importance to concrete individuality; while the Indians seek abstract universality, and in contrast to the Chinese people who are empirical, sensuous, and realistic, the Indian people are imaginative, other-worldly, and metaphysical. It is said that in the East Asian society people generally inherited the same type of agricultural production from ancient times and that there should be little divergence of type among agricultural nations. This is the very reason why the phrase "Asiatic productive type"

is used as if the uniformity of type is taken for granted by economists and sociologists, though, of course, whether it is true that there is such uniformity is a serious question. In economics the "Asiatic productive type" might well be admitted, but so far as ways of thinking is concerned, we shall reject the use of the word "Asiatic" as an unclear and highly questionable concept. According to my opinion, ways of thinking vary according to the cultural traditions of the peoples respectively concerned. The concept of the "Asiatic productive type" does not explain the historical and cultural grounds upon which the differences of ways of thinking existing among Asian nations have arisen. Consequently, as far as this point is concerned, the materialistic view of history or the general economic view of history has in its dogmatic monolithic approach exposed its fatal weak point.

In this connection, it is often maintained by scholars that the absence of the city-state in East Asian society has produced the characteristics common to East Asian thought. It is true that the "polis" or "civitas" was never established in East Asia, and the "bourgeois" in the Western sense of the word has never existed in East Asia. "Shimin" (Japanese for citizen) is merely a coined word; "Chonin * (inhabitant of a town) is not identical with citizen.56 The absence of a city-state might have been the actual basis for the appearance of thought-characteristics common to all the East Asian nations, but it is impossible for us to explain thereby the differences in their ways of thinking.

After such considerations, the following hypothesis emerges; namely, a unique religious ideology is the determining factor of the distinctiveness of the social and economic life of each nation. Apparently this hypothesis was intended to correct other thoughts such as the materialistic view of history. Max Weber, a representative of such an idealistic view, says:

"An idea shapes the world's course just as a switchman directs man's motivated interests on to a track."57 Attaching great importance58 to the influence of religious ideas on social life, economics, and ethics, he examined the relationship between religion and social life in almost all the important nations of the world. The result of his study must be highly valued, but the study of cultural factors, in addition to religion, cannot neglect the characteristics of ways of thinking in every people. Most Indians have certain general characteristics common to Hindus, Jains, and Moslems, and most Chinese have characteristic ways of thinking shared by the devotees of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. Now it is not unusual to find the same person regarding himself a follower of many religions. The fact that this eclecticism occurs among the Japanese with Shintoism, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Christianity shows that in Japan there is a tendency, characteristic of Japan's culture, to transcend all

sectarian distinctions of religions. A foreign religion has often wholly transformed the ways of thinking of a nation, and at the same time the ways of thinking peculiar to a nation have reciprocally changed the foreign religion itself.
Therefore, we have to pay attention to the fact that historical circumstances of a nation count to a great extent in bringing about a difference of thought types. We shall point out the fact that the view of most Indians about human relations favors the identity or fusion of the self with others, in contrast to the primitivistic Westerners' view which insists on the hostile and antagonistic relations of individuals in the "state of nature." The development of such a difference of thought-forms is considered to be due to the historical evolution of the society which different conquerors and ruling people formed in India and in the West. In the case of the West, the Greeks, for instance, formed their city-state (polis) after conquering the older inhabitants. They had come as adventurers and invaders amidst a foreign people, and first of all built a safety-zone encircled by stone walls so as to keep the common enemy out of their own world. They thought that they would thereby succeed in protecting themselves against the power of the dead souls of the enemy, and would at the same time be protected against assault from the living enemy around them, so long as the city provided them a refuge.59 Against their expectations, however, the Aryans who invaded India did not face any such violent resistance on the part of the aborigines, so that their society was less menaced by the aborigines. They constructed puras (fortresses) on hills, wherein they confined themselves only in such emergencies, as an enemy invasion or flood, while in ordinary times living outside the puras. The differences of historical background in regard to social evolution, as illustrated above, continue to shape the ways of thinking of every nation for a long enough time to come. The differences of historical background, however, can be affected and seriously modified by future historical changes. Consequently, past evolution is not possessed of any absolute significance as a cultural determinant.
The question:—What is the existential basis or empirical factors which determine or explain the characteristics of a people's way of thinking?—yet remains unsolved. The question then is: Are not the expression-forms of judgment and deduction which we adopt as the cognitive means for studying the characteristic ways of thinking, working at the same time as an existential basis? Generally speaking, since the grammar and its syntax, which regulate the expression-form of judgment and deduction, do not easily change,60 they are not only expressive of the characteristic ways of thinking of a nation but in return they also regulate them for some time. In other words, it is probable that the ways of working of a thought-form might in turn be qualified by its language-form. Therefore, as far as this
point goes, the expression-forms of thought employed in language are the existential basis for the characteristics of ways of thinking of a people. But this relationship of language to thought is by no means absolute in nature. A grammar or a syntax might change on account of social unrest or as a result of a contact with foreign languages. In such cases, the ways of thinking would have undergone a change. The change of ways of thinking of a nation depends upon the many historical changes that affect the cultural customs and habits of its people.
According to the above considerations, we may offer, in the last analysis, the following hypothesis: There is no such thing as a single fundamental principle which determines the characteristic ways of thinking of a people. Various factors, as mentioned above, related in manifold ways, each exerting its influence, enter into the ways of thinking of a people. If we deal with the question of the existential basis which brings about differences of ways of thinking, we see no way left for us but to take the standpoint of pluralism. The attempt to seek out an isolated single cause looks alluring but it is destined to fail to grasp the complexities of social change. We are obliged to recognize in this case also the principle of "Things are born of various conditions" which Buddhism put forth against the monistic metaphysical theory. In what order, then, do these elements make themselves felt? This is a question to be
contemplated upon and investigated again in the future. Here we cannot dwell upon this question in detail, and even if we try to get a general perspective, it would be difficult for us to offer a single order in response. Since the thinking function is one which in the long run affects man's conduct and practice, it might have to be said that it is conditioned by how man stands at a certain point of time. Man is a historical being and is all the time subject to the currents of history, so that he should heed both the predictable aspects of history, and at the same time, the unpredictable factor of chance. For instance, such an accidental event in which a nation comes into contact with another culture can bring about an unexpected change of affairs of a more serious nature than the nation in question had ever expected.
The ways of thinking of a people have the double relation of being conditioned by the products of man's own creation, and, at the same time, of qualifying them in return. In some cases we can also see the phase on which each one of the above mentioned sundry cultural factors is in turn characterized and formed by the ways of thinking of a people. It is an independent subject of study to clarify the operation of the mutual factors in both relations. In this book, however, we shall have practically attained the objective of our study, if we succeed in clarifying the following two points: In the first place, there are some characteristic differences in the
ways of thinking of East Asian nations. In the second place, with regard to all people, there is a certain logical and human connection among these characteristics.
Attention should also be paid in this connection to the fact that in the history of every people there is a distinction of periods, such as the ancient, the middle, and the contemporary, according to which the ways of thinking of peoples naturally differ. This fact we do not mean to deny. But at the same time we also ought to recognize the fact that in every nation there are special thought-tendencies which have persisted throughout these historical stages. The more communication progresses, the closer the intercourse between nations becomes, and the more the world becomes unified, the less will be the disparity of ways of thinking among nations. Notwithstanding this fact, however, it will never be easy for any people totally to sever itself from the traditional habits and customs of the past. In order to balance variations in the ways of thinking of nations and to create a new-world culture, we need first of all to reflect upon and ascertain the characteristic ways of thinking of diverse peoples. Of course, it goes without saying that we should equally consider how they underwent changes in the course of history. The overall renovation of ways of thinking of nations will not be easily accomplished by taking only external or institutional measures such as reforms of land-ownership, economic, and political systems. For the purpose of building a new culture aspiring to truth, a rigorous criticism of the ways of thinking of nations ought continually to be made.
  student, neglecting methodology, judged on the basis of his selected and partial data that Indian cultural characteristics were of a peculiar sort, he might perhaps reach the right conclusion but he would more probably draw wrong conclusions. For instance, studies of ancient Indian society have often resulted in completely opposite conclusions; those based on Brahmanic literature clash with those derived from Buddhist sources. In our present study of the ways of thinking we face a similar danger, because it is impossible to exhaust all extant sources and data.
In order to formulate objective conclusions, we must consider the methodology to be employed. First, we shall lay stress on the expression of culture in language; in this chapter we shall examine some of the major problems related to linguistic expression. It is important, as a first step, to compare the Indian language with the Greek and Latin languages with respect to their grammars and syntaxes. If we had some concrete examples of Greek or Latin translation of the Indian languages or vice versa, they would be very convenient for our study, but unfortunately we have nothing like them. Although the Bhagavadgita *, a famous religious book of India, and the Dhammapada, sacred verses of Buddhists, have been translated into modern languages by European scholars, the Greek and Latin translation of the former book and the Latin translation of the latter offer us important data for reference.1 The archeological relics and epigraphs, in which Indian languages are written together with European classical languages, are limited only to certain coins so they are of little use in our present study.
Secondly, as a source of data we must lay stress on the way the Indians have taken to foreign cultures; but we regret that the evidence here has not been too clear. This is due to the fact that they did not accept Chinese culture (although Dr. S. K. Chatterjee has recently indicated some Chinese influence on Indian culture); the degree to which they accepted Greek culture has yet to be clarified sufficiently. But it is a fact that to a certain degree they accepted Greek and Latin cultures, a fact which must be considered as a part of our investigation.
Thirdly, we must lay stress on the criticisms of Indian thought by foreigners as important data for our study. In ancient times some Greeks, Romans, and Chinese criticized Indian thought from their respective standpoints. And there were some Japanese who criticized Indian thought, basing their criticism on the Chinese translation of sacred Buddhist books. Again, it is a well known fact that in modern times many European scholars have examined and criticized Indian thought.

Lastly, we must select data from the works written by the Indians themselves. This appears simple, but in reality the problem of selection is very difficult. What should we choose from so many available sources? From what sources can we learn the characteristics of peoples' ways of thinking? First of all, we consider those literatures which have been considered autochthonous by the majority of people. For example about "the Prasnottararatnamalika *"
(Treasure garland of question and answer),2 Brahmanic tradition says it was written by the Vedantist* Samkara*, Jain tradition says it was written by the Jain King Amoghavarsa* or the Jain Vimala, and Buddhist tradition says it was written by a Buddhist; we can really find its Tibetan translation in the Tibetan Tripitaka*. From all of this we can say that this book is an important datum, though it is relatively unknown, in our examination of the general ways of thinking or cultural tendencies of Indian traditions. Again the Kural, which has been called the Veda in the Tamil language, has been admitted as the sacred book by each of the Jain, Buddhist, Vaisnava*, and Saiva* religions. Thus, it falls into the same category as that of the Prasnottararatnamalika.
On the other hand, even though a book is well known to foreigners, if its thought content had not been known widely to the Indians, we should be very careful when we use it as a datum for our investigation. As only a limited number of books will be admitted by the followers of any religion as their authority, we must carefully compare all sources with one another on each point. Especially, when the same sentence is found in various books belonging to different religions of India,3 this general acceptance may be referred to in judging the characteristics of the ways of thinking of a people.
We shall be able to reach the right conclusion by which the characteristics of the ways of thinking of a people will be shown, when we shall have compared various sources with each other and examined all the rele-

Page 43 vant data. In the following, we shall combine the conclusion gained through examining occasionally these data with the conclusion gained through examining the forms of judgment and inference; and then around these results, we shall consider synthetically the dominant characteristics of the ways of thinking of the Indians.

Stress on the Universal
Preponderance of Abstract Notions

Indian people are inclined to consider the universal seriously in expressing their ideas of things. This can be easily seen in the fact of their verbal usage in which they have so great an inclination to use abstract nouns. In Sanskrit, an abstract noun is formed by adding -ta * (f.) or -tva (n.) suffix to the root. These suffixes correspond to th (Greek), -tas (Latin), -tät (German), -té (French), -ty (English), and etymologically they have a close connection. In these European languages, however, abstract nouns are not often used except in scientific essays or formal sentences, while in Sanskrit they are often used even in everyday speeches. For example, "He becomes old,"1 "Er wird alt," is expressed in
Sanskrit He goes to oldness": vrddhatam* (-tvam*, -bhavam*) gacchati (agacchati*, upaiti, etc.); "The fruit becomes soft," "Die Frucht wird weich" is expressed in Sanskrit "The fruit goes to softness": phalam* mrdutam* (-tvam, bhavam mardavam*) yati*; "He goes as a messenger," "Er geht als Bote" is expressed "He goes with the quality of messenger": gacchati dautyena; "A man was seen to be a tree" is expressed "A man was represented by the quality of tree" (puman* kascid* vrksatvenopavarnitah*).2 The European languages express the individual by its attribute or quality realized concretely by the individual itself, while the Sanskrit expresses the individual only as one of the instances belonging to the abstract universal.
In Sanskrit, furthermore, any noun or adjective can become an abstract noun by addition of -ta or -tva suffix, i.e., the abstract noun can be made without limit in Sanskrit. On the contrary, in the Greek or Latin language the abstract noun is made by addition of -th or -tas, and does not allow such freedom. Here we can also find one of the Indian tendencies to think anything abstractly and universally.
Expressions with cognate objects appear more often in early Indian languages than in European languages. In English there are some expressions with cognate objects as "to fight a battle," "to die a hard death," "to live a good life," etc., but such usage is limited. On the contrary, in

classical Indian languages such expressions have been widely and freely allowed through all the ages.3 Therefore it is often impossible to translate from Sanskrit directly into the European languages; e.g., kamakamah * = amori dediti (desiring desire or given to love) in A. W. Schlegel's Latin translation of Dhp., 83 (those in pursuit of their desire), abhijñanabhijñatih* (possessed of occult power), varsam* varsate*, tapas tapate, etc.
That Indians were at home in abstract speculation can be seen in their skillful expression of the ideas of numbers. A large number or an infinitesimal number often appears in religious books and literary works. This reveals their rich imagination and analysis. The decimal system of Arabic numerals based on the place notation, had been invented by the Chinese and Indians, and the Arabians only transmitted it to European countries. The manner of writing numbers in a linear horizontal order appears in ancient Chinese, but our circular sign for zero was invented by the Indians. In Sanskrit zero is called "sunya*" which is translated as "kung" by the Chinese word for "empty in the Chinese Buddhist canons. A dot was used for zero in the ancient Chinese place system.
We are impressed by one of the main features of most philosophical thinking in India, namely a predominant way of minimizing the particular in the logical sense. This does not mean that the Indians did not develop the concept of the individual.4 They did. The Sanskrit equivalent of individual is vyakti. But vyakti did not play much of a role in the history of Indian logic.

Most Indian thinkers are apt to emphasize universal concepts and to subordinate the concrete individual and the particular perception to the universal. Even in the Vaisesika* philosophy of atomic naturalism, which organized objectively the most advanced, logically coherent system of natural philosophy in India, there is no direct awareness of the concretely perceived individual. Instead, the Vaisesika philosophers used the technical term antya visesa*5 to represent the principle of particularity or what the Western scholastic metaphysicians called the principle of individuation.
Of course, in other pluralistic philosophical systems in India there was more attention to the concept of the individual, and its unique meaning was investigated. In ancient India there were frequent debates between the Individualist and the Universalist concerning the meaning of a word. The Individualist (Vyaktivadin*) held that the individual (vyakti) is the denoted sense of a word, whereas the Universalist (Jativadin*) held that the universal (jati*) is the denoted sense of a word. For example, when we are asked to bring a cow, it is only obvious that what is requested is an individual cow and not a universal existing in the entire class of cows, said the Individualist, whereas the Universalist said that the universal form of the cow is implied in this case.6

But in Indian philosophy for the most part, the position of the perceived individual was minimized in favor of the inferred particular and the conceived universal, differing from the schools of European philosophy in which the individual, the particular, and the universal were all given equal consideration with respect to their meanings and logical status.
Even Indian realists and pluralists esteemed universals. In giving the definition of "substance" some of them said, "A substance is that which is endowed with the genus of substance."7 This is a purely verbal definition, or a truism which teaches us nothing new about the thing to be defined, but they were satisfied, perhaps because of their very tendency to reify concepts.

We are aware of the opinion that there is a strain in Indian philosophy which also stressed individualism. But the individual soul is given the metaphysical status of a permanent substance "co-eternal with God"; as Dr. D. M. Datta says: "Emphasis on the importance of the individual is common to all the Indian systems of philosophy. It is worthy of special note that even those who believe in God as the creator do not hold that the individual soul is created by God. God creates only the material objects, including the human body. But the soul is co-eternal with God."8
Even the Buddhists who did not believe in a soul as a permanent substance believed in the potential Buddhahood of every individual. However, Indian esteem for the individual raised problems concerning its metaphysical sense of "the essence of living things," but it was only in the logical sense of the word that Buddhist thinkers admitted the significance of the individual (vyakti). With them the individual meant "the thing in itself" (svalaksana *), which is just an instant or moment in any given situation in the transient course of time; it is the extreme concrete and particular (kiñcid idam—the hoc aliquid).9 Mental construction or judgment (kalpana*, adhyavasaya*) comes later.

This way of thinking appears not only in their philosophy but also in their daily speech; e.g., in Sanskrit the plural form of the abstract noun often appears, i.e., laksmyah* means "happiness of a person," kirtayah* means "honor of a person" and bhayesu* (lit. in horrors) means "when he was filled with horror" (bhayakalesu*). There are a few expressions like this in European languages, but they are generally used with special meaning, while in Sanskrit many plural forms of abstract nouns are used in a meaning not dissimilar to its singular form. Moreover, in modern
European languages, like German and French, the exactly opposite phenomenon can be seen, i.e., the plural form of a proper noun designates those who bear the name, families including all servants and maids, or those who can be ascribed to that person's type; e.g., die Goethe" means "the family of Goethe," "men who are self-centered like Goethe" or "people
who have a brilliant talent"; "les Périclès" means "people who are conceited about their talent like Périclès."11 In short, Europeans generally think of the abstract notion of an abstract noun as constructed solely by means of the universal meaning which is extracted from daily experience, so that they represent it in the singular form; on the contrary, the Indians think of the abstract notion as what is included within experienced facts and so fused with them that the essential principle is often represented in the plural form. And again, modern European people lay stress on the significance of the individual, so that they can easily classify a man by a type consisting of those who are similar to a special person, and thus change a proper noun into a common noun; on the contrary, the Indians tend to neglect the significance of the individual, so that such expressions as "die Goethe" or les Périclès" do not appear at all.
According to the way of thinking of most Indians, therefore, the essence of the individual or the particular is no more than the universal by virtue of which the individual or the particular is grounded and realized. The tendency of most Indians is to lay stress on the significance of the universal only, and they almost neglect the significance of the individual or the particular. From this a characteristic way of thinking is introduced; i.e., the difference between that which possesses an attribute and the attribute itself is not clarified adequately by the Indians, and the difference between that which supports a substance and the substance itself is not clarified. In Indian languages there are many examples of " "; i.e., a common noun was extended to a proper noun; e.g., buddha (literally, he who has won enlightenment) became a proper noun for Sakyamuni *, The Buddha, and jina (literally, one who has won) became the proper name of Jina (Vardhamana*). As a result of the same thinking process, the neuter singular form of an adjective sometimes fulfills the function of an abstract noun, e.g., suci* (pure, pureness), sthira (= solid, solidity = sthairya), slaghya* (excellent, excellence); or again the neuter singular form of an adjective sometimes fulfills the function of a collective noun, e.g., palita (gray, gray hair).12 So in Sanskrit there are similar cases where the distinction between abstract "solidity" and a concrete "solid" thing is not clarified in the actual language, even though it may be clarified by using an abstract noun.
In short, these linguistic phenomena in Indian languages may have resulted from the fact that the earlier Indians were unaware of the significance of the inherent or attributive judgment.13 Now the characteristic way of thinking mentioned above is seen in the structure of the Indian languages and reveals some important differences when compared with other peoples' forms of thought and expression. In this way of thinking, the distinction between an attribute and a ground of that attribute is

almost always neglected, so that the Indians can hardly distinguish between substantive and adjective as two parts of speech. In Sanskrit grammar, these two show little difference in regard to declension, composition, and derivation. Especially in the Vedic literature, it is very difficult for us to find out which is substantive and which is adjective among many terms that indicate the same object. Even in classical Sanskrit, an adjective is used as a substantive, e.g., suhrd * (goodhearted, a friend), tapana (burning, the sun). On the contrary, in classical European languages, regarding the inherent judgment, the distinction between substantive and adjective is fairly fixed and occurs with little variation except in special instances.
The inclination to lay stress on the universal appears to some degree among the ancient Europeans in their languages.
An adjective takes a form corresponding to the gender and number of the noun which it modifies, both in classical
European and Indian languages, and it does not appear in its original form; e.g., , vir bonus (good man),
, mulier bona (good woman). Such a grammatical rule of declension makes a speaker understand clearly that
the essence of a conception expressed by an adjective is different from the specific attribute indicated by the adjective which modifies some concrete thing. Plato touched the problem of "Virtue itself as to its universality" after he had examined human virtue ( ), by analyzing the general idea into the virtue of man, of woman, of child, of slave, and so on. Plato's intellectual procedure would have been very natural and rational for the Greek people at that time; the problem, however, of whether it is possible to pursue abstract "virtue in general" apart from concrete deeds becomes a difficult question in modern ethics. But in India the conception, which was represented by an adjective, had more importance than the individual that was modified by the adjective; and the significance of individual things, which embodied the conception represented by the adjective, was reduced to almost nothing for the Indians.

Abstract Conceptions Treated as Concrete Realities

As a result of the Indian propensity for the abstract notion, in their way of thinking an abstract idea is expressed as if it were a concrete object, i.e., in their thinking process the universal is easily endowed with substantiality. Already in the Brahmanas*, which offer explanations of the Vedic sacrifices, abstract ideas are treated as if they were on the same plane as concrete things. This has been stated as follows: "The most remarkable characteristic of this age was that they gave spiritual powers, mysterious powers, and the role of deities without personification to the concrete

elements of which the universe was constructed (heaven, sky, earth, sun and moon, stars and compass-directions, soil, water, fire, wind, and ether; years and months; seasons; animals, plants, and minerals, and so on), to the elements which were necessary for their rituals (the apparatus, rhythm, curse, and name, and so on), to the physical and mental organs, functions, qualities, abstract conceptions, numerals, and so on; in other words, to all sorts of phenomena in the natural world and human life, especially in a religious ceremony."14 It seems that Brahmin priests of ancient India were certainly engaged in such speculations in accordance with this way of thinking. The word "brahman," the original meaning of which was the magical power of spells used freely by Brahmins, became at the same time the name of the Brahmins themselves merely by changing the position of its accent; by the same thinking process "ksatriya *," the name of the royal family, came from the word ksatra*," the original meaning of which was the reigning power. Here the essential nature of a thing is identified with the realizer of its power, and an abstract noun is used as a common noun; i.e. the Indians expose their thinking to the so-called charge of "reification" by fictitiously endowing every notion with substance.

According to the description in some Upanisads*, the Indians assumed two routes (i.e. the devayana* and the pitryana*) which a man follows after he is dead.15 One who goes the way of devayana (the way of the gods) enters successively into the flame of his cremation, from the flame into the day; from the day into the half-month while the moon waxes; from the half-month of the waxing moon into the six months while the sun goes north; from these months into the world of the gods—the sun, the moon, the lightning-fire; and then he enters, guided by a person of mind (manasa*), into Brahman or the world of Brahma*; thus he never returns to this world. On the other hand, one who by sacrifices and austerity goes the way of pitryana (the way of the fathers) enters successively into the smoke of his cremation and into the night; from the night into the half-month while the moon decreases, into six months while the sun goes south; from these months into the world of the ancestors' spirits; from this ancestral world into the moon where he stays to become food for the gods; then he begins to descend into space; he enters successively into the sky, air, rain, the earth; and then he enters into food (like rice and barley); he becomes a spermatozoon if he enters into the fire of a man; and then he enters into a womb of a woman to be reborn. In these steps after death, the smoke of cremation, the world of ancestors' spirits, the sun, the moon, and the lightning have some extent in space, so that it is no wonder that a dead man passes through these steps; but the night, the half-month while the moon waxes or wanes, and six months while the

sun goes north or south are not anything in space but something in time, so that these descriptions in the Upanisads * seem very strange, as it tells us a dead man passes through the devayana* or pitryana* both in space and in time. This, however, caused little wonder to the Indians at that time, who had inherited the way of thinking in the Brahmana* literature as it had been. Those scholars, who wrote the Brahmana literature, thought that all abstract conceptions or ideas in space also had substantiality, and discussed them as if they were on the same level as material things in space. In this way of thinking, the day, the night, a half-month, and six months, etc. can be expressed as if they were concrete things. Some philosophers in the Upanisads seemed to be incapable of getting rid of such a way of thinking, and the theory of the two ways after death in the Upanisads has been adopted without change by the later Vedantic* philosophers.16

Thereafter, this way of thinking became popular among the common people in India. In many popular books, e.g., in the Upamitibhavaprapañcakatha*, an educational story of the Jains, the Prabodhacandrodaya, a drama based on the Vedantic philosophy, many abstract nouns are used as the main characters in them. These stories and dramas would not be read enthusiastically by Europeans but they can excite much interest among Indians.
There are many cases showing that this way of thinking has been adopted by Indian philosophers. In the Buddhist period, Pakudha Kaccayana* (c. 500 B.C.) posited pain and pleasure in addition to the earth, water, fire, wind, souls, and sky as the eternal, unchangeable, independent elements, of which all things in the universe are composed. Makkhali Gosala* of the Ajivikas* supposed good and bad fortune as well as life and death as substantial principles.
With the Jains the condition or law of movement (dharma) and the condition or principle of non-movement
(adharma) were also independent substances. The Sarvastivadins*, who became the most prosperous Buddhist school, maintained that all the elements admitted in Buddhism exist really in events occurring through all time, i.e. the past, the present, and the future. The principles (dharma) mentioned by them rather belong to psychological functions or to abstract ideas. The Vaisesikas* supposed the six padarthas* (categories) as fundamental principles; they are abstract ideas that are classified into six groups and admitted as substantial elements. The philosophy of the Sarvastivadins and the Vaisesikas is called "Conceptual Realism" (Begriffsrealismus) by European scholars because these Indian systems are similar to the moderate Realism of European philosophy in the medieval period.
Hegel confirms our description of Indian philosophy in characterizing it as the "growing of the mind inwardly in the most abstract way" (Fürsichwerden der Seele auf die abstrakteste Weise), and he called it "intellectual substantiality" (intellektuelle Substantialität).17 This characterization by Hegel is not correct in the case of the Vedanta * Philosophy, which has been the main flow of Indian philosophy; however the endowment of concepts with substantiality can be regarded as a prominent characteristic of most schools of Indian philosophy.

Preference for the Negative
Fondness for the Negative Expression

The Indians were led to an ultimately unlimited or indeterminate goal as the result of their leading school's way of thinking and seeking the universal. Generally, the philosophers of this school say that the universal is less limited than the individual, so that at the end of their quest for the universal they posit the undetermined.

Thus the negative character of Indian thought comes into prominence. When we take up their language as our first problem, we cannot help wondering why the Indians are so fond of the noun with the negative. For instance, the Indians say "victory or non-victory" (jayajayau *) instead of distinguishing "Victory or defeat" and victory or draw" as in other languages, and they say "non-one" (aneka) instead of "many or none." The word composed with the negative serves to express not only negative but also positive meaning. In the Indian mind "non-idleness" (apramada*), "non-grudge" (avera),1 "non-violence" (ahimsa*), etc. appeal as more positive moral virtues than "exertion," "tolerance," "peace," etc. To Europeans such a negative expression of these virtues appeals less than a positive expression for practical conduct but to most Indians these negatively expressed virtues have more power.
A yoga-disciple of the Brahmanic schools must always keep five moral precepts, i.e., non-violence (ahimsa), sincerity (satya), non-theft (asteya), chastity (brahmacarya) and non-acquisition (aparigraha).2 Thus three of them (the words beginning with a—) are expressed in the negative form. The precepts which must be kept by the layman in Buddhism and Jainism are all shown in the negative form, the original meanings of which are "to rest apart from violence," "to rest apart from theft" and so on.3 The Sarvastivadins* also enumerate negatively "non-idleness" (apramada), "noncovetousness" (anabhidhya*), "non-wrath" (avyapada*) and "non-violence" (ahiimsa) among the ten great attainments of the mind. In the Brahmanic canons the various precepts are sometimes given positive expression; but in the Vinaya-pitaka*, in which the precepts for Buddhist monks are

set forth, they are almost written in the negative form. Thus the Indians are apt to see morality in the negation of ordinary men's actions, so that they lay stress on the negative phase. Apart from the Ten Commandments of the Old Testament, showing moral precepts in a negative form seems somewhat powerless and unsatisfactory to most other people, but to the Indians, who lay stress on the negative phase and pursue the undetermined, the negative form of expression has more positive and powerful meaning.
We find it not surprising, therefore, that the Indians like to use negative conceptions even in ordinary sentences. In the classical and modern European languages the negative judgment is usually expressed by adding the negative to the finite verb in the predicate, e.g., "Er wird nicht gehen." On the other hand, in the ancient Indian languages the central conception of a sentence is expressed in negative form, e.g., "One (who attains to Enlightenment) goes to a nonmeeting with the king of Death" (adassanam * maccurajassa* gacche (Dhp., 46) = mortis regem non videbit. = he will not meet with the King of Death.) Thus the Europeans and the Japanese express the negative sentence by using the positive and affirmative conception as its subject, while the Indians express it by using the negative conception as the main subject.

Again in the classical European languages, the negative of the participle of a verb is formed in the same way as the negative of the verb; on the other hand in the ancient Indian languages it is formed in the same way as the negative of a noun is made; e.g., appasam* udayavyayam* (Dhp., 113) = ortum (rerum) et interitum non animadvertens. This linguistic phenomenon again illustrates their fondness for the negative conception.
The Indians think a negative form of judgment is not only negative but also positive and affirmative. So in Indian logic the universal negative judgment (E) is not used, and is discussed only by being changed into the universal positive obverse judgment (A); e.g., "All speeches are non-eternal." (anityah* sabhah*).
Grasping the Absolute Negatively
Due to their way of thinking or expressing everything negatively, the Indians pursue the Infinite or the Negative and focus on the idea of infinity in their philosophical approaches. The Absolute is expressed as the Infinite or the Negative by the Indians.
In remote times, philosophical thought about the world's creation, expressed by the poets of the Rg-Veda*, reached its peak when they sang of the universal principle in the hymn called "Nasadasiya*" (Then there was neither nonexistence nor existence).4 According to this hymn, in primordial antiquity there was neither non-existence nor existence, neither

heaven nor space, neither death nor non-death, and there was no distinction between day and night. The whole universe was covered with darkness and was filled with rippling water devoid of light. "That One" (tad ekam) appeared there, by its own heat, and gave existence to desire (kama *). Then it realized all things in the universe using desire as the motivating power. After the creation of the universe many gods appeared too.
According to Yajñavalkya*, the greatest philosopher among the wise men in the Upanisads*, the highest principle in the universe is that which is free from all differential qualification. He says, "This essential being (atman*) is no other than pure wisdom without internality and externality. . . . It has an indestructible and imperishable quality. . . . This Atman can be expressed only through the negative as 'not so, not so' (neti neti). It is incomprehensible for it cannot be perceived. It is indestructible for it cannot be destroyed. It is non-attachable for it attaches itself to nothing. It has never been restrained, disturbed, or injured."5 In another passage he calls this highest principle the "Non-perishable" (aksara*), and says, "It is neither large and rough (sthula*) nor infinitesimal (suksma*), neither short nor long, neither burning nor moist. It has no shade, darkness, wind, space, attachment, taste, smell, eyes, ears, speeches, mind, light, vitality, mouth, quantity, internality and externality. It eats nothing and nothing eats it."6
We can see similar expressions in the later Upanisads*: "There shines neither the sun nor the moon nor the stars. That lightning bolt also never shines. To say nothing of fire on earth!"7 Light in the phenomenal world is almost nothing when it is compared with the Brahman, the light of the Absolute.
In early Buddhism the state of enlightenment is explained by a similar expression. "Where there exists no earth, water, fire, and wind there shines neither the sun, nor the moon, nor the stars, and there exists no darkness. When a Brahmin becomes able to perceive this by himself and becomes a saint (muni) by silent meditation, he shall be able to be free from materiality and non-materiality (ruparupa*); pain and pleasure."8
Negative expressions are used very abundantly in the scriptures of Mahayana* Buddhism. As one of the instances I would like to introduce some passages from the Prajñaparamitahrdaya-sutra*. "Thus, these elemental things

(dharma) all have the characteristic of voidness (sunyata*); therefore they are neither created nor perished, they have neither impurity nor purity, they can neither increase nor decrease. Therefore, in the void there is neither materiality (rupa*) nor sensation (vedana*) nor imagination (samjña*) nor volition (samskara*) nor consciousness (vijñana*); there exist neither eyes nor ears in it nor nose nor tongue nor tactile organs nor intellect, there is neither color and shape nor sound nor odor nor taste nor

tangibles nor non-sensuous objects; there exists neither the sphere of vision, the sphere of intellect, ignorance, the extinction of ignorance, old age and death, the extinction of old age and death, suffering, the cause and extinction and the path toward extinction, wisdom nor the attainment of wisdom, for there is nothing to be attained. Because the bodhisattva relies on the prajñaparamita *, the mind is unobstructed. Because there is no obstruction, there exists no fear. Abandoning all inverted phantasies, the bodhisattva penetrates to Nirvana*."
Nagarjuna* (ca. A.D. 150–250), who is considered to have established the foundation of Mahayana* Buddhism, in his version of Buddhist philosophy was able to expound and demonstrate the theory of "the excellent causal origin of things (pratityasamutpada*) which is non-destructive, non-productive, non-extinguishable, non-eternal, non-uniform, non-diversified, non-coming, and non-going, and causes vain phenomena to cease."9 The eight kinds of negative expression enumerated here, referred to as the "Eight Negations," can also be found in other Mahayana scriptures.10 Nagarjuna, his followers thought, had chosen these eight negations because they are the most important representative statement of the numerous negations needed to clarify the real aspect of the emptiness of all things.11 Thus the ultimate reality shown by Mahayana Buddhists is the absolute voidness (sunyata*) that is devoid of all qualifications and about which no conceptual determination can be formed.

Such negative expressions of Mahayana Buddhism exerted a favorable influence upon many schools including the Vedanta*. "There is neither extinction nor creation, neither one who has been bound nor one who has practiced austerities, neither one who wishes emancipation nor one who obtained the emancipation. This is the highest truth12 (paramarthata*)."13 The influence of such expressions can be seen not only in Samkara*14 and his followers15 but in the schools of later Hinduism.16
The Jains also state similarly: "[One who has obtained enlightenment is] neither long nor short nor circular nor triangular nor square nor globular nor black nor blue nor red nor yellow nor white nor fragrant nor ill-smelling nor bitter nor pungent nor puckery nor sour nor sweet nor rough nor soft nor heavy nor light nor cold nor hot nor coarse nor smooth, he neither has a body nor departs from the body nor remains in the body, he is neither feminine nor masculine nor neuter; he has wisdom (prajña*) and intellect (samjña*). However, there is no simile [by which the emancipated soul can be known]. The essence of the emancipated soul has no form. One who has no word cannot speak a word. There is neither sound nor color and shape nor smell nor taste nor tactile objects."17
Let us compare this with the parallel case of Greek philosophy where we find the ancient idea that the universe is a circular and complete globe

in itself. This theory perhaps originated in Xenophanes18 and was advocated by Parmenides who maintained that (Being) as the fundamental principle of the world is a complete globe.19 Pythagoras and his followers thought, "What is determinate is more excellent than what is not determinate."20 Empedocles taught that in the beginning of the world the universe was globular when it was in chaos.21 And this idea of the globular universe was inherited by Plato22 and
Aristotle.23

Greek people, who had pre-eminent skill in visual intuition and such arts as sculpture, preferred to see the clear image of all things. Therefore, that which was devoid of boundaries was considered to be indeterminate, without certitude, incomplete, and imperfect, so that even in regard to the super-sensory, they could not divorce themselves from their concrete way of thinking. Even Parmenides, who seemed to grasp the ultimate principle of Being most abstractly and negatively, discussed the fundamental principle of the world as if it were a material existence, expressing it as a spatial or extended thing. And, the fact that he thought it a globe shows us that he was influenced by the intuitive and concrete view of things which was general among Greek people. Even Plato called immaterial substance by the visual name of "idea" (or literally, figure, form).

In general, the ancient Greek people had a way of thinking concretely. Though they speculated on things rationally and conceptually they rarely ever tried to reach such vague abstractions as total voidness.24 As I shall show later, the Chinese people, even more than the Greek people, were fond of expressing themselves concretely and intuitively. On the other hand, the Indians generally disliked grasping the Absolute or the ultimate principle concretely and intuitively. We should not maintain that our conclusion would apply to all Indian thinkers, but we can say that those who liked abstract speculation were inclined to grasp the notion of the Absolute or ultimate principle in terms of the unlimited and absolute negative.

Now the Absolute which seemed to have such negative characteristics has been expressed as a non-personal principle by the Indians. We can also discover such a representation of the Absolute in some of the mystics in Europe, but they did call such an impersonal Absolute by the name of "God." For instance, Scotus Eriugena maintained, "It is not unreasonable for God to be called Nothing because of His transcendent superiority." Yet he called the Absolute "Deus" to whom he refused to give any attribute. On the contrary, Indian philosophers regard the highest God as an inferior existence when compared with the highest principle. According to the Vedanta * school, the creation of the world by the highest God was caused by illusion (maya*). They say, "The God that is Atman* discriminates himself with his own powers of phantasy (illusion, maya)."25 "The God

that is Atman * is deceived (sammohita*) by the powers of phantasy (maya*) of this God."26 There is no maya in God himself, but when he creates the world as a Supervisor maya attaches itself to him. God is in an illusory state. And because this illusion exists, the evolution of the world is possible. Therefore it became the fundamental notion in the followers of Samkara* that "Supervisor (Isvara*) = Highest Principle (brahman) + Illusion (maya)." This view that the Absolute causes the world to come into existence through illusion has been inherited by some sects of Hinduism.
Thus the ultimate Absolute presumed by the Indians is not a personal god but an impersonal and metaphysical Principle. Here we can see the impersonal character of the Absolute in Indian thought.27

The inclination of grasping the Absolute negatively necessarily leads (as Hegel would say) to the negation of the negative expression itself. According to some Upanisad*, Badhva*, a wise man, answered with silence when he was asked the true nature of Brahman. Someone asked him, "Please teach me the true nature of Brahman." Badhva was rapt in silence. The man asked again, and still Badhva spoke nothing. When he was asked repeatedly he said, "I am teaching now, but you cannot understand it. For this Atman is tranquility itself."28 Vimalakirti*, a wise Buddhist layman, seems to have attained a more abstruse state of mind. According to the Vimalakirtinirdesa*, Vimalakirti asked thirty-two Bodhisattvas, "How can it be possible to attain the unequalled truth of Buddhism?" And he listened to their answers silently. At last they asked Mañjusri*, a Bodhisattva, to tell his opinion. He told them, "Where there is neither word nor speech, neither revelation nor consciousness. Such a state of mind is called the attainment of the unequalled truth of Buddhism." Then Mañjusri called on Vimalakirti to express his own views. But Vimalakirti was in silence. Seeing this Mañjusri cried, "Well done! I have spoken of 'non-word,' but you have revealed it with your body.

In India the various religions refer to the sage and to the religious aspirant as "Muni," which means "he who maintains silence."29 They believe that truth is equivalent to the state of silence. Moreover, Mahayana* Buddhism rejects any view attached to the void, and insists that "The void too must be negated." Here we have again the logic of negation.

Attraction for the Unknown

It is a fact that the Indians tend to pay more attention to the unknown and to the undefined than to the known and the defined. This attraction for the unknown resulted in a fondness for concealing even the obvious; their way of thinking tended to prefer the dark and obscure over that
which was clear. As a result the Indians like expressions in the form of a difficult riddle. In the Samhitas * of the Veda we can occasionally find poems offering for conjecture a riddle. Gods were pictured as amusing themselves with a riddle.30 Even philosophical problems are expressed in the form of a riddle; e.g.,

       "A swan never pulls up one leg when getting out of water, If he did pull one leg up indeed there would be neither today nor tomorrow,
       Also there would be neither day nor night,
       Also the light at dawn would never shine."31

This poem is interpreted as being an expression of the following truth: The Supreme Existence manifests itself through the world, and yet exists behind the phenomenal world and is immutable. Such forms of expression found their way into the Upanisads* and later literature. This method must not be confused with the riddles that also provide amusement.

In contrast to this, from the outset Buddhism has maintained the position that it was an "open" religion. "O bhikkhus, the dharma and the precepts revealed by the Tathagata* send forth clear light. Never are they observed in secrecy."32 They are as clear and evident "as the sun-disk or the moon-disk." Furthermore, "Regarding the dharma of the
Tathagatha*, there exists no closed teacher-fist33; i.e., Tathagata as a teacher has no secret in his teaching. These passages, however, can mean only that the religion that originated with Gotama would never be hidden from any people and it would never reject any people. Even Buddhists were unable to free themselves from the Indian propensity to express their thoughts through unintelligible riddles.

     "Killing his mother and his father,
          killing two kings of the Ksatriya* tribe, Killing the kingdom and its subjects, a Brahmin* goes on without pain." (Dhammapada, 294)
     "Killing his mother and his father, killing two kings of the Brahmin tribe, Killing a tiger as the fifth,
          a Brahmin goes on without pain." (Ibid., 295)

It would be impossible for a Buddhist, who would feel it a sin to kill only a little worm, to teach another to kill his mother and father, etc. According to the commentary of these sentences, "his mother" means "passion" (kama*); "his father" means "conceit"; "two kings" means "two unjust opinions," i.e., to believe that the soul perishes absolutely after one's death and to believe
Page 59 that the soul exists for eternity after one's death; "the kingdom" means the "twelve Ayatanas *," i.e., the six internal organs (eyes, ears, nose, tongue, tactile organ, intellect) and the six external objects (color and shape, sound, odor, taste, tangibles, non-sensuous objects) of which our individual existence is constituted; "its subjects" means "attachment to pleasure; "a tiger" means "doubt" and "the tiger as the fifth" means "five kinds of obstacle," i.e. covetousness, anger, sleep, evil-doing, and doubt. We are unable to understand the meaning until we paraphrase the interpretation of the commentary. Whether or not this interpretation explains the purport of the analogy, remains a problem; however, that there exists some sort of hidden meaning within this analogy cannot be seriously doubted. We can also find many allegorical expressions in the Katha*, Svetasvatara*, and other Upanisads*.

Minimizing Individuality and Specific Particulars Language

To lay stress on the universal inclines the mind to disregard the individual and the particular. I have already referred to the Indian disregard for the individual and the particular in a previous chapter, so in this chapter 1 shall consider it from a different point of view.
It is necessary to use an article (the, a) to show where the individual is placed within a proposition. There was, however, no article in ancient Indian languages. Both the definite article and the indefinite article did exist but only in a formative state which failed to develop. So the meaning of the word "mahan *" can be both "great," as an adjective and "a great thing or the great, as a noun. And a substantive can even enter into a compound as if it were an adjective, e.g., hinaseva* = same, with an adjective and participle used like an adjective. An adjective can even enter into a compound as if it were a substantive, e.g., hinaseva = hinanam* seva*, mahadasrayah* = mahatsv asrayah*.1

In the European classical languages to say "someone's descendant" or "someone's army" is expressed by two words, i.e., "someone" and "descendant" or "someone" and "army"; while in Sanskrit it is often expressed by one word containing a possessive connotation and thus having a vague meaning, e.g., mamakah* pandavas* ca =
, nostrates Panduidaeque*2 (Bhag. G., I. 1): Saumadatth* = (ibid. I. 8). From these instances we may infer the following: the Indians in accord with their way of thinking indicated above, express only prescribed attributes as determined, and avoid indicating the substantive as the determined; thus they lay stress on the essentially determining character of a substance which lies in the background or cannot be seen, ignoring any concrete direct perception.
Such a characteristic way of thinking can be also found in the way they express abstract notions. Early Europeans used two different concepts to express what existed independently in each abstraction; on the other hand the Indians thought that these two conceptions really came into exist-
ence conjointly so that through the correlation of these two the more profound conception, from which these two conceptions evolved, had to be sought. In accord with this way of thinking, Indians using Sanskrit often express one of two contrary conceptions by the negative form of the other, e.g., "labhalabhau * jayajayau*" (Bhag. G., II. 38) (literally "attainment and non-attainment and victory and non-victory = good and bad fortune, victory and defeat").
The tendency to grasp abstract ideas in this way of thinking appears most prominently in the philosophy of the

Madhyamika* school of Mahayana*. The founder of that school, Nagarjuna* (c. A.D. 150–250), said, "Impurity (asubha*) cannot exist without depending on purity (subha*) so that we explain purity by impurity. Therefore purity by itself cannot be attained. Purity cannot exist without depending on impurity, so that we explain impurity by purity. Therefore impurity cannot exist by itself."3 He did not try to grasp them separately. He thought that "purity" apart from "impurity" or "impurity apart from "purity" cannot come into existence; "purity," however, exists by negation of "impurity" and "impurity" exists by negation of "purity"; thus they are dependent on each other. He advocated as a basic notion of causation that, "When there is this, then there is that, just as when there is shortness then there is longness."

On the contrary, the ancient Greeks and Romans did not like this way of thinking. So their languages expressed two opposite conceptions by two contrary words independently, as we have seen in the example of "good and bad fortune," "victory and defeat" ( ).
Because their method of thinking puts more stress on the underlying features or essence of the individual than on the particular surface qualities of the self, the Indians seem inclined to stress more the relational meaning of a thing than its fundamental uniqueness. According to the dominant way of thinking in India the nature of the individual or the particular is dependent on the universal through which the individual or the particular is supported and inferred. For instance, "gatabhartrka*" means a widow whose husband (bhartr*) is dead (gata). Such a way of expression, which was called "bahuvrihi*" (possessive compound, attributive compound) by Indian grammarians, has developed eminently in Indian languages; so that the word of "bahuvrihi" is used as a technical term in modern comparative philology.
That the Indians are inclined to neglect the individual can be noticed in many other usages of their language. Sanskrit, the classical Indian language, has no single pronoun to represent "the same," "identical." So to express "the same" an indeclinable "eva" (only, just), which expresses only emphasis, is added after the demonstrative pronoun "tad," so that "tad eva"

is after all a general term for a singular object. To express "identical" an adjective "sama" is used in Sanskrit—this word is derived from the same etymological origin as the English "same"—but this word means also "equal" and similar." And a noun "samya *" means "equality" and "identity." Thus the Indians did not strictly distinguish between "equality," "similarity," and "identity" in their daily usage. This usage is again evidence of their tendency to disregard the individual. Therefore when they need to express "identical" or "same," they used "abhinna" whose literal meaning is "not different." Indian philosophers have invented such circuitous expressions as "ekatva," "tadatmya*," "aikatmya*," "ekatmata*" etc. to denote the meaning of "identity" or "sameness."

In this connection the fact may be worth noting that ancient Sanskrit speaking-people used the singular form of
"sarva" (all) to express "each" and "every."5 The pronoun "sarva" means "all" in its plural form, and in the singular form it means "each" or "every," although when they wanted to express "each" they used the word "ekaika" or repetition of the same word, e.g. vane vane (in each forest), dine dine (every day), yada* yada (whenever). Moreover, the dual form has remained in Sanskrit and it has never been dropped. The dual form can also be seen in ancient Greek in Homer's epics, the Gothic (ancient German language), Celtic (Irish native tongue), etc., which are called collectively Indo-European languages. The Latin language dropped the dual form in its early stage, but we can find the traces of the dual form adhering to some words. The German language lost it in the thirteenth century, but we can find its traces in colloquial Bavarian. Among Slavic languages it remains only in some meaningless colloquial phrases. Among the Ugric (Hungarian and Finnish) languages, of different descent from that of Indo-European languages, it remains only in colloquial Ostyac and Vogul whose cultures are mostly extinct, and in other languages it has been dropped already.

The meaning of the dual form is not, as is usually thought, that it indicates "two things" or multiplication by two, but indeed two things in such a relation that when one of them is expressed the other is necessarily remembered. For example, the Indian god of Heaven, Varuna*, is always connected intimately with Mitra, so "Mitrau" (the dual form of Mitra) means "Mitra and Varuna"; "pitarau" (the dual form of pitr* = father) means not "two fathers" but "father and mother," i.e., "parents." The same expression remains in Finnic-Hungarian languages, where the dual form of both "father" and "mother" means "parents." As father and mother are connected intimately, such an expression by dual form becomes possible. In Finnic-Hungarian languages the dual form of both "father" and "mother" means "parents," while in the Indian language only the dual form of "father" is used. This fact shows us that in India the patriarchal system of
paternal rights dates back to early times, but in the other cultures the more ancient notion was preserved.
It was an original rule that the dual form was adapted to two things which were connected intimately as pairs, e.g., two hands, two feet, pairs which exist in the natural world or which are made artificially. The Indians, however, did not limit the application of the dual form to practical use. Therefore they generally used the dual form to express two things connected to each other. It is a well-known fact that in a primitive man's mind two things connected intimately could not be separated into two units, and they were usually expressed together as one thing. Together with the advance of civilization, however, the idea of a unit became so clear that people thought it unnecessary to distinguish dual from singular and plural, so in time the dual form disappeared from the grammatical system.7 As a concrete example of this general rule, the dual form disappeared from the colloquial Indian languages (Pali * and other Prakrits*). But in India Sanskrit has been used by the intelligentsia until recently, so that the dual form has been retained in use. Thus the thought pattern of the Indian intelligentsia has been influenced to the present day by this way of thinking of a pair of things grasped and expressed in a Gestalt rather than each thing individually. The dual form has had only a numerical value in many cases in Indo-European languages, like the ancient Greek. This linguistic phenomenon may have had little to do with ways of thinking, but anyhow it is worth noticing as an interesting case of a linguistic habit expressing a cultural trait for a given time.

Moreover, many literate people of India liked to express the notion of number by concrete nouns which come from their historical and social life; e.g., "rsi*" (sage) is often used to express "seven" for seven rsi are enumerated as a group in their myths, "agni" (fire) is "three for three kinds of agni are used in a large ceremony.8 This tendency may have some connection with the Indian tendency of fondness for poetic diction, which will be discussed later. The tendency can be seen also in ancient Egyptian and German, which express a certain quantity by a concrete noun, not by a numeral,9 but such expressions of cardinal numerals by concrete nouns cannot be seen in other languages, especially in modern times.
Many literate people of India indeed liked to express number concretely and intuitively, although Indian logicians developed the most abstract notion of number as the class of classes, as in the case of vyasajyavrtti* in the Navyanyaya* school.10
Discussing problems about ways of thinking of ancient peoples, Max Wertheimer11 made it clear that number and the notion of number are so very different between ancient peoples and modern Europeans—i.e., ancient peoples generally grasped concrete numbers and the abstract notion

of number according to their way of thinking by laying stress on Gestalt, while the notion of number of modern Europeans has been reached as a result of abstracting from the process of counting by numbers in common experiences. Such a way of thinking clearly remains in the ancient Indians, e.g., 19 is expressed "subtract 1 from 20" (ekonavimsati *), 597 is expressed "subtract 3 from 600."12 The same way of expression can also be seen in the Greek language, e.g., Now, Megasthenes says, there are '120 lacking 2' (i.e. 118) nations in India."

" (Arrianos, Indike* VII).
Why didn't the Indians use abstract expressions for number, in spite of their inclination, which I have mentioned on several occasions, to lay stress on the universal and to use the abstract expression? We suggest the reason for it is as follows: number is an objective form that is valid for the quantitative aspects of the objective world; and the Indians, not interested primarily in an objective study of such aspects of the external natural world, would not be too concerned with constructive reflection about the application of number. That the natural sciences did not develop as far in India as in Europe seems to have an intimate connection with their way of thinking of universals as mentioned above. And, though the Indians had an intensive consciousness of the idea of time, they had little interest in calculating, grasping, and describing time quantitatively. This fact is connected with the neglect of historical details and the temporal causes of social change by Indian thinkers who look down upon time and change as illusory.

Minimizing Individuality and Specific Particulars

The inclination of most Indians to subordinate individuality and particularity to the universal appears in many spheres of India's cultural life. In the first place, the particular details of local geography and climatology have been neglected in India. Secondly, in their ethical books and moralizing fables, there is very little attention or criticism given to the individual's feelings and conduct. Thirdly, in their essays on art and aesthetics there is a good deal of speculative discussion of the nature or essence of beauty in general, but scarcely any detailed analysis of individual works or time-honored masterpieces of the many works of art in India.

A similar tendency may be noticed in the mythological personages of India. Gods in Indian mythology have hardly any individual personality insofar as they are symbolic mainly of universal powers or virtues. For example, Indra, a thunder-god, is a very highly respected deity in the Rg-Veda*, but the word "Indra" is also used as a common noun to stand for any divine being who performs the same function.13
The underlying idea that motivates this minimizing of the individual, as a concretely perceived being, is the Indian tendency to think that all particular beings perceived by the senses are only illusions because only the universal is real. The subsumptive judgment ("A is a B") is simply a logical step from an illusory particular to a more real universal.

It may be argued that attention to particular details of individual things characterizes the scientific literature of India, especially in the biological sciences. However, the tendency to classification in any detailed concrete fashion has been confined to Indian works of a general kind such as the Kama-sutra *, the Artha-sastra*, and the Nattya-sastra* of Bharata. But most of these works lack case-histories of natural phenomena, just as there is a general neglect of specific events in human history other than the court annals and family records, never as detailed as the writings of the Chinese historians.
The Buddhist logician Dharmakirti* (ca. 650 A.D.) already had investigated problems concerning analytical and synthetic judgments. For him, however, in the following inference "This is a tree, because it is a simsapa*," the major premise "All simsapas* are trees" is an analytical judgment, and "tree" is the essence of simsapa," so tree is connected to "simsapa" by the relation of identity (tadatmya*). Now, common sense would not identify "tree" with any of its predicates, but the Indian Buddhist logic regards the essence of the predicate to be pervasive of the subject, and in that ultimate abstract sense finds an identity between them. Dharmottara, a follower of Dharmakirti*, says:14 "'Identity' with the predicated fact means that (the mark) represents itself, its essence (svabhava*). Since (in such cases) the essence of a logical reason is contained within the predicate, it is therefore dependent on it (and invariably concomitant with it)." He then goes on to present an objection: "The question arises, if they are essentially identical, there should be no difference between the reason and the predicate, so will the argument be (a repetition or) part of the thesis?" His answer to this question is: "These two are identical with reference to the ultimately real essence (i.e., the sense datum underlying both facts). But the constructed objects (vikalpa-visayas*), those (conceptions) which have been superimposed (upon reality), are not the same (in the facts constituting) the reason and the consequence."15
The universal or the species, upon which the particular is based, must be subsumed under the higher universal or more general species. If such a relation to higher species is pursued, then eventually ultimate existence (satta*) is reached, beyond which nothing exists.
As a matter of fact, Bhartrhari (ca. A.D. 450–500) expressed just such speculative thought. He maintained that since all species are realized by ultimate existence in the final analysis, so all the meanings of words are no

Page 66 other than ultimate existence. Moreover, he thought, the only ultimate existence is absolute being and what gives existence to species as species is not true being; as this relation between truth and non-truth can be seen between the subsuming upper species and the subsumed lower species, so any kind of conception is non-true against the universal while it is true against the particular. He said, "Now, as it was testified in the sacred book, these two things (bhava *), true and non-true, are present within every thing (bhava); and the true thing is the species, the individual is nontrue."16

The Concept of the Unity of All Things

As a result of their inclination to emphasize Universal Being, to which all individuals and particulars are subordinated, most Hindus concentrate on the idea of the unity of all things. They look down upon the changing manifestations of the phenomenal world as illusory. According to those Indian philosophers who were more or less Vedantic *, only Universal Being behind these manifestations is the ultimate source of reality. And the more anything is individualized, the less it shares in the essence of reality. Individuals are nothing else than limited manifestations of Universal Being. From very ancient times, the Vedantists* had a strong tendency to think of the multifarious phenomena of the world as self-realizations of the one Absolute Being. The main current of Advaita Vedantic metaphysics has been a thoroughgoing monism imposed on pluralistic but illusory phenomena. Although there were other branches of Vedanta*, such as that of Madhva who adhered to a purely realistic and pluralistic standpoint, the main emphasis was on monism. The monistic Vedanta has dominated the classical scholarship of India, which has left its impress on Indian philosophy in general. This tendency has penetrated into more popular philosophy. Even the dualistic Samkhya* and the Vaisesika* schools also finally came to make a compromise with monism.

A primitive form of this monistic view was expressed in the Rg-Veda* in the hymns of the creation of the universe, and it took a more clearly defined form in the Upanisads*. The Upanisads express Absolute Being in many different ways. They follow the Vedas, assigning the role of the primal principle to things in nature, such as Wind, Water, or Ether. Adding to those survivals of the old Vedic ideas, the Upanisads took again the primacy of Absolute Being over the principles and functions of individual being such as the Spirit, the Understanding (vijñana*), or the Soul (purusa*). And before they named it the Brahman or the Atman*, they attempted to express Absolute Being by various notions like "the existent," "the non-existent," "that which is neither existent nor not existent, "the undeveloped," "the controller within," or "the imperishable." Though the Upanisads express the Absolute by such multiple names, we can point out
one feature common to these concepts: all of them suppose the existence of the One Absolute Being, underlying the diversified phases of the phenomenal world. All of the phenomenal phases belong to it, proceed from it, depend upon it, and are controlled by it. Furthermore, in the Upanisads *, they conceive that the soul in individual beings is in its ultimate nature identical with the true Self (Brahman; Atman*). And this metaphysical monism in the Upanisads is followed in later Hinduism.1 It is natural, therefore, that the Indian ethics sets as its highest goal the unification and assimilation of the individual self with the Universal Self. Even when one cannot hope to attain this goal in this life, he should continue his efforts to achieve it in the next world. One of the Upanisads describes the state that a man freed from desires enters after his death as follows, "Being Brahman, he goes to Brahman."2 And the sage Sandilya* declares, "When I shall have departed from hence, I shall obtain it (that Self)."3 When one has attained this final goal, he is one with the Absolute Being. There he no longer bears any personal differentiation. Uddalaka* teaches as follows: As the bees, my son, make honey by collecting the juices of distant trees, and reduce the juice into one form, and as these juices have no discrimination, so that they might say, I am the juice of this tree or that, in the same manner, my son, all these creatures, when they have become merged in the True (either in deep sleep or in death), know not that they are merged in the True."4
This monistic view of the Upanisads was developed further by the Vedantic* philosophers. Samkara* is the chief representative of the monistic philosophy of the Vedanta*. "So great is the influence of the philosophy propounded by Samkara and elaborated by his illustrious followers, that whenever we speak of the Vedanta philosophy we mean the philosophy that was propounded by Samkara."5 Nearly two thirds of contemporary pundits (scholars of traditional scholarship) of India belong to the school of Samkara.6
Of course, it is wrong to say that all the Indian thinkers hold such a view of the unity of all beings. But this is the view maintained by a majority of the philosophers in India. Even the schools of Indian pluralism did not always reject monism; in the philosophy of Vallabha (1481–1533) who was a pluralistic monist, "the duality that we perceive in the world does not contradict monism; for the apparent forms and characters which are mutually different cannot contradict their metaphysical character of identity with God. So Brahman from one point of view may be regarded as without parts, and from another point of view as having parts."

A monistic tendency forms the core of the theological system of the Hindu religious schools. Throughout the history of philosophy in this country, the monistic view has been accepted by a majority of its thinkers.

"The tendency of Indian philosophy, especially Hinduism, has been in the direction of monistic idealism. Almost all Indian philosophy believes that reality is ultimately one and ultimately spiritual. Some systems have seemed to espouse dualism or pluralism, but even these have been deeply permeated by a strong monistic character."


 The Buddhists, however, rejected the existence of any metaphysical principle as advocated in the Upanisads * and in the Indian orthodox philosophical schools. And they did not engage themselves in metaphysical discussions about the unity of one with the Absolute, but they emphasized participation in the current affairs of the world for the realization of absolute virtue. They taught the importance of unity among individuals in the actual society of their fellow-beings. From its inception, the Buddhist religious movement strongly opposed class discrimination in any form. A sentence in one of their sutras* reads: "What has been designated as 'name' and 'family' in the world is only a term."9 Within the early community of the Buddhist monks, this idea of equality of all classes was faithfully carried out. Gotama the Buddha no longer belonged to any particular caste or family (gotra). And whoever, having renounced the world, joins the Buddhist community (samgha*) to become a Bhiksu* is called uniformly a Sakya-putra* or a son of Sakyamuni* the Buddha. Within the Samgha*, everyone belongs directly to the order of the Samgha without any intermediary agent and he is treated as absolutely equal to others in all his qualifications. The standing order within the Samgha was fixed according to the number of the years elapsed since one had taken orders. So, one of their Vinaya texts describes the Samgha as follows: "Just, O Bhikkhus, as the great rivers—that is to say, the Ganga*, the Yamuna*, the Aciravati*, the Sarabhu*, and the Mahi*—when they have fallen into the great ocean, renounce their name and lineage and are thenceforth reckoned as the great ocean, just so, O Bhikkhus, do these four castes—the Khattiyas, the Brahmans, the Vessas, and the Suddhas—when they have gone forth from the world under the doctrine and discipline proclaimed by the Tathagata*, renounce their names and lineage, and enter into the number of the Sakyaputtiya Samanas*."10 In one of the Upanisads, we can find a teaching with a similar context. "Just as the flowing rivers disappear in the ocean casting off name and shape, even so the knower, freed from name and shape, attains to the divine person, higher than the high."11 It can be said here that the metaphysical or ontological concept of the unity of all things held in the Upanisads shows itself in Buddhism only by taking the form of practical ethics.
Buddhist thought was refined remarkably in the hands of the Mahayana* Buddhists. The idea of Sunyata* or The Void admits nothing real or substantial, but even in this idea we can notice a feature of the old

Indian monism. Sunyata * means absolute negation and it permits nothing differentiated. The great teacher of Mahayana* Buddhism, Nagarjuna*, teaches: "the release (moksa*) is the extinction of all action (karman) and of all defilement (klesa*). The action and the defilement arise from the differentiating notions (vikalpa). They come from the concept of diversity (prapañca). This concept of diversity, however, is terminated in the state of Voidness."12 The release in Nagarjuna's sense means the attainment of this state of Voidness.
For most Indians, to enter into a perfect state of tranquility where the mind is immovable and identical with the Absolute is the highest religious experience that only a man of wisdom can hope to gain. And they attach only a relative and secondary significance to other states of religious experience, considering them to be lower states only serving as intermediate means to help one attain the highest.
This tendency can also be noticed even among present-day intellectuals of India. They prefer to study the philosophy of Hegel, Bradley, or Whitehead. The philosophy of Spinoza, which is also a favorite subject for contemporary Indian philosophers, is often interpreted in the non-dualistic, monistic light of the Sankaraite* Vedanta*; for example, the infinity of God's attributes is explained as the "absolute indeterminateness of God," which is surely a Vedantist* speaking and not Spinoza.13

Now, as additional evidence to show that the core of Indian thought is the idea of the unity of all things, we will proceed to study a linguistic phenomenon observed in the Indian languages. In Sanskrit, the universal class of "all the individuals or things in the universe" is designated by words in the singular like "idam* sarvam," "idam visvam*," (all this) or simply idam" (which means "this").
And this usage of the words in the singular number can be observed in the old Upanisads*, in the Buddhist books,14 and in many other Indian works in general.15 In Japanese, to express "the things in the universe," we say banyu*, bansho*, monomina, all three implying the infinite diversity of the phenomenal world. In contrast to the Japanese way of thinking, the Indians tend to ignore this diversity and the differentiated phases of the phenomenal world and grasp all things as one unit. Of course, it is grammatically correct to write in the plural the Sanskrit pronoun "sarva" and its equivalents in other Indian languages. There are some cases of such usage in old Indian scriptures.16 But, in those cases, we should not overlook the fact that the word "sarva" does not mean all things without limitation, but that it implies the whole within a certain boundary. And to mean all things without limitation, the Indians never fail to write "sarva" in the singular number.
This Indian usage of the words in this case presents a remarkable contrast to the Greek and the Latin usage of the equivalent words, , omnia. In Greek, though it belongs to the same language root as Sanskrit, the pronoun equivalent to "sarva" in the neuter plural form means "all things." There is a fine example of this Greek usage in Heraclitus' well-known proposition all things flow ( )." Both Plato17 and Aristotle18 represent the universe as a complex body using the word in the plural number. And this usage was accepted by the Greeks for a long time up to comparatively recent times.19 When they use the Greek equivalent of "sarva," in the singular number, it has the meaning of "everything" and the meaning of "all" will not be expressed accurately.20 There is a very rare case in Greek expressing "all things in the universe" by the pronoun in the neuter singular " ."21 But, in this case, the philosopher who used this expression took a stand very similar to the Indian monistic view of the world and its pantheism. His view was more like the Indian than like the Greek one, for such a view was rarely held by the Greeks in general. In Latin, too, they use "omnia," the word in the neuter plural form, to mean "all things."22 And to mean "all things as one unit" or "the universe," the Romans have another word

"universum" so that they have no fear of the confusion that might exist in Greek. In Greece, not only philosophers but people in general thought that the universe was a complex body consisting of innumerable individual and particular things. Greek atomists regarded the atoms as innumerable. In contrast to this Greek view, the Indian philosophers have mostly maintained that all beings in the universe are limited and particularized manifestations of the sole ultimate reality. Here, without relying upon other methods of comparative philosophy, we can maintain the foregoing conclusions through analysis of linguistic expressions.
Now, insofar as most Indians attach little significance to individual phenomena, it is natural that they should be inclined to minimize the absolute value of any individual being.
As a natural result of such a way of thinking, there appears in India the idea of the oneness of opposite pairs, of good and evil, and of beauty and ugliness. Megasthenes, referring to the features of Brahmanistic thought, writes as follows: "[According to the Brahmanists] whatever happens in human life is neither good [ ] nor evil
[kakóv]. For if the nature of a thing or an act is fixed for good or evil, why is there any difference among men, whose notions are all more or less like a dream, of those who are pleased by a thing or act and those who are troubled by the same thing or act?"23 In the old Upanisads *, too, it is repeated that what appears good or bad to our human eyes is not so in the absolute sense and that the difference between the two is only a matter of comparison.24 For instance, one of the Upanisads reads as follows: "[The true Self], the con-

troller of all, the lord of all, and the ruler of all, does not become greater by good works nor smaller by evil works."25
And in another text, it is said, "As water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil deed clings to one who knows it."26 And this idea of the oneness of opposite pairs held in the Upanisads * was accepted by the Vedantists*, the most influential philosophical school in the India of later ages.27
To the above, of course, a counter-argument will be presented: how could the Indians have gone into such minute classification of phenomena and their division into sub-sub-types if this were really true? Also, why is it that one powerful school of philosophy has felt compelled to develop an ultimate category of differentiation (visajya*) without reference to which phenomena could not be intelligible? These counter-questions are pertinent. Still the writer cannot help retaining the impression that many Indian thinkers admitted pluralism only on a secondary plane, and not in the metaphysical realm. Even if we admit the predominance of pluralism in Indian philosophy, still we cannot deny the stronger influence of monism in other cultural areas of Indian thought, such as religion.

The Static Quality of Universality
Comprehension of This Quality Through Static Aspects of Language

It has already been suggested that most Indians incline to comprehend phenomena statically. This tendency has a close relation to their tendency to put a high value on universality. All things in this world are always changing and moving. On the other hand, the substance of these things continues as long as they exist and its nature changes little. Therefore, the tendency to prefer universality generally draws more attention to the nature or essence of things than to their manifestations which are always changing, and again this tendency stresses the static aspect of things more strongly than their dynamic functions.
Some special characteristics of this way of thinking can be found in the Indian usage of parts of speech. First, it can be said that the noun (or verbal noun) is more likely to be used than the verb in a Sanskrit sentence, because the noun expresses the more stable and unchanging aspects of the thing. Secondly, the adjective which modifies a noun is used much more frequently than the adverbial form which is seldom used in Sanskrit.
The former characteristic will be explained first. Although expression by verbs was very complicated in the sentences of the Vedas, it became very simple in classical Sanskrit. Verbal nouns came to be mainly used instead of the finite verbs in classical Sanskrit.1 Especially in prose writings, the nominal predicate is widely used and the finite verb is seldom used. The noun which is used in Sanskrit as the predicate is in some cases a participle and in some cases a verbal noun. For example, the sentence "due to rain, the food appears" is expressed in the form of "due to rain, appearance of the food (is possible)" in Sanskrit. (parjanyad * annasambhavah*, Bhag. G. III, 14. = imbre fit frugam proventus, ). It was the practice since ancient times to use the participial form instead of the finite verb to express the past tense, and it became a common expression in colloquial speech of the later periods.2

The adjectives whose quality is static are used in Sanskrit in place of the finite verbs used in the classical languages of the West. For example, the sentence "sarvam anityam (all things are impermanent)" is used in Sanskrit instead of the sentence "all existences change and move" ( ).
Thus the "periphrastic form" was established in Sanskrit. Although it is seldom found in the Vedic Scripture, the periphrastic perfect, one of the periphrastic forms, can be frequently found in the literature after the Brahmanas *. For example, in order to express the meaning "he went," the phrase "gamayam* cakara* (he made a going)" is used. And again the form of periphrastic future is used in some cases in order to express future action.3 For example, the word "gantasi* (you are the one who goes)" is used to express the meaning "you will go. (gantasi = pervenies ad . . . . Bhag. G., II, 52.)

Again in Sanskrit, the denominative, a special form of verb, which is formed from a noun, is established. For example, putriyati*, a denominative which was formed from a noun putra (son), means "to desire to have a son," and svamiyati*, a denominative formed from a noun svamin* (master) means "to regard as a master." Generally speaking, denominative is used as the word which connotes the meaning of "to be . . .," "to work as . . .," "to regard as . . .," and "to desire . . . ." Such special categories of verbs as the denominative are not found in the classical grammar of the west.
Another grammatical fact can be considered as showing a similar tendency; namely, in Sanskrit, sakya*, an adjective, or sakyam*, an indeclinable, is used to express the meaning "to be able to . . .," which is expressed by using a verb or an auxiliary verb in the Western languages. (For example, "na devasuraih* sarvaih* sakyah* prasahitum* yudhi" [[[Ramayana]]* II, 86, 11] = non potest proelis superari a cunctis dis daemonibusque.)4
In the Sanskrit language, it is seldom that a verb in the form of the finite verb is used; the verb is mainly used in the form of the verbal noun. Therefore, the general characteristic of Sanskrit construction is that the nominal sentence is more likely to be used than the verbal sentence. Especially in classical Sanskrit, the finite verb is seldom used.

In connection with the above fact, usage of the infinitive form of the verb is very much limited. In Sanskrit the infinitive form is never used as the subject.5 Nor is the infinitive form ever used as the object. When it is necessary to use the infinitive verb as an object, an abstract noun formed from the root of that verb is used instead of the infinitive form of that verb. Originally, the infinitive form of a verb preserved the case ending of the verbal noun in the RgVeda*, that is, it preserved case endings of accusative, dative, genitive, and locative cases. However, in classical Sanskrit,

only one form, which ends with "—tum" (one of the above mentioned case endings), remains. Moreover, in most cases in classical Sanskrit, the infinitive form is used only when the meaning "in order to do—" which denotes an object of behavior is expressed. Even in this case, usage of the infinitive form is not necessarily the same. The infinitive form is used in both the active and passive voices.6
There is a remarkable difference between Sanskrit and the classical languages of the West on this point. For example, there are two kinds of infinitive, the present and the perfect, in Latin. The present infinitive expresses continuation, repetition, and process while the perfect infinitive indicates completed action. The infinitive in Latin can become subject, predicate, and also the object of a sentence as a noun, because it possesses the properties of both verb and noun.

It is quite likely that the reason why there exists such a great difference between Sanskrit and the Western languages is that the Indians did not pay as much attention to the changing and moving aspects of existence.
Another striking characteristic of Sanskrit will be considered. Sanskrit does not possess any adverbial suffix which is common to all Western languages. As a general rule, an adjective can become an adverb by adding some suffixes such as "— " in Greek and "—ment" in French, in the Western languages. However, there are no such adverbial suffixes in Sanskrit; so we find the accusative case of the adjective (neutral, singular) is used in Sanskrit when it is necessary to modify the verb.7 Again accusative, ablative, and locative cases (singular) of adjective are used adverbially in some cases. In brief, the adverb is not acknowledged to be a part of speech in the system of Sanskrit grammar. And it is very common to use the adjective where the adverb is used in Western languages.

(The same disparity between the Indian way of thinking and other ways of thinking can also be found among modern Western languages. Among the modern Western languages, German tends to stress the unchanging, static, and universal aspects of phenomena. On the contrary, English attaches great importance to changing aspects of things. There exists no special suffix which can distinguish adverb from other parts of speech in German, whereas in English an adverbial suffix is added to the adjective when it modifies a verb.8)
This tendency to comprehend things through their static aspects can also be found elsewhere. For example, a demonstrative pronoun "sa" is usually added to the subject when it is necessary to connect two sentences to express the meaning of "and" or "then." Namely, the demonstrative pronoun is used in Sanskrit instead of the conjunction.9 In order to show compound events, it is often necessary to use the conjunction in Western languages. On the contrary, the Indians repeatedly mention the

same subject of action which remains unchanged through a period of time.
The subject of action which influences the gerundive, which has passive meaning, or the past participle, which ends with "—ta," is expressed by the instrumental case or genitive case in Sanskrit. The following sentences are its examples: "bhavata * (or bhavatah*) krtah* kartavyah* (you fulfilled your duty)"; "rajñam* pujitah* (one was respected by kings)." Here the instrumental case is apt to express the same meaning with a participle but the genitive case is used with an adjective.10 In the case of Western languages, the subject of action is always introduced with prepositions such as , à, by, von, or par. It can be concluded from the above fact that, on the whole, Western people comprehend action through its changing aspects, while Indians comprehend action attributively. That is to say, many Indians consider that action is an unchanging aspect or only an attribute of phenomenal existence.
The above-mentioned characteristic way of thinking also influenced the construction of concepts. In classical Indian languages, there was no word which corresponded to the word "to become." Although the verb formed from root "bhu*" connotes the meaning of "to become," this word also connotes the meaning of "to exist at the same time. Why did the ancient Indians fail to distinguish the word meaning "to become" from the word meaning "to exist" in their daily conversation? It was because "to become" was one form or aspect of "to exist" for them. A noun "bhava*" formed from root "bhu" is understood as the word which means either "being born" or "existing."11 That is to say, "to become" is "to be born," in other words, for the Indians. Therefore, the Indians managed to produce the words "anyatha* bhavati"12 or "anyathabhava*" (being otherwise) in order to express "to become" or "to change."
For the Indians, therefore, "all the things of this world are changing and moving" is not the expression of the changing aspect of existences but is the expression of a static and unchanging state. In the sentence "sabbe sankhara* anicca* (all things are impermanent)," a common expression of the Indian Buddhists, "anicca" is an adjective. Thus, change is understood statically. This adjectival form of expression is fundamentally different from the sentence " (all things flow)" of Western thought in which the predicate is dynamically expressed by a verb.

The Static Quality of Thought

Thus, in Indian philosophy the Absolute is generally explained as a Being beyond all temporal appearances.
According to the Upanisads*, the Absolute is also expressed as Imperishable (aksara*) in the following ways.13
"Atman * is imperishable for it cannot be destroyed. . . . It is unfettered, it does not suffer, it is not injured."14 "This is that great unborn Self who is imperishable, incorruptible, eternal, fearless, Brahman."15 In early Buddhism such a metaphysical principle as the Absolute is not laid down, but it is claimed that the principle of pratityasamutpada*, whether the Buddha has appeared or whether he has not appeared, is unchanged and eternal. According to Mahayana* Buddhism, sunyata* or dharmata* (the essence of things) is the principle of pratityasamutpada* that nothing can disappear or arise. As stated above, the idea of the Absolute, which Indian philosophers have conceived, is of a negative character. Accordingly, the Absolute can only be expressed as essentially static in quality in relation to all appearances of changing things.

The same kind of way of thinking is discernible concerning their concept of man. Let us compare it with the Christian concept of man. According to St. Paul, the concept of man is roughly as follows: Man is composed of two parts, i.e. body and mind, representing the external and internal aspects of man respectively. Mind is that which gives vitality to body or the source of life. He calls this mind "psyche*," and when he defines it as the subject of consciousness or self, especially distinguishing it from the body, he also gives the name "pneuma" or soul to mind. However, the term "pneuma," which was employed in few cases, generally means the origin of a resurrected life in the awakened man as distinguished from the ordinary man. In other words, it denotes the generative power of the resurrective, sacred, and eternal life which comes from God or the Savior and which controls man. Accordingly, soul is identified with the Holy Spirit, which is distinctly separate from the mind of man. On the other hand, the body, which represents the external aspect of man, is supposed to be constituted by a bony substance (sarx). It might be acknowledged that it does not apply merely to the flesh, but to all the elements composing man-in-nature,16 due to imagining that the sarx is the main element of all constituents of body. On the contrary, according to Indian philosophers, soul is defined as prana*, atman*, or jiva*, and body as sarira* or deha, not as mamsa* or flesh. It appears that they considered the bone to be the central part of the body. Sarirani*, the plural form of sarira (body), means the bones or remains. That the bone is considered to be the fundamental component of the body, we see in the following passage of the
Dhammapada: "Body is formed by the bones together with flesh and blood spreading on it. It contains decay, death, pride, and falsehood."17 As seen from the above statement, the Christians in the West find the central significance of body in the dynamic element of which body is constituted; Indian philosophers in the East find it in the static element, i.e. bone.
Such being the case, generally in Indian philosophy the idea of "becoming" is not considered primary, but the idea of "being" is the central consideration. Therefore, Indian philosophers in general explain three aspects of "being," i.e. appearance, extinction, and continuance or intermediate state of "being." These three are referred to early in the Old
Upanisads *,18 and they are generally accepted by the orthodox schools of Brahmanism and the Jain schools.
However, the idea of becoming" is little mentioned in these schools. Vikara*, vikriya*, parinama* , viparinama*, etc.
are considered to be equivalent to "becoming," but they show that the simple becomes specialized into complexity, and these words rather mean evolution or development. Varsyayani*, philosopher of language of ancient India, set forth the theory of the sixfold aspect of being (bhavavikara*)19 in the phenomenal world, i.e. appearance, existing, changing, increasing, decreasing, and extinction, and in later ages it was accepted by the other famous Indian philosopher of language named Bhartrhari*.20 However, Samkara*, the famous Vedantist, refuted this theory as meaningless, and he maintained that appearance, continuance, and extinction are recognized to be the only three aspects of "being," and that all other aspects of being might be included in these three.21 Also in Buddhism these three aspects are designated as those of the conditioned (samskara*) or phenomenal being.22 The Sarvastivada* school, the most eminent of Abhidharma Buddhist schools, maintained the theory of four aspects of being by adding the fourth aspect of being or the conditioned, namely, jara* or decaying, which was interpreted as "changing to other" (anyathabhava*, anyathatva*).23 Accordingly, they show the four aspects of the conditioned as appearance, extinction, continuance, and decaying.24 However, this theory was not accepted by all Buddhist schools.

From the point of view that the idea of "being" is considered primary, and that the idea of "becoming" is ignored, Indian thought is considerably similar to Greek thought, and departs from modern thought. As pointed out on several occasions, the central problem of ancient Greek philosophy was to investigate reality or "being," and there the truth was nothing but "being" and it was to be materialized in Existence. The truth is thus realized by insight into the form of reality and it denotes the discovery of the essence of "being." Accordingly, the science of geometry was the typical pattern of science in ancient times, through which the principle of the fixed forms of material bodies in space was investigated. Only Statics was developed even in the field of physical science. On the other hand, the idea of "becoming" is investigated mainly in modern thought. Kinetics has developed in the field of physics of the modern age. Mathematics has developed in the form of analytics and algebra studying variable quantities and relations. And for the first time analytical geometry was organized

and studied. Indian thought is similar to Greek thought from the point of view of its difference from modern thought in which the idea of "becoming" or movement is regarded as its chief characteristic; however, compared with Greek thought, Indian thought may be said to go to extremes in expressing its ideas ontologically.

Thus, the static quality of ways of thinking of some Indian minds is distinctively far from the dynamic quality of modern thought; however, from the very point of view of its contrast with modern thought, it can offer a certain significance for modern civilization. While modern life is inclined to drive man to a disturbed or mad restlessness, the static quality of Indian thought is capable of giving peace or rest to the mind of modern people. Accordingly, Indian culture is helpful in presenting rest and a quite joy to persons today who are tired of the turbulent movement of their culture.
In introducing the life and activity of Ramakrishna (1834–1886), who was one of the most eminent religious teachers of modern India, Romain Rolland writes as follows: "He was a fruit harvester of early autum whom Europeans had rarely if ever known." And he goes on to say: "I should like to inform European people who are feverish and restless because of this arterial throbbing. I want to wet European lips with unperishable blood."25 Even Albert Schweitzer, who is known as a devotional Christian teacher, though criticizing all Indian religions, acknowledged the following merit in them: "However, there is one significance which we European people ought to acknowledge in regard to the religious thought of India. It is that the Indian religion teaches us calmness or equanimity of mind . . . the Indian people comprehend the essential weak point in the faith of modern Christianity. We Europeans believe that Christianity is only dynamic in its religious activity. There are too few occasions when we reflect on our deeper selves. We Europeans are usually devoid of equanimity of mind."26 In view of the contrast between Indian calm and modern activism, it is no wonder that the Indian idea of inner peace" is so attractive to the minds of modern people.
Lack of Common-Sense Concepts of Time

The thought process which regards existence behind the phenomenal world as more important than the phenomenal world itself, naturally results in destroying the concept of time, especially the concept of differences in time necessary for expressing specific events in experience.
This thought process can be seen in the fact that mood in the Sanskrit language has gradually vanished and become simplified; various kinds of tense have disappeared, and accordingly their usages have been confused.

In the proto-Indo-European language, the difference of verb usage is mainly based on mood and, therefore, the verb of this language was based on a flimsy grasp of the concept of time. The present tense of direct speech simply indicates sustaining action, while the perfect tense denotes the state of action which was momentarily conceived regardless of duration as completed. It was somewhat later before the concept of time was emphatically introduced by the use of verbs. The old writings of the Greek language preserved a good variety of moods. It was so with the Vedic language. However, in Latin the verb is principally based on a concept of time. Even in the present Greek language the mood of the verb persists with considerable tenacity, and in the Slavic languages it is still preserved.27 However, generally speaking, the tenses of verbs came to occupy the important place and the differentiation of tenses became developed in later ages. These trends are remarkably discernible in all modern languages.

However, though there are five kinds of tense in the Sanskrit language as in Greek,28 they are not sharply discriminated. For example, in indicating the past tense, the following five forms are actually used almost without discrimination in usage; imperfect, perfect, past participle active, aorist, and historical present.29 Simply concerning the frequency of each tense's use, there are differences according to periods. At the end of the period of the Brahmana * writings, the aorist30 was frequently used, and in the Pali* language a single tense denoted almost all past events. According to the famous grammarian of ancient India, Panini* (c. 4th century B.C.),31 the aorist is a single tense which indicates the recent past. However, after Panini, the past participle has been gradually employed as equivalent to the aorist. Finally, in classical Sanskrit there is little usage of the aorist.

Besides, the Sanskrit lacks the past perfect and future perfect tenses in either the indicative or subjunctive moods as well as the past tense in the subjunctive.32 This fact shows that discrimination between absolute past and relative past is not made in Indian languages.

Furthermore, it is also possible to employ the present tense of Sanskrit in order to indicate recent past and future.33 For example, in the sentence "What is the use of it? (It is of no use)," the present tense is used in the Sanskrit language, while the future tense is used in Latin: kim karomi tena = quid faciam eo. Thus Indian people do not have too clear a consciousness of the discrimination of tense. There seems to be a similar linguistic phenomenon in Hindustani in which the same word—kal, adverb—has two meanings, namely, yesterday and tomorrow. Similarly, the term "parson*" means the day after tomorrow and at the same time the day before yesterday, and the term "atarson*" means three days after and before. Such being the case, the determination of the meaning of these

kinds of words is dependent on the context, and so confusion can be removed. That Indian people are not very sharply aware of the discrimination of tense denotes their unwillingness to comprehend the current of time from past to future in the form of quantitative time through which the length of time is capable of being measured. However, it does not mean that the Indian people have no concept of time, but rather the reverse. The law of transiency and its philosophical expression, i.e. their view of the uncertainty of life, sharply pointed out by the Jains and the Buddhists, can be realized only by those who understand from their heartfelt experience the changing phases of the world. The Indian people, who have not exerted themselves to grasp the concept of time quantitatively, have rarely written historical books with accurate dates, and we have indicated that this fact signifies a characteristic feature of Indian culture. It may be said to result from the characteristic way of thinking described above. Presumably, according to the world-view of the Indian people, the universe or world and the social order remain eternal; on the other side, personal life is nothing but one of a succession of lives existing repeatedly in limitless time, and therefore finally becomes meaningless. The idea of the transition of life which the Indian people have conceived is transmigration, i.e. a perpetual wheel of rebirths. Such an idea appeared occasionally in Greek (Pythagorean) philosophy, but in India it has always been maintained by all people. So far as this way of thinking is concerned, such passing phenomena as political or social conditions, as a matter of course, do not attract people. Consequently, it is not surprising that historical descriptions have not been made with much attention to accurate dates in India.

Contemplative Attitudes

Viewing the essential universality behind and beyond the variety of concrete phenomena of our experience can be defined as a contemplative or meditative attitude. It means no more than comprehending all progressive phenomena as eternally completed. Accordingly, in describing successive events, the present participle is used only in Greek and Latin. The gerund which shows a kind of past tense is used instead in ancient Indian languages. Here are some examples: upasamgamya = accedens (Bhag. 1, 2); param * drstva* = (II, 59). (Only in this case also may be used.); pallalam* hitva* = lacum relinquens (Dhp. 91) (having left a pond, the bird . . .); maccu adaya* gacchati = mors prehendens abit (Dhp. 46); kumbhupamam* kayam* imam* viditva*/nangarupamam* cittam idam* thapetva* //yojetha maram* paññayudhena (Dhp. 40) = Vasi simile

corpus hoc agnosscens, arci similem cogitationem hanc sistens, subigat (sapiens) Maram * intellectus armis (Having known that this body is a weak vessel and that the mind is like a confused thoroughfare in a city, you should battle against the Evil One with the aid of wisdom). As seen from these examples, in the Sanskrit language the main and subordinate actions are expressed in different tenses, the latter in the past tense; on the other hand, in the Greek language both are expressed in the same tense. Furthermore, in saying "by means of" for the sake of showing the instrument of action, adaya* or upadaya*, the gerund form relevant to the past is used in the Sanskrit language; however, in the Greek language or the present participle, is used. Also the same characteristic is recognized in constructing compounds in the Sanskrit language. In indicating the causal relation between two notions, a compound is formed which suggests that the order of thought follows the way of tracing effect back to cause. Accordingly, the expression "effect and cause" (phalahetu) occurs instead of "cause and effect" as stated in other languages. Instead of the expression "the relation of cause and effect," "the relation of effect and cause" (karyakaranabhava*)34 is used. Likewise, the following expressions are used in the Sanskrit language: relation of the knowable and the knower (gamyagamakabhava*)35; relation of the generated and the generative (janyajanakabhava*); relation of the proved and the prover (sadhyasadhakabhava*); relation of the established and the establishing (vyayasthapyavyavasthapakabhava*)36; relation of one being excited to activity and the instigator (pravartyapravartayitrtva*)37; relation of that on which anything depends and that which depends on

(asrayasrayibhava*).38 These expressions of the Sanskrit language are remarkably different from those of other languages. Accordingly, when scholars translated the Indian original texts into Chinese, they changed the word order of the above expressions and they appeared as the relation of cause and effect." The Tibetan people also translated "effect and cause" (phalahetu) into "rgyu dan* hbras-bu*" (cause and effect), changing its word order. The way of thinking, in which the notion of effect is first formed and that of cause is inferred and stated afterward, is retrospective, and in this regard, it is basically different from the way of thinking in which the notion of cause is first formed and then that of effect is deduced. (By the way, it is needless to say that such a way of thinking of the Indian people is basically different from the thinking process of natural science through which, with the help of inductive and deductive reasoning, the cause of an effect is investigated and is ascertained by functional correlation without giving primacy to either the cause or the effect.) The Indian people, even if they investigate the relation of two things from cause to effect, generally do not take the view that a single effect is

caused by a single active movement, but prefer to assume that various effects are produced by the combination of various causes. Therefore, most Indian thinkers do not employ the definite technical term which corresponds to efficient cause (causa efficiens). It seems that nimitta-karana * is equivalent to causa efficiens; however, it is also used in expressing causa occasionalis and final cause of aim (teleological relation). The thinking process through which the experienced action and change are immediately perceived as past matters not only restricts the thinking process of common people in India, but exerts an influence on the thinking process of Indian philosophers. The fact that the main Indian philosophies are contemplative is closely related to this thinking process. Greek philosophy is characterized as investigating overtly and speculatively the substance of matter and of watching its forms of activity, and therefore it is commonly criticized as theoretic. However, on this point, it may be rightly said that Indian philosophy has been more contemplative. Indian religious teachers have generally practiced yoga, by way of which they have contemplated the truth or intrinsic nature of phenomenal matter, whereas, it appears that such introspective contemplation did not predominate in Greek philosophy. It is said theoria is very similar to yoga;39 however, yoga does not mean merely watching; it denotes also attaining a state transcending one's own limited self.

Passive and Forbearing Attitudes Toward Behavior

The contemplative attitude leads people usually to assume a rather passive attitude toward the objective or the natural world instead of encouraging an active attitude. They attempt to adapt themselves to nature without reconstructing nature. When assuming such an attitude, they especially tend to speak highly of the virtue of self-surrender or forbearance in its moral sense. Even in the Upanisads* forbearance is mentioned as follows: "Therefore he who knows it as such, having become calm, self-controlled, withdrawn, patient and collected sees the Self in his own self, sees all in the Self."40 In early Buddhism it is also explained as follows: "By virtue of forbearance he should suppress anger."41 "Indeed in this world if he return evil for evil, he cannot be apart from evil. Give up his own evil and take a rest. This is eternal and unchangeable law."42 And again, according to the Jain school, the true hero (vira*) is a man who has ceased hostility (vaira-uparata).43 In Mahayana* Buddhism forbearance is counted as one of six virtues (paramita*). The following passage shows the predominant point of view of Indian religion: "By whom can this world be conquered? It can be conquered by the man who is truthful and patient."44 Here, "conquest does not denote controlling all things

existing in the natural world by sheer force, but subduing one's own uncontrollable passion deserves to be called "conquest." Accordingly, in regard to human effort in action, it is praiseworthy to hold one's desire and passion in check: "Who is the hero? He is a man who is not disturbed by the arrow of beauty's eyes."45 The cause of our living in the illusion of becoming (bhava) is craving (trsna *)46 We have to eliminate it in order to attain emancipation. In every Indian religion the man who eliminates all evil passions is especially extolled.47 Such being the case, the attitude of non-resistance by the Indian people toward outward oppression is extremely forbearing and passive. In resisting the king, Brahmins resorted to the method of fasting. It was believed in India that if a Brahmin who resorted to such a fast died of starvation, the king would sustain a dreadful injury by the force of its miraculous effect. On account of the faith in such miraculous strength, the king was obliged to submit to the resistance of Brahmins, and to grant their request. Even in India today, those who resist governmental power often resort to a hunger strike, emulating Gandhi's successful fasts against British rule.

With respect to economic morality, Indian people lay stress on the fairness of sharing rather than on that of production, because they are not inclined to have an active approach to the natural world. The plains of the Ganges, where the ancient Indian culture flourished, possesses fertile soil and the climate of this area is very hot and rainy. Accordingly, it is fit for rich farm production without much artificial effort. On the other hand, when natural violence comes, the artificial effort is wasted. As far as primitive industry is concerned, nature in India has inflicted its overwhelming power on the Indian people. In such a natural environment all production is controlled by the power of nature and only sharing it requires an artificial effort. Such being the case, the morality of sharing is invoked and taught, and the virtue of the act of giving has been emphasized. Early in the Rg-veda*, there appeared about forty poems praising the act of giving (danastuti*), in which the Brahmin poets praised kings and lords who had offered them cows, horses, servants, etc. Since then, the virtue of the act of giving has been regarded as common in Indian society. This virtue is taught also in the Upanisads*.48 In early Buddhism, considering the extant sacred texts, the act of giving to mendicants and priests is often emphasized, however, and general charity is also taught as a virtue of social morality. The offered things are to be used efficiently and enjoyed both by oneself and by others, and the central point of giving, that one should offer what others need, is repeatedly asserted with emphasis. The sutra* condemns and rejects the notion that only those who are rich in property and full of treasures and foods live

on dainty food.49 And moreover, it teaches us that even the poor should offer what they can in the following way: "Just like a companion of a traveller proceeding on a wild plain, those who offer something in spite of being poor never perish among the dead. This is the eternal law."50 In Jain teaching the virtue of the act of giving is alike regarded as important. In Mahayana * Buddhism the act of giving is the first virtue which is to be practised by Buddhist followers. Accordingly, in India, guided by this thought, the act of giving things which the king and the rich offer to the poor and forsaken has become an almost fixed convention. Thus, it might be rightly said that the respect for the virtue of the act of giving is a really remarkable character of Indian morality.51 The extremity of the contemplative attitude finally results in praising inactivity or "absence of work as the ideal state." Jain followers set a value "on absence of work" (akamma),52 and also aim at ceasing all action.53 They aim at wiping away the dust of karma54 from the past without a new karma or action, because good and bad actions generally produce pleasure and suffering. Also in Brahmanism inactivity or abstinence from action (naiskarmya*) is regarded as an ultimate ideal. In Buddhism, though slightly different from the above teachings, the saint who has attained the highest state of quiescence has achieved what he should have sought in his practice, and there is nothing more for him to do.

However, in regard to this view, some objections have been offered by some Indian thinkers themselves. For example, Bhaskara*, a scholar of the Vedanta* school, says, "Properly speaking, it is impossible to do nothing at all. If emancipation could be attained by the virtue of inactivity, the religious mendicant (parivrajaka*) would not have attained emancipation. Generally speaking, it is impossible for a living person to do nothing."55 According to Bhaskara, it is not possible for anyone to refrain from all action, but one can and should aim at renouncing attachment to self-centered action. His criticism certainly applies to all. In spite of that, the majority of Indians have not thought that way, for inactivity prevails among them at least ideologically. That is the reason why so many Indians seem to lack a drive to activity.

The inactive and contemplative attitude of the Indian people has an influence even on Indian philosophy. Among the four principles, namely, efficient, material, final, and formal causes, which are ascribed to Aristotle, the cause (causa efficiens) corresponds to nimitta-karana*, the material cause to upadana-karana*, and the final cause to prayojana in Indian philosophy; however, formal cause does not have its corresponding term in Indian philosophy. (Of course, it cannot be said that form has not been considered. For some Indian philosophers sabda* is regarded as the form. However, they do not regard form as the so-called cause.) In other words,

Page 86 action in order to create a specific form has not been fully considered among Indian philosophers. Some may think that the cause of such an inactive attitude on the part of Indian thought may be ascribed to the "state of despondency" arising from the influence of hot climate. It may be surely accepted as a contributory cause. However, this type of causal explanation again requires to be criticized as too one-sided.

Subjective Comprehension of Personality

Subjective Comprehension of Personality as Revealed in Language

When we examine the simple subject-predicate form of judgment in the Sanskrit, we find that the predicate is as a rule placed first because of the importance attached to the predicated quality or attribute; the Indians' way of thinking thus tends to emphasize qualities as subjective rather than as objective relations. This is also one of the eminent characteristics of Indian thought. We shall examine in the following passage the reflections of this way of thinking in language. First of all, as a visible example of this tendency, in Western languages, when a person is the object of a verb, the name of the person is expressed most of the time in the accusative case, while in Sanskrit the person in question is often referred to in the nominative case. For example, in a Greek sentence: (= They called Xenophon father), both "Xenophon" and "father" are in the accusative case. Similarly, a Latin verb "nomino" governs two accusatives. In Sanskrit, what is to be defined or named is expressed in the accusative case, as in Greek or Latin, but the new term to be added is expressed by a noun in the nominative case followed by an indeclinable "iti." This kind of expression appears even in the oldest literature, e.g., tám ahuh * supraja* iti, Rg-Veda*, IX, 114, 1 (= they call him a man having good offspring). It may be said that in Sanskrit, importance is attached to a new term rather than to what is already known. By using this kind of syntactical form, i.e. by the use of an independent nominative case for a new term, the Indians regard a new term as the expression of an independent subjective existence different from what is named by it. The same tendency is clearly observed in the use of the gerundive. In the cases of Greek and Latin, the object of a transitive verb is expressed in the accusative case even in gerundive construction. But in old Indian languages it is expressed in the nominative case. The Indians never use the accusative case in such a situation.

E.g. Greek:

                 We should seek after the enemy. 
         Latin: aeternas poenas in morte timendum est. 
                 We should be afraid of eternal punishment after death. 
         Sanskrit: brahmano * na hantavyah*                     A brahmin* should not be killed. 
                   tasmat* svadhyayo* "dhyetavyah*," SBr*. XI, 5, 7, 3.                     Therefore the daily lesson is to be practiced.

Indian languages have no form of "accusativum cum infinitivum" as do the Western classical languages,1 that is, they do not use the accusative case to express the subject which takes a verb in infinitive form as the predicate. It is replaced by an instrumental.2 This seems to reveal an Indian tendency to avoid as much as possible the use of the accusative case for expressing the subject of action. Then what is the significance of the expression in the accusative? All noun cases except the accusative can stand for the nominal predicate of a sentence,3 that is, among all noun cases, the accusative alone has no predicative meaning. The accusative, by definition, has an objective sense and cannot express a subjective sense. In the light of this linguistic rule and the fact mentioned above, we may be allowed to draw a conclusion that Westerners are inclined to comprehend an object of observation as an objective matter, while the Indians, disliking such a way of comprehension, try to grasp its subjective significance. In self-reflection, the Indians did not like to comprehend themselves objectively by placing the self at a distance. In the expressions such as "to think oneself," "to call oneself," "self" is expressed in the accusative case in Latin and Greek, but it is expressed in the nominative case in ancient Sanskrit; e.g., parabhavisyanti* manye. I think I shall be one who has disappeared. (Tait. Samh*, II, 5, 1, 2.) katham* so 'nusisto* bruvita. How can he say [by himself] that he has completed his study? (Chand*. Up. 5, 3, 4.)4

The Indians did not want to reflect upon their own self objectively as the substratum of mental activities. The use of impersonal judgments in which the mental substratum, when it is influenced by sentiment, is shown in the accusative, is occasionally observed only in early Sanskrit literature.5 But it has a fairly good number of examples in Western languages; e.g., "One should keep one's self calm." Similar contrasts between Western languages and Sanskrit are also observed in impersonal admonitions which express the idea of duty or necessity.6 It shows that some characteristics common to the old Indo-European languages have been lost in Classical Sanskrit.

Subjective Comprehension of Personality as Revealed in Philosophy

The Indians tried to avoid comprehending mind as an external substance not only in their ordinary language but also in their philosophical thinking. The mind or soul, which is termed " ," "spiritus," "mens," or " ," and "anima by Greek and Roman philosophers, is called "atman *" by Indian philosophers. The term atman is etymologically related to German "atmen" (to breathe), but is used as a reflexive pronoun in Sanskrit. In Chinese Buddhist scriptures, it is always translated into "wo" (I, ich). It was probably natural for the Indians, who thought of mind as a substance mostly in terms of subjective concepts, to use a reflexive pronoun in order to express such a concept. If a concept is named by any kind of noun, as in Western philosophy, there usually is a more or less objective comprehension about it. In Greek, there is no form like " " or " " and " " means "the same," but has no sense of "the self." In modern philosophy, too, the main point of discussion was on the "I" (das Ich), but not so much on "the Self" (das Selbst) as in Indian philosophy. One may perhaps object here that there existed a few Indian thinkers who understood the subject of mental activity in terms of the objective world; for example, the Nyaya-Vaisesika* school,7 the Mimamsa* school, and even some Vedantists* like Bhartrprapañca*8 held such an objective way of thinking. Indeed, these philosophers called the mind a substance, "atman*," but, so far as the use of such terms is concerned, it was usually in accord with the Indian mode of thought. Their natural philosophy was indeed objective, but its significance lies merely in its criticism of the general tendency of the Indian way of thinking, and they were against orthodoxy merely by way of protest. There can therefore be no objection to characterizing the Indian mode of thought in the manner indicated above.

In the main current of Indian philosophy—from the Upanisads* to the Vedanta* philosophy and to Hinduism—this "self," i.e. atman, is regarded as identical with the Absolute, the ultimate Ego, and both are equally called atman. Sometimes the latter is called paramâtman in contrast with the former, jivâtman*. Though both are different in their attributes, parama or jiva*, they are included in one and the same genus of atman. Thus the Indians thought of an intimate relation between the self as the substance of individuality and the reality belonging to the ultimate self. On the contrary, such an idea was hardly established among Western empiricist philosophers, for not until modern times is there an investigation of "the real self" in Western philosophy.9

A prominent tendency of Indian philosophy is often referred to as "pantheistic." For example, according to Sandilya *, a famous Upanishadic thinker, the Absolute Brahman is said to be "that which is of true thought," "that which is of true intention," and "that whose own thought and mind is realized as they were." Also it is said that it "performs all the activities, it is "endowed with all kinds of desire," and "manifests whatever is intended by it"; therefore "it is possessed of all kinds of odor, all kinds of taste," it is limitless in its scale, "pervades everything," moves "as quick as mind," and "governs over all directions."

This kind of universality is not unique to Sandilya, and we find a similar concept of deity in the philosophy of Xenophon. However, Sandilya regarded his Absolute as being identical with the real self, whereas Xenophon did not. One may here naturally recall the Buddhist negation of atman* against the orthodox atman-theory, and this would raise the objection that the substantial view of atman cannot be regarded as common to the Indians because a major religion such as Buddhism denies it. But did Buddhism really deny atman? According to the non-atman theory expressed in the scriptures belonging to the oldest phase of early Buddhism, Buddhism denies the concept of "mine" or "my possession" (mama). Mendicants are first of all requested to remove their affectionate hold on the concept of "mine."10 It means that they should not harbor the idea of possession, of "mine" vs. "others."11 This concept of renunciation and its practice have characterized Brahmanism since ancient times. Renunciation is described in the Vedic scriptures as a kind of religious observance under the name of "sarvamedha." In the earliest Upanishadic literature, a real Brahmin who realized atman is said to go wandering and begging, casting off desires for sons, wealth, and the world.12 The same idea of the rejection of the concept of "mine" is also taught in Jainism.13 And if the so-called non-atman theory means this rejection of the "mine"-concept, Jains must be said to have kept the idea of "non-atman" (nirmamatva) until later days.14 Why then is the concept of "mine" to be rejected? In giving us the reason, the early Buddhist scriptures teach that whatever is regarded as one's own possession is always changeable. Therefore wealth does not belong to the self forever, and after a person's death, all the things possessed by him and all the relatives and subordinates who are regarded to be his possession will be separated from him. Therefore one should not be attached to his own possessions.15 Thus, in early Buddhism, they taught avoidance of a wrong comprehension of non-atman as a step to the real atman.16 Of things not to be identified with the self, the misunder-

standing of body as atman * is especially strongly opposed. Foolish people comprehend their body as their own possession.17 Even gods are captured by this sort of infatuation so that they cannot release themselves from suffering through transmigration.18 Buddhists of early days called this mis-comprehension "the notion on account of the attachment to the existence of one's body" (sakkayaditthi*) and taught the abandonment of it.19 What is therefore taught by early Buddhists is that whatever is not atman, especially the body, should not be regarded as one's own. With the establishment of technical terms in Buddhist philosophy, the component elements of a body or individual thing are designated by the terms samskarah* (conditionings), or pañca-skandhah* (five groups), and using these terms, the scriptures explain the Non-atman theory in the following way: "pañcakkhandha* (or samkhara*) are to be understood as different things (from atman), and not as atman."20 And in the scriptures of a little later period, we find the following formulae often repeated: "Form (rupa* = feeling, idea, volition, consciousness) is impermanent. What is impermanent is of suffering. What is of suffering is non-atman. What is non-atman is not mine, nor is it I, nor is it my atman." Ordinary people and philosophers superimpose the existence of atman, or the soul, and are seeking it. But whichever elements, mental or physical, may compose human existence, these are not to be understood as atman. These elements are always changing, and hence they are unlike atman which is permanent. Also, being accompanied by suffering, they are different from atman, which is the ideal perfect reality. Then what is our atman? It cannot be comprehended objectively. Whichever principle or function is imagined by people to be atman is in reality neither atman nor that which belongs to atman at all. Such is the outline of the non-atman theory of Buddhism. Therefore early Buddhists never maintained the non-existence of atman. They merely opposed the substantial permanence of anyone's atman. As for the metaphysical question whether an absolute atman exists or not, early Buddhists kept silence. On the other hand, Buddhists admitted the self (atman) as the moral agent and ground in the problem of responsibility for one's acts,21 for example, when they say that one should perform one's own duty,22 or one should be conscious about his "own good."23 Here what is meant by one's own benefit (svattha, svahita) is neither material nor sensual but rather the realization of truth.24 Lord Sakyamuni* is said to have asked those youths who indulge themselves in amusement "to seek after the self (atman)" rather than "to run after women," and advised them to become monks. Seeking after atman is emphasized in the Upanisads*.25 In early Buddhism it was said that, being desirable (priya),26 atman was to be

loved and protected.27 This teaching corresponds to that of Yajñavalkya *.28 The Jains, too, call themselves "atmavadins*"29 and teach the purification30 and protection31 of atman*. Thus, in spite of the existence of different opinions among various religions and philosophies with regard to the essence of atman as the metaphysical principle, the significance of atman as the moral agent of one's actions is sure to be generally admitted among the Indians. For any religion of India, the ultimate goal of emancipation is the recovery or discovery of one's true self. In Brahmanism, attainment of self-control (svarajyam* adhigacchati) is generally considered as the state of emancipation.32 Hell is said to be nothing but "the state of bondage to others."33 Buddhism specially emphasizes that "man is the master of himself."34

Supremacy of the Universal Self over the Individual Self The Unlimited Extension of the Self as Revealed in Language

From these intellectual tendencies in the culture of India, there emerges another notion, viz. the supremacy of the universal Self over the individual self. The Self which is grasped through the way of thinking described above is not identified with the numerable individual selves which are regarded as only relatively separate while they coexist on the same illusory plane of the external world. Beyond this plane of appearances the agent or subject of action transcends the opposition or gulf between the self and "other-than-self," because the transcendent agent cannot be conceived as something subjective. The qualities through which it manifests itself—that is, its qualitative phases— alone are emphasized. Here, it may be noticed that this view brings out by a striking contrast the difference in the views of the self held respectively by Indian and Western peoples. Generally it is claimed that the consciousness of self appeared at the beginning of the modern age. However, in some respects, it had appeared previously among the Western peoples of classical antiquity. The Romans of antiquity, having conceived each self as endowed with the same capacity as other selves, weighed all things respectively on the basis of their own selves. In the Latin language,

the expression "ego et tu" (I and you) is used in order to refer to "one's self and others" at the same time.1 In Japanese, this is a very impolite way of addressing others or one's opponent, while in Latin it is a rather usual expression. The Romans neither accepted the spiritual supremacy of another's self over one's self, not set up a distinction of social standing between one's self and another's. Even gods and superiors were addressed only by the pronoun of the second person tu." This is also true in the Greek language. Hence in Western languages of ancient times honorific expressions are few. On the other hand, most Indian people are destitute of any acute awareness that the self of others is distinct from one's self. In India the tendency is not to regard another's self as an independent subject of action opposed to one's self.

This attitude of Indian thinkers is manifest in the usage of the Sanskrit language, as seen in the way they often employ a particular kind of causative mood. For example, karayati * (to cause to do), a causative mood of karoti (to do), is often used in Indian languages. However, in Western languages of ancient times there is no usage corresponding to the causative mood. When one wants to express a causal relation in the Latin language, he has to use a complicated formula, e.g. "cogo (duco, permitto) ut + subjunctive." Accordingly, in the Sanskrit language the causative mood is often used, in order to express a certain situation, while in the Western languages of ancient times very complicated expressions must be employed in order to show the same meaning. Here, two examples will be given: katham* sa purusah*. . . . kam* ghatayati* hanti kam (that man . . . how can he slay or cause to slay—whom?) (Bhag. G., II, 21) = quomodo is homo quempiam aut aliorum ministerio, aut sua manu occidat? =

naiva kurvan na karayan* (not in the least acting nor causing to

act) (Bhag. G., V. 13) = neque ipse agens, neque aliis agendi auctor = . When the expression "to cause others to . . ." is used in Greek and Latin, various attitudes of others toward one's self are taken into account, and then only after these are expressed is the causal expression used. Therefore, the causative mood "to cause someone to . . ." is formed by using various verbs according to the pattern of behavioral relations between "someone spoken to" and the speaker. In contrast with this the action of another's self is manifested as an extension of action by one's self. The Indian people, who frequently use the causative mood, are very often unconscious of the distinction between the actions of one's self as narrator, and of another self, the person addressed. Accordingly, in the Sanskrit language, there are even some cases where the meaning of the causative mood of a verb is not different from the indicative mood. For example, dharayati* (to cause to hold) is actually used as having the same meaning as dharati (he holds).








These cases become rather striking in the Pali* and Prakrit languages. Generally in these languages, the opponent, when caused to do something, is expressed by the accusative case, but when regarded as a means of action, is expressed by the instrumental case.2 In this case, he is not regarded as possessed of intrinsic personal value, but only as an instrument or means; therefore, he may be denoted by the instrumental case, and because he is nothing but an instrument, the causative mood of a verb is actually identified with its active mood in such cases.

There is a tendency for the Indian to be concerned with an unlimited extension of the will or volition in place of a more finite human relation.

In such a case the subject or agent is sometimes omitted. On describing the process of personal and mental experience, the Indian people do not use a personal pronoun or a term which corresponds to "one" or "man" in English. The subject is denoted only by using a verb;3 e.g., gacchet (should go) can take practically any subject (he, anyone, etc.). In the social circumstance where the will's unrestricted extension might be materialized in another person, those who are coerced to act by this will are dependent upon that other person. This circumstance gives rise to honorific usage in addressing that person, although it has not been so highly developed in India as in Japan. However, there are some honorific words which belong to pronouns of the second person.4 On the other hand, the Greek and Latin languages do not possess any honorific words (bhavan * = , tu ipse, Bhag. G., I, 8). We find in Indian epics that the pronoun of the second person "you" is permitted to refer to a younger person or one's contemporary but not to a senior or higher ranked person, and one is not permitted to call the latter by his real name.5 Likewise in sacred writings of early Buddhism, it is noteworthy that those who were lower in their caste never called the Kshatriyas (members of the ruling class) by pronouns of the second person or by their real names.

The Continuity of One's Self and Other Selves

Although the people of India are concerned with the unlimited extension of the self, as seen in their forms of expression, it is also undeniable that they do not ignore the personality of others; on the whole, they characteristically show a high regard for others. The early Buddhist writings and other doctrines urge everyone to pay respect to others at all times.7 We can only suppose that they did not consider others as other selves or as opponents of one's self. In other words, they conceived the idea that other selves become one with the self as an extension of the self. The aphorism: "Buddha's identification with the self and the self's identification with the Buddha," stated in Tantric Buddhism, is based on the view of the continuity of one's self with other selves which the Indian people commonly conceive. Here we have a striking contrast with the familiar view held by ancient as well as modern Western people who hold that other selves are hostile counterparts of one's self or stand in opposition to it. One can find any number of passages which reveal this kind of view in the writings of Western people: "War is the father of all things" ( —Herakleitos); "Man is a wolf to others" (Homo homini lupus—Plautus); "If you wish for peace, prepare for fighting" (si vis pacem, para bellum). Even in modern times the natural condition of human beings is compre-

hended as "A war of all against all" (bellum omnium contra omnes—Hobbes). From ancient times, the Westerner's view of life has been rather aggressive. In Western history peace was gained largely as a result of bitter struggles. It is not a continually standing peace but the aftermath and interlude of ravages of war. On the other hand, in India, peace was eternal and the soul's tranquility the highest end. Of course, wars occurred time after time in India; however, on many occasions only lords and their mercenary soldiers fought in war, while ordinary people did not join them. In some cases, farmers near the battlefield cultivated their lands without fear and without worrying about it.8 Hence in the agricultural districts of India, peaceful religious ceremonies and customs of a thousand years ago, or more, have been conveyed to the present time almost without sustaining any changes. Generally speaking, the character of the Indians is obedient and remarkably opposed to aggressiveness. Naturally they want and love a calm and peaceful life. As Indian history affords a proof of this view, it is difficult to find instances in which Indians invaded countries outside of India.9

Generally, the Indians have not cultivated the idea of hating other people. The Aryans conquered other Indian peoples and incorporated them into their community as their slaves; but they did not treat their slaves with much cruelty and did not drive them very hard. Megasthenes the Greek writes, in his record of his personal experience in India, that it is a marvellous fact that all men of India are free people and among them moral equality ( ) prevails.10 Sudra *, a man of the lowest of the four castes in the ancient society of India, is commonly interpreted as "slave"; however sudra* denotes a kind of social standing. Accordingly, sudras* are not identified with the "slaves" of Western society who were treated badly and driven to hard work. It is thought that some sudras were only engaged as individuals at work in some Aryan's family. Accordingly, in the eyes of a Greek, slaves did not exist in the ancient society of India. In the ancient languages of India there is no pronoun which denotes the public or a mass of people in contrast with an individual, a pronoun which indicates the common subject, as e.g. "man" in German,11 because the Indians did not regard the individual self in opposition to another self. Therefore, in order to indicate the common subject, generally the active voice of third person singular is used. If necessary, sa (he), nara (man), purusa* (person), and loka (world) are substituted. Conversely, comparing the old language of India with Western languages, this fact shows that, for the sentence whose subject is man, the active voice of the third person singular is commonly substituted in the former language. In

India, it is common in this connection for a proposition to have a universal as its subject; it is rather exceptional that the individual is its subject. This fact exhibits a tendency to attach importance to the universal self beyond the individual self who comprehends it. To cite an example of the ways of thinking of the Indians, people or men as subject of a sentence are, in many cases, stated in the singular form, and then its predicate becomes singular. For instance, ayam paja *12 (whose form is singular) means "these men." In the ancient language of India, jana (meaning "people") is predicated in the singular form;13 on the other hand, people in English takes a predicate in the plural form. In the ancient languages of the West, even though a nation or group is stated in the singular form, its predicate is expressed in the plural form.14 This linguistic mode is inherited even in German.15 Therefore, in the West not only modern people but also Greeks and Romans had a clear idea that the subject of action was an aggregate of individuals, while in India there was a strong tendency to regard the subject of action as a group or united body. Thus, in Western society each individual has an intrinsic value, and each individual opinion becomes the object of public attention. Such passages as "quot homines, tot sententiae" (there are as many thoughts as men) or "vox populi, vox Dei" (the voice of people is the voice of God) are characteristic of this society. The Indians, on the contrary, emphasize that as a member of the united body, i.e. of humanity, each individual is worthy of love and respect. The distinctive feature of Indian thought that the individual self is not to be discriminated ultimately from other selves is acknowledged also by another linguistic phenomenon, the fact that the desiderative mood is often used in India. On a few occasions, an independent word which means "to desire" is used,16 but, on the whole, the desiderative mood is preferred when the meaning "to desire to do . . ." is required. The desiderative mood is formed by a special conjugation of the verb. (As its derivative, the noun form is also used.) For instance, in order to express "he desires to live," two verbs, "to desire" and "to live, are required in the ancient languages of the West as well as in Japanese, while in the Sanskrit language a desiderative conjugation "jujivisati*" is used.17 In the latter language, "to desire" is grasped only as a case of the verb "to live," just as the future conjugation denotes only an action "to come." Therefore, in the West, the desire for action is comprehended as different from the action itself, since it depends upon the free will of the subject of action whether he desires to act or not, while in Indian, the desire for action is seen to be only an annexed action of the subject of that action. Outside of the desiderative mood, in order to express "I hope he

may. . . ." for instance, in the Latin language "rogo ut vivat" (= Je veux bien qu'il vive) (I hope he may live) is used; in the Sanskrit language, on the contrary, "(api nama *) jivet*" is simply used.18 Even in everyday practical life the idea of non-discrimination between the self and the other selves appears. According to Megasthenes, the Greek ambassador to India from Syria (c. 300 B.C.), the Indians did not ask for a bond when they lent money to others. In brief, the Indians are not possessed of any very conscious reflection that the desires of one's self will meet with the antagonistic reaction of others. It is the idea of non-discrimination that underlies their attitude to all men. About this way of thinking, Hegel says: "Intellectual substantiality (of the Indians) is the opposite of the reflection, reason, and subjective individuality of the Europeans. For us Western people, it is the important thing that, in accordance with his own nature, the individual ego desires, knows, believes, or considers something as he pleases, and on that freedom immeasurable value is subjectively placed. On the contrary, the intellect's substantiality stands on the other pole, and there the subjectivity of the self comes to lose its significance. For this subjectivity, all objective things come to be meaningless, and moreover there is neither objective truth nor duty nor right. The result is that only subjective falsehood remains."19 Obviously, it is a misunderstanding on the part of Hegel that the Indians have no conception of either objective truth or of duty and right. The fact is that many scientific discoveries and moral conceptions were formulated in India. However, it is an obvious fact that the Indians seek their religious and moral ideal by effacing the subjectivity of the self. It is on the basis of this way of thinking that absolute unlimited devotion is emphasized in the Puranas* of Hinduism and the Jatakas* of Buddhism. It has been the ideal of the Indians to attain the state of non-discrimination between the self and other selves.19a Consciousness of the Existence of the Self

Then would it be right to say that in India, where the idea of the continuity of one's self and others' selves is generally accepted, no attempt has been made by its thinkers to prove the existence of the self? No, on the contrary, in ancient times the thinkers of India were already engaged in the study of self-consciousness and the demonstration of its existence. But their way of conceiving the self is quite different from the more analytical methods used by modern European philosophers. The Vaisesika* philosophers asserted that the existence of the atman* or the self can be known by intuitive perception. According to Upavarsa*21

and other Vedantic * philosophers, the existence of the atman* cannot be known by inference or demonstration, nor can it be accepted on the authority of scriptural statements. But the atman is known to exist intuitively through the notion that every individual person entertains towards his own self. Really the atman is known to exist from the very fact that "a man is conscious of his own self."22 Because anyone can have ideas about himself, like "I get thinner" or "I perceive this, we cannot deny the existence of the atman or the agent which makes him have such ideas. In a later period, the Kumarila* school in the Mimamsa* system continued this idea of Upavarsa*, claiming immediate perception of the atman. And it was on this point that this school was distinguished from the Prabhakara* school of the same system.23 In accord with what we have observed above, we can say that the assertions concerning the atman by the ancient Indian thinkers are very similar to the view of the self which Western thinkers like Augustine, Descartes, Fichte, and Hegel came to hold through their study of self-consciousness.

It should be noted, however, that in India the atman is generally understood to mean not only the individual ego but also the Brahman or the Universal Self. The Hindu thinkers were inclined to make a big leap in their reasoning; they assume that the existence of the Universal Self is known directly from the existence of the individual self. For instance, Samkara*, the prominent eighth-century Indian philosopher, makes the following statement in one of his books: "Moreover the existence of Brahman is known on the ground of its being the Self of everyone. For everyone is conscious of the existence of (his) Self, and never thinks 'I am not.' If the existence of the Self were not known, everyone would think 'I am not.' And this Self (of whose existence all are conscious) is Brahman."24 And as to the existence of the Self (atman), Samkara writes as follows: "[The existence of the Self cannot be denied]; since that very person who might deny it, is the Self."25 In another part, he gives a full explanation of the existence of the Self. "Just because it (the Self) is the Self, it is impossible for us to entertain the idea even of its being capable of refutation. For the (knowledge of the) Self is not, in any person's case, adventitious, and is not established through the so-called means of right knowledge; it is rather self-established. The Self does indeed employ perception and the other means of right knowledge for the purpose of establishing previously non-established objects of knowledge; for nobody assumes that such things as other selves can be self-established independently of the means of right knowledge. But the Self, as the abode of the mind-function that acts through the means of right knowledge, is itself established previously to that function. And to refute such a self-established entity is impossible. An adventitious thing, indeed, may be refuted, but not that which is the

essential nature (of him who attempts the refutation); for it is the essential nature of him who refutes. The heat of a fire is not refuted (i.e. sublated) by the fire itself. Let us further consider the relation expressed in the following clauses: 'I know at the present moment whatever is present; I knew (at former moments) the nearer and the remoter past; I shall know (in the future) the nearer and remoter future.' Here the object of knowledge changes accordingly as it is something past or something future or something present; but the knowing agent does not change, since his nature is eternal presence. And as the nature of the Self is 'eternal presence,' it cannot undergo destruction even when the body is reduced to ashes; nay, we cannot even conceive that it ever should become something different from what it is."26 In another part, Samkara * also says that the interior Self (pratyagatman*) is "the object of the notion of the Ego (asmaspratyayavisaya*)" and is well known to exist on account of its "immediate intuitive presentation (aparoksa*)."27

Apparently Samkara was influenced by the idea of Upavarsa*. But, starting from the latter's standpoint, Samkara developed his unique system of thought. According to him, the demonstration of the existence of the Self only proves the existence of the individual embodied self which is the agent of our consciousness, but the existence of the Highest Self or the Brahman cannot be known directly from this demonstration. The Highest Self is not the object of the notion of the ego, for it surpasses all the elements that the individual self has. What can be perceived by the individual self is limited only to the things of the phenomenal world. So Samkara says: "It is only this principle of selfconsciousness (ahamkartr*), the object of the notion of the ego and the agent in all cognition, which accomplishes all actions and enjoys their results."28 Strictly speaking, the agent that has the power to cause the notion of "the ego" is the buddhi within the individual self. "If the buddhi has the power of an agent, it must be admitted that it is also the object of self-consciousness (ahampratyaya*), since we see that everywhere activity is preceded by selfconsciousness, 'I go, I come, I eat, I drink,' etc."29 According to Samkara, it is the buddhi within the individual self that causes the notion of the ego and effects all action in practical existence. The Highest Self, on the other hand, shares no Ego-Consciousness that the individual self has. It is not the object of the notion of the ego, nor is it the agent that causes the notion of the ego. It surpasses all these elements. It is absolute and indivisible. It is so-called absolute knowing. It is beyond the perception of all ordinary people, but it reveals itself to a Yogic ascetic in the state of self-nullifying concentration (samradhana*). "Neither from that part of the Veda which enjoins works (vidhikanda*) nor from reasoning does anybody apprehend that the soul (purusa*),

different from the agent that is the object of self-consciousness, merely witnesses that which is permanent in all transitory beings; uniform; one; eternally unchanging; the Self of everything."30 As we can observe in this quotation from Samkara *, the Highest Self in his sense is beyond the notion of the ego held by the individual self. We should not forget, however, that in his thought the Highest Self is understood to be identical ultimately with the individual self which is known to exist on the ground that every man has an undeniable knowledge of his own existence. Samkara succeeded and relied upon Upavarsa*'s idea of the Self, but he went further than his predecessor and established his own unique system of thought. To the present day, Samkara's philosophy has been accepted by most of the traditional orthodox scholars (Pandits*) of India. And his idea about the Self can rightly claim to be the representative view of most Indian people. Furthermore, similar views are observed in the theological assertions of modern Hinduism. The Cartesian proposition cogito, ergo sum was conceived in Hindu philosophy in a way quite different from the individualistic European view. The Self or the Atman* in the Indian concept does not simply mean that individual souls populate this phenomenal world, each one claiming itself to be distinct from others in spite of its substantial homogeneity with others. But, by the Atman, Indians imply also the Self hidden behind the competing individual souls, or more properly speaking, the Absolute Self shared by every individual soul. In many Indian books of philosophy and religion, the Self means the Absolute Highest Self as well as the individual self. As the form of the word (sol-ips-ism) indicates to us, solipsism in the Western sense is the concept of "Only I am." On the other hand, as a result of their unique concept of the Self, the atmavada* or the Indian theory of the Self-only emphasizes the oneness of all beings in the universe. As we have seen above, Indians acknowledge the Highest Self as being the substratum of the individual soul. It is natural, therefore, that they insist on the oneness or identity of the two. The relation of the individual self and the Highest Self is one of the major problems for philosophers in India, each working out his own conclusions.

Here we shall limit ourselves to the fact that the idea of the avatara* or incarnation is also based on this concept of non-duality between the individual self and the Highest Self. The avatara is the idea that for the salvation of living creatures the Supreme God emerges in this world in the incarnate form of man or animal. In India, this idea of incarnation is most remarkably expressed in the Puranas* and subsequent works. In these works, they relate the multiple avataras* of Visnu*, though the stories of incarnation of other gods like Siva* and Indra are also abundant. The

number of Visnu *'s manifestations is said to be variously six, ten, twelve, sixteen, twenty-two or twenty-three, and is not definitely fixed. Generally the Hindu religionists count the following ten as the avataras* of Visnu: fish, tortoise, boar, man-lion, pigmy, Rama* with the axe, the strong Rama, Krsna*, the Buddha, and Kalki. Visnu, taking those forms, subjugates evil, saves living beings and stands for Brahmanism. In Buddhism, too, the Buddhas and the Bodhisattvas are supposed to have the magical power of revealing themselves in various forms for the salvation of suffering creatures. For instance, they say that the Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara* possessed thirty-three manifestations.

In India, where people hold such a non-dualistic view, monotheism in the Western sense has never come into being. In the Upanisads* and in the philosophical assertion of the Vedantins*, the Absolute Being is assumed to be an impersonal spiritual principle without any limiting attribute. But, because such an abstract principle is far from appropriate as an object of worship for the common people, they desired ardently to have an anthropomorphic god in place of the abstract principle. And as Hinduism supplemented its system by a religious order, one of the gods like Visnu, Siva*, or Krsna* came to be worshipped as the Highest Absolute Being. All the gods other than the Supreme One are supposed to be His avataras. Thus, the Indian worship of the One Supreme God at the same time retains a coloring of pantheism. Indians combine whole-hearted devotional faith together with mysticism of a high intellectual level. And in their religious systems, the element of refined spiritual introspection is mixed with that of primitive vulgar ritual. Indians, however, feel no sense of contradiction in this existence of antagonistic elements in one system. In their way of thinking, these elements can be embraced in one big unity. Here, it can be said that metaphysical monism in their basic way of thinking is aimed to justify this mixture of different elements. Ethics of the Non-Duality of One's Self and Other Selves When most Indians think that each self is essentially identical with others and that the distinction of persons is merely a matter of phenomenal form, it is natural that they look upon the state of non-duality of one's self and others' selves as the ideal. In the Upanisads they teach, "All this thou art,"31 or "I am Brahman."32 And these statements form the core of their ethics. Both Brahmanism and Hinduism are founded on the basis of this view of non-dualism. The philosophical standpoint of Buddhism was considerably different from that of Brahmanism. Buddhism adopted rather the pluralistic view. Buddhists do not acknowledge the individual soul as a metaphysical

entity, so that they attach no importance to the consideration of the relation between a self and other selves. But their ethical ideal has been to remove the barriers among different ages. As we have already seen, Buddhism prescribed that men in the monastic order (Samgha *) live as one body without any personal discrimination. Here, we can say that the Indian view of non-dualism between one and others takes another form of expression in Buddhism. This opinion still prevails in present-day Southern Buddhism. Reverend U. Thittila, a spiritual leader of Southern Buddhists, explaining the fundamental principle of friendliness (metta*), says: "It is metta which attempts to break all the barriers separating one from another. There is no reason to keep aloof from others merely because they belong to another religious persuasion or nationality. The true Buddhist exercises himself with all, making no distinction whatsoever with regard to caste, color, class, or sex."33 Mahayana* philosophers also taught that in the ultimate state one can reach the "transformation of one's neighbor into one's ego (paratma-parivartana*)."34 Things being so, the union of one with others is the ideal in the practical ethics of the Mahayana Buddhists. In the final stage of Indian Buddhism it was claimed that everything is Buddha.35 According to most Indians, respect for life, which is found in any living being, can be logically deduced from nondualism. Non-violence (ahimsa*) is often described as the supreme virtue (parama-dharma).36 Buddhism teaches Not-killing, and most Buddhists extend this prescription to animals. The altruistic virtues and duties have men's respect and help each other to work out their respective spiritual ideals. Every individual, every living being, thus comes to be regarded as a sacred center of potential value, deserving of respect and possessing freedom for progress toward its goal of perfection. An Indian explanation on this point is as follows: "Insofar as the individual is a self, it is a distinct reality; its spiritual freedom is the ultimate end to which its entire life's activities should be directed. But insofar as the self is embodied, and all its activities are through the body, subtle and gross, and the body is an inseparable member and product of the world of Nature, out of which the bodies of other selves also have evolved, there is an indissoluble bond between the embodied individual and all other such individuals forming the social corpus."37 In Indian religious schools, a man is urged to work for "the interests of the public as well as of himself."38 For Indians, truth (satya) means nothing other than the good of all living beings (bhutahita*).39 They think that the good of oneself and others can be realized through one's act of love and mercy. They say, "Benevolence (maitri*) brings happiness and ease to people,"40 or "Even gods make a respectful salutation to merciful (daya*) persons."41 The virtue of benevolence is especially emphasized by

the Buddhists. They teach that we should abandon hatred against others. "For hatred does not cease by hatred at any time: hatred ceases by love, this is an old rule."42 And they urge us to be compassionate to others, men and all other living beings. "As a mother at the risk of her life watches over her own child, so also let everyone cultivate a boundless (friendly) mind towards all beings."43 In another place, they teach that we should render to others a service greater than what we get from our parents and from our relatives.44 This idea of benevolence was developed further at the time of the Mahayana * Buddhists. This trait of benevolence brought about an important effect on some social and economic problems. In the West capital punishment was not necessarily regarded as bad by Christians. Luther, for example, while explicitly condoning the hangman as exercising a tolerable Christian vocation, condemned the late medieval usurers and speculators.45 Buddhists of ancient India, on the other hand, while tolerating money-lending on the basis of reasonable rate, excluded the hangman and the butcher from a list of justified vocations. (This does not hold true of Buddhism in other countries.) The ideal of love and mercy forms one of the characteristics of Indian thought. Some Westerners recently, however, seem not to have fully realized the true nature of this Indian idea. Consciously or not, they hold biased views. And those Western views are accepted without due consideration by the Japanese. To quote Bergson as an example: "Not that Buddhism ignored charity. On the contrary it recommended it in the most exalted terms. And it joined example to precept. But it lacked warmth and glow. As a religious historian very justly puts it, it knew nothing 'of the complete and mysterious gift of self. . . .' That enthusiastic charity, that mysticism comparable to the mysticism of Christianity, we find in a Ramakrishna or a Vivekananda*, to take only the most recent examples. But Christianity, and this is just the point, have come into the world in the interval. . . . But let us suppose even that the direct action of Christianity, as a dogma, has been practically nil in India. Since it has impregnated the whole of Western civilization, one breathes it like a perfume, in everything which this civilization brings in its wake. Industrialism itself, as we shall try to prove, springs indirectly from it. And it was industrialism, it was our Western civilization, which unloosed the mysticism of a Ramakrishna or a Vivekananada." This view of Bergson can be safely taken as one of the common views of Indian religion held among very many Westerners. But, contrary to Bergson's contention, various manuscripts and edicts of ancient India and the records of the foreigners who travelled through the country all present detailed descriptions of the political and social movements of the

ancient Indians which were all based on the idea of benevolence. Bergson, either for lack of knowledge of the historical facts or because of his presumption that complete mysticism appeared only among the Christian mystics, is led to erroneous conclusions about Indian social movements. As historical evidence reveals to us and as the historians confirm, the so-called social welfare policy or charity movement began in Asia earlier than in the Western world. Law books of the ancient Brahmanists refer to many social facilities. And the sacred books of the Buddhists of the earliest time tell us that the kings during Buddha's lifetime, under his influence, advocated a social policy for the welfare of the general public. King Asoka * (c. 250 B.C.) promoted social welfare policy on a still larger scale. He had strong faith in Buddhism and he made efforts to effect rules in conformity with the teachings of the Buddha. He taught the people that magical acts of spell and rites are useless and he persuaded them to have faith in Buddhism. He prohibited people from killing living creatures in the name of sport and from castrating animals. He built charity houses to relieve the poor and went so far as to establish hospitals even for animals. He encouraged the cultivation of medical plants. He protected the minority tribes in the remote regions. He granted amnesty to prisoners. King Asoka's social policy, based on the teachings of the Buddha, was carried on by the Indian people of later periods, and the tradition lasted for a long time.47 The charity movement in the West began at a later date. In one of his historical works, Vincent A. Smith quotes Sir H. Burdett's statement as follows: "[In the West], no establishments for the relief of the sick were founded until the reign of Constantine (A.D. 306–37). Late in the fourth century Basil founded a leper hospital at Caesarea, and St. Chrysostom established a hospital at Constantinople. A law of Justinian (A.D. 527–62) included hospitals among the ecclesiastical institutions. The Maison Dieu or Hôtel Dieu of Paris is sometimes alleged to be the oldest European hospital. It dates from the seventh century."48 In Greek philosophy, there was no element encouraging the development of social welfare services and any charity movement. The Indians are in fact the people who first established the spiritual and social tradition of public welfare service. (We should not forget, however, the fact that the social movement in India was later doomed to stagnation while the Western movement showed remarkable progress especially in the modern age. This problem will be dealt with on another occasion.) The religious leaders in modern India have been striving to restore the spiritual tradition of their ancestors. Romain Rolland writes as follows: "Usually in European thought 'to serve' implies a feeling of voluntary debasement or humility. It is the 'Dienen, dienen' of Kundry in Parsifal.

This sentiment is completely absent from the Vedantism * of Vivekananda*. To serve, to love, is to become equal to the one served or loved. Far from abasement, Vivekananda always regarded it as the fulfillment of life."49 The Indian leaders of national movements emulate Ghandi whose life was in turn guided by the strong religious faith of love and service exemplified by Vivekananda. The tradition of non-dualism of self and other selves continues to shape the attitudes of millions of Indians today.

Subservience to Universals

Subservience to Universals as Revealed in Language

As we have seen, most Indians attach greater importance to universals than to individuals and, with respect to action, they hold the view that one's self is immersed in and identical with others. For Indians, the acts of individuals are not of great importance; they tend to emphasize the power of the universal Being which transcends individuals. This feature of the Indian way of thinking is revealed in their language. In Sanskrit, to describe an act of a person, one is likely to write in the passive as well as in the reflexive form (Atmanepada *). In the Vedic language, the active form is preferred, as in Western writings. But, in the classical Sanskrit, the passive form began to be used instead, and this tendency grew stronger as time passed. In Sanskrit, even intransitive verbs have their passive forms. As a consequence, there are in Sanskrit a great number of passive sentences used impersonally;1 e.g. karmano* hy api boddhavyam (Bhag. G., IV, 16) = . . . = tum ad opus omnino est attendum; kair maya* saha yoddhavyam (Bhag. G. I, 22) = = quibuscum mihi pugnandum. These two sentences may be respectively translated into English as: "For one must understand the nature of action"; and "With whom must I fight? " Sanskrit sentences are written impersonally in the passive mood: the subject is not stated. In the dominant Vedantist* view of the Indians, an act is not ascribed to a particular subject primarily, but is regarded as a changing phenomenon caused by many conditioning factors, and the subject of the action is only one of many factors. It can be said, therefore, that the Indian preference for propositions stated impersonally in the passive form shows a feature of their way of thinking which places importance on unrevealed and hidden power, rather than on the spontaneity of overt individual action.

The Extension of the Subject of Action

As a result of this characteristic of Indian thought which refuses to acknowledge a fixed and substantial subject of action, the moral status of the individual self became a problem, and gave rise to many ideas. The Buddhists theory of "non-self" (anatman *) is one of the oldest of such ideas. Buddhists, as we have seen, do not necessarily deny the existence of the Atman* itself. But, they refuse to recognize any permanent subject of action whether it is the Atman or not. The idea of "non-self" is generally supposed to be a concept unique to Buddhism, but there are in India other schools of thought having a similar view. A sentence in the Maitri*-Upanisad* (3. 2.) for instance, reads as follows: "Like a bird trapped in the net, (the individual ego) binds itself thinking 'It is I (aham)' or 'it is Mine (mama).'" And it exhorts man to free himself from all bondage. The Bhagavadgita* (2. 71) also teaches man not to cling to one's ego saying: The man who casts off all desires and walks without desire, with no thought of a Mine (nirmama) or of an I (nirahankara*) comes unto peace."2 A theory of "non-self" is also found in a book of the Samkhya* where we read that the individual soul (purusa*) is delivered from attachments when it has attained "the pure and complete wisdom" that "I am not; (Nothing) is mine; and (Nothing) is I."3 The Samkhya supposes the Purusa, which is identical to the Atman, to be a unique metaphysical principle. On this point, their doctrine is in essence quite different from the Buddhist theory of "non-self." However, so far as the expression of their doctrine is concerned, they are very close to the Buddhists. Bhartrhari*, in his metaphysical study of the Word, asserts a kind of "non-self" theory. According to him, the Word is the subject of cognition—the Atman or the Absolute Being. And just as one projects one's image on the wall, the Word, which is the subject of cognition, projects itself objectively on the screen within itself and perceives its own image, viz. the Word as the object. This is cognition in Bhartrhari's sense. What serves as the screen in the case of the Word is the internal organ (antahkarana*) which performs the apperceptive function (buddhi). The Buddhi is in reality no more than the screen reflecting the image of Absolute Being and has no active power in itself.

In short, cognition is understood to be only one phase of the self-evolving process of the Absolute Being—of the Word which divides itself into two parts, one as the subjective knower and the other as the object, and unfolds itself in a process of mutual interrelation. Bhartrhari explains action in the same way as he explains cognition.4 This may be considered an expression of the "non-self" theory. It is erroneous to maintain that the idea of "non-self" and ideas similar to it are popular in India apart from its metaphysical thinkers.

However, it should be noted that in no other country has the idea of "non-self" developed into such various forms as we see in India where a metaphysical way of thinking pervades the spiritual background for the growth of such ideas. Because they were apt to suppose that the action of an individual is supervised and regulated by an invisible power so that the action, having no creative function in itself, is no more than an attribute of the self, most Indians have been inclined to take a submissive attitude toward their fate and conditions. The ideas of Karma and Samsara * are still deeply imbedded in the minds of most Indian people. And a man of a lowly family in India is likely to be resigned to his fate, simple expecting to be reborn under more favorable circumstances in the next life. And here it is assumed that the ultimate subject of action is not the individual but a Reality beyond and above the individual.

Because of their basic emphasis on a super-individual Being, Indians assert that the idea or action of a person is universally valid if it conforms to the True and Universal Law. And it does not matter for them whose idea or action it is. It is not seldom in India that a book and its commentary are published at the same time; not infrequently, the two are composed by one and the same author. Indians claim that their books, which reveal the eternal truth, deserve to be handed down to posterity for ages without modification. And commentaries are necessary in order to make others understand the truth expounded in their books. For ancient Indian scholars, therefore, it was never regarded as strange to write commentaries on their own works.

In India there are many forged manuscripts, though there are, of course, many such also in China and in Western countries. But far exceeding anything like it in other countries, there exist in India a great many books claiming to be the works of ancient saints. Almost all the religious scriptures which mention the names of the authors are spurious documents. This sort of forgery is understandable in the light of the tendency of most Indians toward self-effacement and philosophical minimization of the importance of unique individuals. All the Mahayana* texts claim unduly to be "the Buddha's discourse." They are forgeries in the sense that they were not expounded directly from the